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 ABSTRACT 
 The Muhammad1
Together, these rhetorical artifacts allow for analysis of the product of the 
worldviews as expressed through the cartoons, multiplied by the values and traditions 
of the interlocutors, and multiplied by the amplification of the conflict through 
televised broadcasts. Dramatizations by parties at the center of the controversy 
 Cartoon Controversy was unique to all other art 
controversies involving the melding of the sacred and the profane. And it differed 
from all art conflicts prior to it in that it was global in scope; engaged millions of 
people in protest (peaceful and violent); and resulted in property damage, economic 
disaster, the loss of good will between nations, and the loss of life. Following 
publication of the cartoons, a debate about freedom of expression vs. religious 
sensibilities swept the globe.  
 This study is an exploration into how the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy 
unfolded at three critical thresholds of the conflict’s development vis-à-vis a 
comprehensive examination of the scope of the phenomenon. First, this study focuses 
a lens on critical communications that transpired in Denmark among key figures 
engaged in the conflict. Second, the interviews of Flemming Rose provide insight into 
how the conflict was dramatized by Jyllands-Posten and Flemming Rose for 
international dissemination. Third, the televised broadcasts provide examples of how 
the controversy was dramatized for American audiences.  
                                                 
1 Out of respect for the religious sensibilities of readers, where the name Muhammad and the term 
Prophet appear in this work the phrase Peace Be Upon Him is understood.  
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affected how the phenomenon was perceived in Denmark and Europe. How the 
controversy was framed in mediated discourse resulted in a different, more toxic, 
interpretation of the conflict for American audiences. The ultimate purpose of this 
study is to determine what lessons learned can be applied to ameliorate future 
international conflicts involving disparate value systems.  
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The corrective of the scientific 
rationalization would seem necessarily 
to be a rationale of art—not, however, a 
performer’s art, not a specialist’s art for 
some to produce and many to observe, 
but an art in its widest aspects, an art of 
living
CHAPTER ONE  
Symbolic Disequilibrium 
.  
-- Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change: 
An Anatomy of Purposes, 1984, emphasis in 
original. 
The publication of cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad sparked a 
debate over whether respect for religious sensibilities trumps free expression of ideas, 
or vice versa. Moderate Muslims condemned the violent protests that erupted in 
response to the publications, but also questioned why the cartoons were published, 
first in the Danish newspaper Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten (Jyllands-Posten), the 
country’s largest daily, then in several other European newspapers that reprinted the 
images in a show of solidarity. Supporters of the cartoons cited them as a legitimate 
exercise of the right of free speech. They argued that the satire of religion is a 
Western tradition and that artistic expression, in the form of the Muhammad 
Cartoons, underscored the issue of upholding long-held traditions in a period of 
extremist terrorism. Ardent critics described the cartoons as blasphemous and 
Islamophobic, with the rhetorical intent of humiliating Muslims. Reflecting on the 
nation’s history, Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen identified the cartoon 
controversy as Denmark’s worst international crisis since World War II (Saunders, 
2008, p. 14).  
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This study is an exploration into how the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy 
unfolded at three critical thresholds in the conflict’s development rather than a 
comprehensive examination of the scope of the phenomenon. First, this study focuses 
a lens on critical communications that transpired in Denmark among key figures 
engaged in the conflict. Second, the interviews of Flemming Rose provide insight into 
how the conflict was dramatized by Jyllands-Posten and Flemming Rose for 
international dissemination. Third, the televised broadcasts provide examples of how 
the controversy was dramatized for American audiences. Together, these rhetorical 
artifacts allowed for analysis of the product of the worldviews as expressed through 
the cartoons, multiplied by the values and traditions of the interlocutors, and 
multiplied by the amplification of the conflict through television broadcasts. The 
ultimate purpose of this study is to determine what lessons learned can be applied to 
ameliorate future international conflicts involving disparate value systems. This work 
is intentionally interdisciplinary and draws upon the work of scholars, journalists, and 
commentators from the international community.  
In this study, I conduct a rhetorical analysis of the Muhammad Cartoon 
Controversy to provide an understanding of how discourse surrounding the 
phenomenon defined debates in the media. Rhetorical studies on the Muhammad 
Cartoon Controversy in newspapers and television broadcasts have been recognized 
previously. But what has not been understood are the rhetorical strategies employed 
to frame the rhetoric of individuals and groups at the nexus of the controversy, as well 
as the contribution of moderate Muslim voices to the debate.   
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The function of rhetorical strategies employed by interlocutors on either side 
of the debate point to the need for insight into the nature of public discourse involving 
cardinal values that are rooted in disparate cultures. In an increasingly global society 
cross-cultural interaction is on the rise as is the potential for misunderstanding aided 
by technology that makes rhetoric anywhere in the world immediately available. 
Thus, analysis of any past controversy about cultural issues and failures to address 
cultural values can provide guidance for dealing with future potential controversies. 
Specifically, this chapter begins with a background on the controversy, and then 
moves to a literature review. It is followed by an overview of the study.  
Anatomy of the Controversy 
The cartoon controversy erupted following the publication of twelve cartoons 
depicting Islam’s Prophet Muhammad in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten on 
September 30, 2005. The paper published the images as a check on self-censorship 
when a Danish author of a children’s book, Kare Bluitgen, could not find an 
illustrator to depict the Prophet. Publication of the cartoons was problematic because 
depiction of the Prophet is prohibited. The prohibition is observed by Muslims world-
wide; illustrations by Muslims and non-Muslims alike are deemed highly offensive. 
There is no explicit edict against depiction found in the Koran (cited in Schacht, 
1982) but the Hadith, recorded sayings and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad that are 
orally handed down by an uninterrupted chain of transmissions (isnad), admonishes 
Muslims not to depict any living creature.   
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It was in response to Kare Bluitgen’s situation that Flemming Rose, cultural 
editor of Jyllands-Posten, searched for illustrators to publish cartoons to demonstrate 
the right to free speech (Rose, 2006). Twelve of the 25 members of the Association of 
Danish Cartoonists responded (2006). Danish Muslims protested the publication. 
Ambassadors from Muslim countries and the Palestinian representative in Denmark 
sought to meet with Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen who declined, stating 
“the Danish government has no means of influencing the press” (Muslim 
Ambassadors, 2005; Rasmussen, 2005). He directed them to seek redress through the 
court (Rasmussen, 2005).  
A Danish Muslim coalition brought a criminal complaint against Jyllands-
Posten and brought the issue to the attention of a delegation of Muslim religious and 
political leaders convened in Saudi Arabia (Fattah, 2006, February 9). Amid backlash 
from Muslim organizations worldwide, media outlets of numerous European 
countries published the cartoons in a show of solidarity. Editors of Jordanian 
newspapers who published the images were arrested, gag orders were issued to 
prevent publication in much of the Muslim world, and foreign publications containing 
the offending images were barred from entering their countries ("Prophet Cartoons 
Row", 2006).  
To better understand the cartoon conflict it is helpful to survey the political 
and social conditions in Denmark just prior to and at the time of the publication of the 
Muhammad cartoons. By the end of the 20th century, the influx of a substantial 
Muslim population had resulted in some tension between Muslims and the rest of 
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society (Bureau of Democracy, 2005). A 2004 report by the International Helsinki 
Federation for Human Rights concluded that “the overall political climate for 
Muslims [in Denmark] has deteriorated since 2001” (2005). Tensions between 
Muslims and Danish society began to find expression in policy reforms that targeted 
the Muslim community. 
In November 2001 Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s right-leaning 
government was elected, “riding a wave of popular anger about rising immigration” 
(Sullivan, 2005). “Nearly overnight, the government reversed Denmark’s generous 
immigration policies” (2005). Rasmussen’s minority government includes the Danish 
Peoples Party. Founded in 1995, the Danish Peoples Party managed to put aliens 
policy, integration of immigrants and refugees, and the issues of the multi-ethnic and 
multi-religious society vis-à-vis the Danish national identity at the center of the 
political agenda (Bille, 2006). They increased their number of seats in Parliament, the 
Folketing, from thirteen to 22 at the General Election in 2001 and to 24 in 2005 
(2006). The 2001 and 2005 elections were historic because right-of-center parties 
together gained a majority for the first time since 1929 (2006).  
The Folketing’s principal functions are the reading and passing of bills 
together with the control of government and administration (Bille, 2006). Denmark, 
like some other western European nations, maintains hate speech and blasphemy laws 
that played a role in the government’s involvement in the Muhammad Cartoon 
Controversy (Winfield, 2006). The hate speech law in Section 266(b) of the Criminal 
Code punishes “any person who, publicly…makes a statement…insulting or 
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degrading a group of persons on account of their race…or belief.…” (cited in 
Winfield, 2006). Denmark also maintains a blasphemy law for which offenders may 
be imprisoned for up to four months (2006). Section 140 of the Criminal Code 
punishes “any person who, in public, ridicules or insults the dogmas or worship of 
any lawfully existing religious community….” (cited in Winfield, 2006). As this 
broadly worded legislation criminalizes offensive expression, the government was 
thus “specifically empowered to prosecute any news organization that published copy 
mocking or scorning Islamic doctrines or acts of worship” (Winfield, 2006). 
However, the Crown’s Prosecutor, Henning Fode, upheld the regional prosecutor’s 
ruling which held that the drawings published in Jyllands-Posten on September 30, 
2005 did not violate bans on racist and blasphemous speech ("No Charges for Paper", 
2006).  
Denmark’s population is approximately 5.4 million (Bureau of Democracy, 
2005). In January 2005, 83.2 percent of the population belonged to the official 
Evangelical Lutheran Church (2005). The Lutheran faith is taught in the public 
schools and approximately twelve percent of the Church’s revenue comes from state 
subsidies (2005). “Members of other faiths, most notably Catholics, have argued that 
the system is unfair, and that the Government does not provide religious equality, 
despite providing religious freedom” (2005). Denmark’s second largest religious 
community is Muslim, approximately 3.5 percent of the population (180,000 persons) 
(2005).  
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Governmental support is extended to the private sector of Danish society as 
well. For example, Kare Bluitgen, the Danish author who unsuccessfully sought 
illustrators to depict the Prophet Muhammad for his children’s book reported that he 
lives on Biblioteksafgiften (a yearly sum paid to Danish writers by the state) (Sekkai, 
2008). He contended that Denmark needs his most recent publication, a translation of 
the Koran with illustrations of Muhammad’s life, arguing that “with the growing 
number of Muslims in Demark, the Koran has become an important book” (2008). 
Popular support of Rasmussen’s coalition center-right Government suggests a 
symbiotic relationship between the anti-immigration government and the citizenry. 
During its election campaign in February 2005, Rasmussen’s Government was 
successfully re-elected to a four-year term (Bureau of Democracy, 2005). It affirmed 
its commitment to pursuing and promoting effective integration policies intended to 
address “disproportionately high crime rates and unemployment among immigrants 
from Islamic countries (and other ethnic minorities in Denmark)” (2005). A survey 
found that in 2005, 80 percent of Danes supported new laws to battle terrorism and 
control immigration (Sullivan, 2005).  
The Muhammad Cartoon Controversy unfolded in the tense atmosphere 
following 9/11. Portrayals of Muslims as intolerant and backward terrorists in the 
news and popular media caused many to feel that their culture and religion were 
under attack. Seeing the drawings as a direct attack on their values, some Muslims 
called the publications a “hate program”(Ghattas, 2006). There was, and continues to 
be, displeasure with American occupation of Iraq and the handling of the war (Fattah, 
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2006, February 9), including the atrocities at Abu Ghraib. Officials of some Muslim 
countries and the U.S. military suspected that extremist groups exploited the 
controversy by inciting protestors to riot around the world ("4 More Afghan Deaths", 
2006).  Another belief of some Western government officials was that Arab 
governments exploited the conflict to undercut the appeal of Western democracy to 
Arab citizens (Stewart, 2006). Despite the tense atmosphere, the U.S. fight to win the 
hearts and minds of Muslims in favor of democratic reform across the Middle East 
was ongoing even as widespread publication of the images set off the global firestorm 
(Kaplan, 2005). 
While there were peaceful protests in response to the publications in many 
parts of the world, widespread protests in other parts of the world resulted in 
destruction of property, violence, and death. Several Muslim countries boycotted 
Danish products, imports were banned, and ambassadors withdrawn (Williams & 
Born, 2006). On January 30, 2006, Jyllands-Posten published a statement saying that 
it regretted offending Muslims, but stood by its decision to publish the cartoons 
(Sullivan, 2006). The Danish Prime Minister called on all parties to abstain from 
aggravating the dispute further and sought dialogue with Muslims to resolve the 
conflict. Moderate Muslim leaders and intellectuals invited public debate on issues 
underlying the controversy as they called on protestors to stop rioting (Tanz-Flaum, 
2006). Instead, they called for peaceful solutions to resolve this controversy over 
religious sensibilities vs. freedom of artistic expression.  
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Controversial Artistic Expression 
The arts have provided an important avenue for expression for previously 
marginalized groups. Expression of their collective identity and what they desire have 
been immortalized in various media (Dubin, 1992, p. 2). Such works document social 
change and register a response to what has occurred. Largely, 20th and 21st
Several distinct conditions heighten the probability of art controversies. One is 
the nature of the subject (Dubin, 1992, p. 11). The extent to which the work either 
displays satisfactory categorical fit or violates understood and accepted beliefs is 
determinative in whether the artifact is accepted or rejected. Rejection is more likely 
 century art 
controversies have been symbolic struggles since it is easier for marginalized groups 
to establish a presence in the “world of making images” than it is for them to affect 
the equitability of the relatively unyielding realm of organizations, institutions and 
political structures (p. 3). Art also functions to “push-back” change from the status 
quo. This battle has been “engaged in the cultural sphere” by opponents of change 
“because it is somewhat more acceptable…to assail a group’s speech or their images 
of themselves than it is to attack them directly” (p. 3, emphasis in original). 
Moreover, reluctance toward change finds its expression in the creation of images 
that rearticulate staid notions and representations. And fear of displacement can find 
its expression in artistic endeavors that attempt to define new groups that pose a threat 
to the status quo. These battles confirm that significant social conflicts may have been 
relocated to the cultural realm, but they have merely been reassigned, not resolved (p. 
3). 
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when art blends together what social conventions generally separate (p. 11). Two is 
the degree of fit between the audience and the work. What is legitimate in one setting 
and before certain audiences may be devalued when it is thrust before others (p. 11). 
Inseparable from this notion is the question of what discourse individuals bring with 
them when they evaluate art. When critics carry a frame of reference they have 
derived primarily from within the contemporary art world, they may dislike a certain 
creation but it may not lead them to discount the entire category of art (p. 11). But 
when convictions originate in other social spheres, e.g., politics or religion, a creation 
that violates what is viewed as sacred can cause the critic to see the entire category of 
art as “irreversibly befouled”(p. 11). Finally, add to this combination fundamental 
social and demographic shifts along with generally unsettled social conditions and 
there is fertile ground in which art controversies may germinate (p. 11). 
The eruption of art controversies requires the “combination of two critical 
elements: there must be a sense that values have been threatened, and power must be 
mobilized in response to do something about it” (Dubin, 1992, p. 6). In his 
compendium on art controversies involving elite and popular, and performing and 
visual art forms from 1988-1992, Dubin posited that there are situations in which 
conditions are insufficient for art controversies (p. 7). For example, although critical 
values are assailed in certain instances, the failure to arouse people and to consolidate 
resources consigns some potentially contentious situations to the domain of 
nonevents.  
This may be due to the paucity of leaders who have established their 
credibility or amassed followings, a lack of preexisting organizational 
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expertise, or community fatigue or disinterest because of other circumstances. 
In such instances what might otherwise explode, instead fizzles” (p. 7) 
 
What can be drawn from art controversies generally, and the Muhammad 
Cartoon Controversy in particular, is that artists affect the broader world and social 
conditions influence artistic expression. Threats to religious dogma, a changing 
political climate, a shortage of resources, a desire to inflate archaic images of 
marginalized groups, fear of displacement, and other social struggles are reflected in 
artistic expression that can give rise to controversy. Important to understanding 
controversies involving religious iconography in artistic expression is the knowledge 
that religion is the source of the most basic and enduring values of a society (Dubin, 
1992, p. 79). Artwork that violates sacrosanct values signals a challenge to those 
values. The challenge registers as a threat to core values. And efforts to defend basic 
values result in conflict. 
Contemporary art has dealt extensively with threats to the religious values of 
various faiths. Blending the divine with the mundane; representing holy persons or 
religious narratives in a manner that is incongruent with a given faith; or violating the 
prohibition of depicting a religion’s adherents, holy persons, or other living creatures 
have routinely sparked art conflicts. Such works are found valuable and non-offensive 
by some, worthless and offensive by others, worthwhile but offensive by a few. One 
argument by opponents of such works is that they could affect behavior, belief, or 
knowledge and perception of the faith in question. The remainder of this literature 
review provides examples of artistic expression involving religious subject matter that 
have sparked controversies. We will see that, as in the case of the Muhammad 
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cartoons, art and piety is an intersection where religious sensibilities and freedom of 
expression collide. 
The Sacred and the Profane 
Mircea Eliade is credited with being the first to employ the use of the terms 
“sacred” and “profane” to classify religious experience (Lee, 2006, p. 15). He posited 
that the manifestation of the “sacred” is something of a wholly different order, a 
reality that does not belong to our world, in objects that are an integral part of our 
natural “profane” world (Eliade, 1959, p. 11). Durkheim extended this notion by 
stating that “sacred things are things protected and isolated by prohibitions; profane 
things are those things to which the prohibitions are applied and that must keep at a 
distance from what is sacred” (Durkheim, 1995, p. 38). For some groups, the 
depiction of venerable religious figures in art violates this protective order.  
Traditionally, sacred art functioned to translate religious experience into a 
concrete, representational form by seeking to make the invisible visible (Eliade, 
1986a, p. 55). But artists are no longer interested in traditional religious imagery and 
symbolism (Eliade, 1986b, p. 82). And while offensive and obscene elements have 
always existed in art, contemporary art exhibits an insistent and progressive 
exploration of the forbidden frontiers of the human experience (Iannone, 1990). 
Works such as ‘Christ is risen’ brought the artist and the Baltic Centre for 
Contemporary Art under fire (2008). Terrence Koh’s plaster model of Jesus with an 
erection drew a measured response from the Reverend Christopher Warren of St. 
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Mary’s cathedral in Newcastle who stated that “to interpret [Christ] in a sexualized 
way is an affront to all we hold dear” (cited in Grant, 2008, p. 56).  
A major theme of religious dogma is man’s mortality, the notion that man has 
his beginnings on earth as descendants of the gods (De Wall Malefijt, 1986, p. 165). 
This explanation stresses “man’s mortality and his separation from the divine” 
(1986). In the history of human thought “the sacred and the profane are always and 
everywhere conceived by the human intellect as separate genera, as two worlds with 
nothing in common” (Durkheim, 1995, p. 36). Encounters between man and the 
divine in artistic expression that violate the void that separates the two can ignite 
dramas that are played out in society. The ‘Christ is risen’ exhibit incited one 
Newcastlelander to say that “if other religious characters were portrayed like this 
there would be riots” (2008).  
Sculptor Edwina Sandys considers ‘Christa’ to be her most influential work 
(Gillis, 2008). The 1975 bronze poses a female nude in the posture generally reserved 
for the crucified Christ. The sculpture was created during the height of feminist 
activities in the United States and Europe and “seems to comment on the patriarchal 
traditions of Christianity and the traditionally male-oriented purview of western 
culture” (Meyer, Spring 1997). By the early 1970s, a feminist coalition began to 
challenge long-held views concerning the place of women in religions defined by 
centuries of patriarchal interpretation (Meyer, Spring 1997, p. 20). When the work 
was unveiled in the Episcopal Cathedral of St. John the Divine in Manhattan in 1984, 
“gasps could be heard throughout the main chapel” (HP-Time.com, 1984). That the 
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work was controversial was echoed in the comments of two female parishioners. On 
the one hand, one thought ‘Christa’ was “not at all blasphemous” reflecting that it 
portrayed a mystic Christian view that “sees Christ as our mother” of the church 
(1984). On the other hand, another woman stated “It's disgraceful. God and Christ are 
male. They’re playing with a symbol we’ve believed in for all our lives” (1984). 
Emotions were mixed but rarely mild.  
To New York Suffragan Bishop Walter Dennis, it was a “desecration” of 
Christian symbols. He urged parishioners to write the diocese’s presiding 
bishop, the Rt. Rev. Paul Moore Jr., “if it shocks you as much as it did me.” 
Cathedral Dean James Parks Morton, who organized the display with Moore’s 
concurrence, responded that the effort to “send a positive message to women” 
had upset only the same people who oppose ordination for women. (1984) 
 
Eliade reminds us that “artistic endeavor inspired by divine subject matter seeks  
to demonstrate the nature of the gods and their creations” (Eliade, 1986a, p. 58). 
Clifford Geertz notes that works embodying religious symbols, which are 
“historically created vehicles of reasoning, perception, feeling, and understanding,” 
give meaning to existence by modeling the world as it is or as it ought to be (cited in 
De Wall Malefijt, 1986, p. 269). ‘Christa’ “reverses gender in title and image” and 
refocuses the lens on traditions of “sin as female-generated and salvation as male-
engendered” (Meyer, Spring 1997, p. 20).  
Martin Scorsese’s (1988) film “The Last Temptation of Christ” depicts Christ 
as vulnerable, riddled with self-doubt, given to anger and sexual desire, and at times 
haughty. Such a display of human frailty in a divine symbol of perfection exhibits 
illicit intercourse between the “sacred” and the “profane.” According to Durkheim, 
“the mind experiences deep repugnance about mingling, even simple contact, 
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between the corresponding things, because the notion of the sacred is always and 
everywhere separate from the notion of the profane” (Durkheim, 1995, p. 37). The 
aversion is particularly acute among the Abrahamic religious traditions.  
Scorsese met wide-spread praise among members of the film community for 
his controversial take on Christ as fully human and fully divine (Burton, 2008, p. 33). 
But the proximity of the two genera without their having been morphed into one is 
what “drew enormous negative attention in many religious circles” (Greydanus, 
2001). Steven Greydanus, who writes film criticism informed by his Christian faith, 
called the film “deliberately iconoclastic, self-consciously contrary to traditional 
Christian understanding, [and] calculated for shock value” (2001).   
For a director of significant stature, the script and production quality of 
Scorsese’s film should have drawn more rebuke than the subject matter (Scorsese, 
1988). Perhaps the quality was intentional in order to impress on the subconscious of 
the audience that the narrative is an exploration into the notion that the Messiah was 
more human than our idealized notion of one who is destined to save mankind. The 
disclaimer at the start of the film and Scorsese’s expertise support this hypothesis. 
However, neither the disclaimer that the film is not based on scripture and is 
exploratory, nor the highly stylized presentation of the subject matter allowed 
Scorsese to escape the conflict surrounding the film. Regardless of presentational 
style, the melding of the “sacred” and the “profane” in artistic expression has the 
potential to influence beliefs, values, and understanding of the world. And when 
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artistic expression combines what society traditionally separates the ground is tilled 
for controversy.  
Visualizing the Sacred 
When artists disregard prohibitions against visualizing the sacred 
controversies can erupt that may be dramatized in the broader society. It should be 
noted that “all religions have in common the embodiment of sacred beliefs” (De Wall 
Malefijt, 1986, p. 145). Consequently, there have been instances where the very act of 
portraying the sacred has created controversy even though the representations did not 
alter the traditions of the faith. And for some religious groups it is accepted truth that 
neither the sacred nor the mundane are to be replicated in artistic expression. The 
nature of the prohibition is usually connected with the notion of not creating graven 
images which could potentially become an object of worship. This practice is found 
most often in religions of the Abrahamic tradition—Judaism, Islam, and 
Christianity—based on the injunction commanding followers not to make “any 
graven images, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the 
earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth” (Exodus 20:4 Holy Bible, second 
commandment, n.d., emphasis in original). The various religious traditions practice 
this admonition to varying degrees. Sects of a particular faith may adhere to the 
practice while others may not. Temporal considerations, geographic region, and 
interpretation of the command are factors in whether and to what degree the 
prohibition is applied.  
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Two instances illustrate the conflict that arises when the prohibition is broken: 
Nussenzweig v. diCorcia and the production of the film, “Muhammad, Messenger of 
God.” In 2005, Erno Nussenzweig filed a lawsuit against Philip-Lorca diCorcia, a 
photographer, and the Pace/MacGill Gallery in New York seeking both a permanent 
injunction to prevent the defendants from using a photograph taken of him while 
walking on a public street in New York, and damages for the prior use of that 
photograph (Goldstein, 2008). Nussenzweig stated that he is an “Hasidic Jew with 
deeply held religious beliefs that are violated by defendants’ use of the photograph,” 
citing the Second Commandment prohibition as evidence (2008). In an affidavit 
submitted to the court, a chief curator of photography argued that “if the law forbids 
artists to exhibit and sell photographs made in public places without the consent” of 
the subjects “then artistic expression…would suffer drastically” (Gefter, 2006). He 
reasoned that the calculated participation of the subjects would alter the naturalness 
sought after in the works of art. 
Supporting the curator’s contention, the photographer, Philip-Lorca diCorcia, 
argued that “there is no way the [collection of] images could have been made with the 
knowledge and cooperation of the subjects” (Gefter, 2006). Professional 
photographers watched development of the case closely “claiming equally high moral 
stakes” (2006). The court dismissed Nussenzweig’s case on the procedural ground 
that the statute of limitations had run out although the court was “sensitive to the 
plaintiff’s distress” (Goldstein, 2008). On appeal, the Supreme Court of New York 
upheld the decision of the lower court ("Nussenzweig v. Philip-Lorca diCorcia, et 
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al.," 2007 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3636).
 One other situation where accurate representation in artistic endeavor was 
sought to be prohibited was the production of the film “The Passion of the Christ” 
(Gibson, 2003). Mel Gibson, director, reports that he attempted to provide a dramatic, 
artistic, and realistic depiction of “events leading up to and surrounding the 
crucifixion of Jesus Christ” (Brown, Keeler, & Lindvall, 2007, p. 91). Before the film 
was released, some Jewish groups and various scholars denounced the film for its 
 Deciding the case on a procedural ground 
demonstrates the Court’s reluctance to set precedent on conflicts involving the 
freedom of artistic expression vs. respect for religious sensibilities. This posture 
speaks to the problem that courts face when trying to balance freedom of speech and 
freedom of religion, both constitutionally guaranteed rights in America. The problem 
is that either courts lack the capacity to decide these types of cases on the issues or 
courts are not the best forum for resolving such disputes, or perhaps both. 
The production of the film “Muhammad, Messenger of God” drew the ire of a 
group of Muslims (Akkad, 1977; Arnold & Turan, 1977). Many Muslim scholars 
were outraged by the film though the Syrian-born Muslim producer, Mustapha 
Akkad, observed the prohibition against representations of the Prophet (Steyn, 2006). 
Responding to objections by an ad hoc committee of New York area Islamic groups 
to alleged historical distortions and inaccuracies, Akkad invited them all to see the 
movie (Arnold & Turan, 1977). He challenged them stating that “if they can find one 
inaccuracy, historical or religious, I will destroy the film” (1977). The producer 
indicated that they all refused to view the film (1977). 
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portrayal of Jews (2007). The film was described as displaying a disturbing and 
gratuitous use of violence toward Jesus by Jews (Burton, 2008, p. 27). Gibson 
acknowledged that he “showed as much violence as people [were] able to bear” but 
argued that “the crucifixion was actually more violent” than what he depicted 
(Brown, et al., 2007, p. 94). In his study, John Pawlikowski argued that the film could 
have conceivably rekindled post-Biblical Christian anti-Semitism because of its 
portrayal of Jews as responsible for Jesus’ death (Pawlikowski, 2004). Vatican 
officials praised the film, insisting that it was theologically accurate and not anti-
Semitic and an endorsement from Billy Graham heightened the film’s credibility 
(Brown, et al., 2007, p. 93).  
A principal concern of opponents of visualizing the sacred in artistic 
expression is the potential for the artistic endeavor to influence the beliefs and 
behavior of individuals in society. As Geertz pointed out, religious symbols provide 
meaning to existence by providing a model of the world as it is and a model for the 
world as it ought to be (cited in De Wall Malefijt, 1986, p. 269). Admittedly, Gibson 
attempted to reach the “unchurched” and evangelize via his film (Brown, et al., 2007, 
p. 91). Pawlikowski posits that artists have historically “assisted the implantation of 
the negative image[s] of Jews and Judaism into the prevailing ethos of Christian 
societies” (2004). The practice of disregarding prohibitions against visualizing the 
sacred, and in some cases the mundane, can lead to controversies of varying 
magnitude and breadth that are dramatized in the broader society.  
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Representations and the War of Words 
The artistic expressions that set off the firestorm known as the Muhammad 
Cartoon Controversy or Danish Cartoon Controversy disregard the proscription 
against melding the sacred with the profane and violate prohibitions against 
visualizing the sacred. The twelve cartoons, first published in Jyllands-Posten then in 
other newspapers in a show of solidarity, depict the Prophet Muhammad, revered by 
Muslims around the world, with an ignited bomb for a turban in one instance and with 
horns in another (Gudmundsson, 2006). A long-standing Islamic tradition prohibits 
the depiction of the Prophet Muhammad, under any circumstances (Ghosh, 2006). 
The juxtaposition of a religious figure and symbols of corruption in knowing 
violation of the prohibition against depiction provides insight into the worldviews of 
the artists and the publisher. 
The act of creating cartoons that are considered blasphemous by the second 
largest population in Danish society may have caused conflict only on a local level if, 
for example, the images had been only on pubic display at a local venue—requiring 
knowledge of the exhibit and a trip to the site to view them. But unlike localized 
controversies over artistic expressions such as ‘Christa,’ the Nussenzweig case, 
“Muhammad, Messenger of God,” and the other controversies noted above, the 
Muhammad Cartoon Controversy was international in scope. The difference in the 
scale of this controversy is attributable to how the conflict was dramatized in the 
broader society. The publication of the cartoons in Jyllands-Posten, republication by 
European newspapers in a show of solidarity, and coverage of the conflict by major 
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broadcast and newspaper outlets brought this controversy over artistic expression vs. 
religious sensibilities to the desktop and doorstep of households around the globe.  
While the media has had a greater presence during military conflict, it has 
played an even larger role in information warfare to the degree that they have become 
participant observers on the international scene. The media’s ability to influence 
public opinion and set the parameters for how the masses understand events plays a 
major role in how events are perceived and world views are constructed. Perceptions 
and world views in turn affect the outcome of events. The media has functioned to 
bring audiences closer to the epicenter of international conflicts such as the cartoon 
controversy and have become necessary sources of information as international 
conflicts unfold. The media can also contribute to resolving potential or existing 
conflicts. How the media portray conflicts and more generally how the media 
contribute to cultural awareness or fuel misunderstanding is the subject of research by 
several scholars. 
During the years since the eruption of the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy 
there has been a growing body of literature on the relationship between the media and 
international conflict in the 21st century. Douai (2007) examined how the Arab 
television outlets Al Jazeera and Al Arabia framed the Muhammad Cartoon 
Controversy and what space was occupied by the re-emerging “clash of civilizations” 
frame. Huntington’s post-Cold War “clash” hypothesis identifies the dominating 
source of conflict as cultural rather than primarily ideological or economic 
(Huntington, 1993, p. 22). His notion of “civilization” differentiates people by 
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history, language, tradition, and “most important[ly], religion,” produced over 
centuries and which will not disappear soon (p. 23). According to Huntington, more 
frequent interaction between people of different civilizations increases awareness of 
the existence of similarities and differences (p. 23). Although Huntington’s thesis is 
controversial, it is true that issues and conflicts in numerous parts of the world 
resulting from increased immigration are on the rise. The immigration of a large 
number of Muslims to Denmark led to tensions between Muslims and the broader 
society which led to this controversy over artistic expressions of religious subject 
matter. Douai posited that: 
the media represent a key player in the cartoon controversy as both “cause” 
and “effect” at the same time. The “causal” aspect narrowly lies in the 
publication of those controversial cartoons whereas the “effect” aspects center 
on media practices, specifically in the conversations about free expression that 
the controversy subsequently engendered. (p. 23) 
 
Douai suggested that the primary and supplemental frames utilized by Al 
Jazeera and Al Arabia created a “meta-narrative” frame that subsumed “all pre-
existing frames”  into a frame of “transgression” (p. 21). This frame “sympathetically 
reinvents the debate of the place of the sacred in the modern media environment” (p. 
23). The modern media portrayed the global Umma (Islamic community) as united in 
its outrage and sought to “justify” and legitimize the outrage of an empowered 
“helpless” community (p. 22). Douai found that while Huntington’s “clash of 
civilizations” thesis was mentioned by both networks, it did not rise to the level of a 
meta-narrative because the notion was conjoined with an emphasis on “dialogue of 
civilizations” in “a conscious effort” to “circumvent” the clash paradigm (p. 24). 
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While Douai’s study informs our understanding of how the Arab media framed the 
Muhammad Cartoon Controversy, it does not apprise us of the rhetorical strategies 
employed in creation of the frames affecting the potential reading of the controversy.   
Like Douai, Powers (2008) argued that the media played a large role in 
problematizing the phenomenon. In particular, technological advancements in 
Western broadcast media have assisted in the shaping of broader public attitudes, 
opinions, and ideologies that are at the core of international tensions. New 
technologies allow for development of “mediatized public crises”—the construction 
and propagation of stories “through a series of discernable phases...in order to explain 
the course of events over a given period of time” (p. 11). Such “mediatized public 
crises” are “social dramas” that are “narrated by media through the deployment of 
deeply cultural and ideological stories and conventions” (p. 12). Powers found that 
the media was “unusually performative” in the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy in 
that it was an “entirely media-instigated crisis” (p. 14). Powers stated that: 
(1) the Danish cartoon affair was an exceptional form of a media event in that, 
from start to finish, its escalation onto the global news agenda, as well as its 
ability to inflame cross-cultural tensions was almost entirely dependent on the 
actions and motivations of parts of the mainstream media; (2) the events 
surrounding the affair were specifically narrativized, through the processes of 
strategic framing, in ways that mapped onto and drew from underlying 
cultural codes regarding Islam and cross-cultural conflict; and (3) the 
collective performances and framing of the cartoon affair worked to further 
instantiate a “Clash of Civilizations” narrative within Western discourse, a 
narrative that both obscures the underlying realities surrounding the affair and 
furthers problematic cultural assumptions about Islamic faith and culture. (p. 
23) 
 
Flemming Rose’s decision to create a public discussion about the rise of self-
censorship is best read as a “reenactment” of a “cultural battle between defenders of a 
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particular conception of Western freedom of expression and Muslim religious 
sensibilities (Powers, 2008, p. 14). Powers argued that the cartoon affair was 
“considerably reliant on and escalated by a series of performative acts by media 
institutions to maintain its emotional resonance and international stature” (p. 14). In 
the context of the cartoon controversy, the framing efforts of Jyllands-Posten 
specifically and the mainstream Western media generally were of a strategic nature in 
that they drew from the culturally resonant ‘clash’ thesis and “actively and 
intentionally provided packages of symbolized images and stories to further 
problematic stereotypes of Muslim societies” (p. 27). Particular frames were 
strategically chosen in order to “sensationalize the events” and “deploy symbols that 
invoked fear…about the escalating ‘crisis’” (p. 27).  Powers’ study is useful in 
helping us understand how media technologies and institutions affect the propensity 
for international conflict; it fails to uncover the underlying motives related to the 
social drama as it was chained out in the coverage of the cartoon controversy.  
In addition to televised coverage of the cartoon conflict, leading newspapers 
around the world published developments on the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy. 
Eko and Berkowitz (2007) examined the role of religion and multiculturalism in Le 
Monde, France’s leading newspaper, to see how it represented French secular 
republican ideology and freedom of expression in relation to the controversy. Secular 
republican ideology is rooted in the Enlightenment and is based on a strict separation 
of church and state such that it is critically opposed to religious dogma of all kinds (p. 
4). Thus, “French republican citizenship emphasizes individual citizenship and 
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equality over communitarian interests…so that the country exists as a secular nation 
of culturally homogeneous people” (p. 4). Therefore, in French society, the struggle 
was not over the expression of one faith as opposed to another. The goal was to 
suppress all religious identification in favor of individuality and the manifestation of 
French cultural heritage. 
The Eko and Berkowitz study returned three findings. First, they concluded 
that Le Monde used its coverage of the controversy to “restate fundamental human 
rights ideologies as they were interpreted in…the context of French secular 
republican principles” (Eko & Berkowitz, 2007, p. 22). This is in line with the 
Charter of the French Press, “which stipulates that one of the roles of the press is to 
defend ideas” (p. 22). Second, the diasporatic Islamic populations and their “culture-
specific brands of Islam have clashed with the secular humanistic ideologies of the 
West…and specifically with French secular republicanism, which rejects racial and 
ethnic identification” (p. 22). Third, the researchers found that  
although Le Monde defended Jyllands Posten’s right to publish the cartoons 
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the paper also reported that 
by publishing the cartoons, the Danish newspaper had exhibited some ethical 
lapses: It had equated Islam and terrorism, and showed double standards in 
that it rejected anti-Christian and anti-Semitic cartoons but had no problems 
publishing the Mohammad cartoons. Le Monde insinuated that Jyllands 
Posten’s ethical lapses and the troubles they ignited were avoidable. It also 
implied that these ethical lapses were the result of Danish journalistic 
insularity and lack of sophistication. (pp. 19-20) 
 
Eko and Berkowitz argued that the cartoon controversy “can be viewed as the 
latest weapon in the centuries-long war over the image of Islam” (Eko & Berkowitz, 
2007, p. 22). They, like others who have studied the phenomenon, argued that the 
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conflict between Islam and the West is not a “clash of civilizations” (p. 22). Instead it 
was “a clash of imperialisms” (p. 23). The researchers posited that the conflict is a 
“long struggle for territorial conquest between the resurgent Umma, the House of 
Islam, and a secularized, post-Christian West” (p. 23). Douai reaches this same 
determination (Douai, 2007, p. 22). But both studies fail to grasp that Huntington’s 
“clash of civilizations” thesis is not unlike their determination that the contest is 
between two cultures that do not share the same history, traditions, and religious 
values. The Eko and Berkowitz study enlightens us concerning how the French press 
represented French secular republican ideology and freedom of expression vis-à-vis 
religious sensibilities in connection with the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy. 
However, their exploration does not help us to understand how the social drama was 
influenced by key figures such as the editor of Jyllands-Posten and the Prime 
Minister of Denmark. Nor does their study help us to appreciate if and in what way 
Muslim voices affected the social drama.  
Bhattacharya (2007) compared the Rushdie Affair (publication of The Satanic 
Verses) to the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy using textual and framing analysis to 
analyze media discourse surrounding the two events. He examined how Muslim 
identity was constructed in two newspapers published in the United Kingdom, The 
Times and The Guardian, and questioned whether changes over the last two decades 
have resulted in a different view of Islam. Bhattacharya approached his study from 
the theoretical basis of Huntington’s (1993) clash of civilizations thesis and Barber’s 
(1992) McWorld thesis. Huntington envisioned a post-Cold War world where cultural 
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values move nation states into two polarized camps, the West and Islam, which 
struggle for power and control (Huntington, 1993). Barber described the modern 
conflict as occurring between the modernizing force of globalism, and Jihad, which 
he sees as Muslim advocacy of “reactionary fundamentalism” (Barber, 1992). 
Drawing on the work of Edward Said, Bhattacharya also considered orientalist 
rhetoric and its use in the construction of immigrant and minority identity 
(Bhattacharya, 2007, p. 8). 
Bhattacharya’s analysis of media frames revealed that the British press used 
“orientalist imagery while covering the Rushdie affair and the Danish cartoon 
controversy” (Bhattacharya, 2007, p. 9). Bhattacharya argued that the use of 
orientalist imagery along with “Britain’s attitude towards it Muslim 
population…located within a larger rhetoric on race, class, and immigrant identity in 
the United Kingdom” can account for the nature of media discourse that surrounded 
the Rushdie and Danish cartoon affairs (p. 9). Bhattacharya pointed to the media’s 
role in shaping Muslim identity by pointing out that  
the press has also contributed significantly towards this cultural segregation. 
In a study examining news coverage of Muslims, [a study]…found that the 
volume of press content has increased dramatically from 12 percent of total 
news in 1994,to 25 percent in 2003.Muslims were represented most often in 
stories concerning religious extremism (including terrorism), politics, inter-
personal relationships (ex: polygamy, misogyny, and honour killings), crime, 
and television. The study found that in general, newspapers framed Muslims 
as socially “deviant” and culturally alienated from mainstream British society. 
Although the volume of coverage has increased studies indicate that Muslims 
remain highly under-represented in the British press. [It was]…found that 
journalists preferred using non-Muslim sources if their story involved the 
Muslim community, but was not concerned about Islam. Muslims were also 
less likely than non-Muslims to be used as primary sources or quoted directly 
in a story. Furthermore, since journalists sourced terrorist and criminal groups 
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more often than ordinary citizens or community leaders, most stories were 
critical of Islam even when Muslim sources were used.(pp. 11, 12) 
 
Bhattacharya (2007) concluded that the rhetoric on ‘Islam’ during the Rushdie 
affair and the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy suggests that Muslim identity in 
Britain is defined along orientalist terms (p. 19). Yet, he argued that despite cultural 
alienation, his analysis of media texts reveals that in some respects the “divide 
between Islam and the [W]est can be bridged” (p. 20). Bhattacharya noted that 
compared to the Rushdie affair, where Muslim voices were not heard, a few stories in 
the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy provided Muslim perspectives, though they are 
negligible vis-à-vis mainstream views (p. 20). Bhattacharya’s study is insightful and 
illuminates the state of Muslim identity and changes in that state during the period 
between the Rushdie affair and the cartoon controversy. But the study does not 
address the way in which Muslim voices affected the dialogue during the cartoon 
controversy.    
For Shroff (2006), the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy exemplified the long-
standing conflict between press freedom and press responsibility. In her examination 
of this topic, she considered how the controversy was framed by the press. An 
exploration of framing strategies as an element of this study was critical, given the 
expansive role of the press in shaping international crises. The researcher looked at 
coverage in six U.S. newspapers—the New York Times, the Washington Post, the 
Chicago Tribune, the Atlanta Journal Constitution, the Detroit Free Press, and the Los 
Angeles Times. Seven broad frames representing issues in relation to the controversy 
were examined:  “Factual Information,” “Criticism of Media” (press responsibility), 
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“Support of the Media” (press freedom), “Islam vs. West,” “Physical/Monetary 
Damage,” “Criticism of the Danish Government,” and “Others.” These frames 
predominately focused on press activities and public response to those activities 
rather than the controversy per se. Yet, this study underscored the importance of 
examining framing strategies to provide greater understanding of the power of 
mediated strategies in shaping what becomes salient during international crises. 
While this study helps us to understand how the subtext of press freedom and 
responsibility were framed during the controversy, it does not provide insight into 
how the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy was framed by the broadcast media. The 
present study explores how the broadcast media framed the conflict for American 
audiences. 
About this Study  
This study investigates the cartoon conflict narrative developed in the West 
for American audiences. What the West has in common with every civilization is that 
we, like all other human beings, are by nature story tellers. To apprehend motive one 
must investigate the narratives developed and extended by the rhetor. The study is, so 
to speak, a look in the mirror. A look in the mirror at how the West used symbols to 
construct and perpetuate narratives about the perceived “enemy.” It is a hard look in 
the mirror and perhaps not a cerebration to be engaged in by the shy. I contend that an 
endeavor that has only intellectual appeal is just that, an academic exercise. There are 
certain topics for which mental calisthenics are appropriate. However, for studies 
involving the common good I argue instead for an expenditure of energy and 
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application of knowledge that can affect change in society. Meaningful change is 
impossible without first identifying the problem, requiring honest reflection on our 
own symbol use. No other civilization can make this investigation on our behalf. Nor 
can we inspect the eye and remove the straw on behalf of any other. Above and 
beyond providing knowledge and understanding on how the Muhammad Cartoon 
Controversy was dramatized for American audiences, this study explores how we, the 
West, can be a leader in taking on the responsibility to reflect on our symbol use in 
order to reform and improve our rhetorical strategies for the good of humanity and to 
improved relations in the global community. By setting an example of responsibility 
which is based upon respect for others in the global society what we can reasonably 
hope for is the edification of humanity. In order to realize our hope, each of us, 
academics, journalists, policy makers, political leaders, governmental entities, and the 
private citizen must do our part to right the disequilibrium, symbolic and actual, in 
our world. The hope of ushering humanity along the path toward full actualization 
should be a catalyst for every civilization to be an exemplar in responsibility and 
respect for the common good of today’s global society.  
Overview of the Study 
Chapter One: Symbolic Disequilibrium. This chapter provides a timeline of 
the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy and an overview of social and political 
conditions in Denmark prior to and at the start of the conflict. It provides a review of 
the literature on controversial artistic expression as well as coverage on the small but 
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growing amount of literature related specifically to the Muhammad Cartoon 
Controversy. This chapter concludes with an overview of the study. 
Chapter Two: Clang of the Symbol: Method. In this chapter the objects of 
study are presented along with a justification for their selection. The tools and 
methods used to interrogate the objects of study are presented to demonstrate how 
their application will help to illuminate important essential qualities of the selected 
rhetorical artifacts. This chapter concludes with presentation of the research questions 
and how they will be applied to the objects of study. 
Chapter Three: Analysis of Official Communications. In this chapter the 
questions asked of the official communications are examined through application of 
the methods presented in Chapter Two.  
Chapter Four: Analysis of Interviews of Flemming Rose. In this chapter the 
questions asked of the interviews of Flemming Rose are examined through 
application of the methods presented in Chapter Two.  
Chapter Five: Analysis of Televised Broadcasts. In this chapter the questions 
asked of the televised broadcasts are examined through application of the methods 
presented in Chapter Two.  
Chapter Six: Envisioning the Entelechialized Narrative: Tragic or Comic 
Frame? In this chapter I provide a review of the conflict over freedom of artistic 
expression vs. religious sensibilities and review the significance of studying this 
phenomenon. I discuss whether the questions posed of the selected texts have been 
answered and discuss my findings by examining the relationships among and between 
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the rhetorical artifacts. This chapter addresses what lessons learned from analysis of 
the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy can be applied to the amelioration of future 
international cultural conflicts. Also, I discuss whether my findings agree or disagree 
with the conclusions of other studies on the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy. Also, 
limitations of the study are presented. This chapter concludes by summarizing the 
content and organization of the study.   
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But the work of Man is only just 
beginning, and it remains to conquer all 
the violence entrenched in the recesses 
of our passion…and no race possesses 
the monopoly of beauty, of intelligence, 
of force. And there is a place for all at 
the rendezvous of victory. 
-- Aimé Césaire, Return to My Native Land, 
English Ed., 1968. 
CHAPTER TWO 
Clang of the Symbol 
Method 
This study examined the rhetoric of interlocutors at the genesis and nexus of 
the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy. The study was an exploratory into perspectives 
on the controversy with the goal of examining in detail what is contained in the 
rhetoric of various parties to the conflict. The findings provide a fuller understanding 
of why the parties were unable to resolve the freedom of artistic expression vs. 
religious sensibilities conflict. The rhetorical artifacts were classified into three 
categories: official communications, interviews of Flemming Rose (televised and in 
print), and television broadcasts covering the conflict. 
The artifacts cover the period of October 2005 through February 2006, the 
period that the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy received the highest amount of news 
coverage. One artifact is from 2007 and was chosen because it is an interview that 
sheds some light on the retrospective thoughts of the cultural editor of Jyllands-
Posten, Flemming Rose, who commissioned and first published the artistic 
expressions. Each artifact is available to English speaking audiences by either being 
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produced in English or official English translations. In what follows, I justify the 
importance of the texts selected for analysis, and explain the theoretical framework 
that informed this study. This chapter concludes with a presentation of the research 
questions and a discussion on how the questions were applied to the objects of study.  
Selection of Texts 
The Muhammad Cartoon Controversy sample of texts is comprised of the 
following rhetorical artifacts produced as a result of the conflict (see appendix to 
access the artifacts online): 
Official communications. 
1) Letter from eleven Muslim Ambassadors to Prime Minister Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen requesting a meeting, October 12, 2005  
2) Reply from Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen concerning the meeting 
request, October 21, 2005  
3) Flemming Rose on Why I Published Those Cartoons, Jyllands-Posten, 
February 19, 2006 
4) January 1, 2006 New Year’s address to the Danish people by Danish Prime 
Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
Interviews. 
5)  “The Situation Room” interview of Flemming Rose, cultural editor of 
Jyllands-Posten, February 7, 2006  
6) Alia Malek interview of Flemming Rose in the Columbia Journalism Review,  
March/ April 2007  
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Television broadcasts. 
7)  “Charlie Rose,” February 9, 2006  
8) “60 Minutes,” February 19, 2006  
These rhetorical artifacts were relevant to the purposes of this study because 
they exemplify the interlocutors’ positions on the conflict. The official 
communications were important because they were delivered by the most prominent 
individuals and groups engaged at the genesis and nexus of the controversy. 
Flemming Rose was the most interviewed person involved the controversy. His 
interviews provided insight into the worldview of the individual who initiated the 
conflict. The television broadcasts covering the conflict provided access to the voices 
of moderate Muslims, gave us an overview of the debate, and provided data for 
analyzing how the controversy was framed by the media. The interviews and 
television broadcasts are representative of interviews and broadcasts produced and 
aired by other American media outlets. Together, these artifacts allowed for analysis 
of the product of the worldviews as expressed through the cartoons, multiplied by the 
values and traditions of the interlocutors, and multiplied by the amplification of the 
conflict through television broadcast strategies.   
At the time of this writing, the official communications by key parties to the 
controversy and interviews of Flemming Rose had not been examined. European and 
American newspaper coverage of the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy have been 
examined by several scholars and was not considered in the present study (pp. 212-
232; Eko & Berkowitz, 2007; Shroff, 2006). Instead, mediated coverage of the 
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controversy in the present study focused on how the broadcast media framed the 
controversy. This choice was made for two reasons. First, a greater number of 
Muslim voices were heard in televised coverage. Second, the use of video footage 
during the televised broadcasts produced more robust rhetorical artifacts for analyzing 
debates surround the controversy. Video available from “Charlie Rose” and “60 
Minutes” provided data for analyzing how images were utilized by the media to 
dramatize the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy as an international crisis. The 
recordings provided an excellent example of the use of images to support framing 
choices.  
While Douai (2007) explored Arab television broadcasts this study pointed a 
lens at American television broadcasts to provide understanding on how the 
Muhammad Cartoon Controversy was used to re-position Islam to American viewers. 
Specifically, broadcasts on the networks of CNN and CBS were investigated. 
Notably, the way Islam was re-positioned to America affected the international 
community through exportation of cultural interpretations via broadcast networks 
such as CNN.  
Theoretical Framework 
Rhetorical critics endeavor to illuminate the intrinsic characteristics of a 
particular rhetorical artifact. In doing so, critics must be careful not to impose an a 
priori critical prism on the rhetorical artifacts under investigation (Black, 1980; 
Campbell, 1982; Foss, 1989; Leff, 1980; Rybacki & Rybacki, 1991). Proceeding 
inductively, the rhetorical critic  
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 [often] begins with a fixed idea about how a rhetorical transaction is to be 
apprehended; apprehends it in accordance with that fixed idea and in no other 
way; and then, the apprehension having been achieved, the fixed idea is 
regarded as having been confirmed. The system is infallible. But it is also 
sterile. (Black, 1980, p. 333). 
 
Sonja Foss reminded us that “the critic cannot possibly examine all of the rhetorical 
features of any artifact” because no method allows the critic to examine everything 
about an artifact (Foss, 1989, p. 15). Any methodological approach both reveals and 
conceals aspects of the artifact (Foss, 1989, p. 15). However, practitioners can avoid 
the “sterile criticism” that Black (1980, p. 333) cautions against by the care used in 
selecting his or her method. The methodological approach is 
 a vehicle or lens for the critic to use to examine the artifact in order to answer 
the research question. It is a scanning device for picking up particular kinds of 
information about the artifact, and whichever one is selected will direct and 
narrow the analysis and thus the answer in particular ways. (Foss, 1989, p. 
15). 
  
Close textual analysis was used to identify the major appeals and strategies 
employed in the official communications that are part of the rhetorical artifacts in this 
study. It was revealed that each could be treated essentially from the dramatistic 
perspective of Kenneth Burke’s (1969) pentad. A close textual reading of the Rose 
interviews revealed that each could be treated from a frame perspective, which has its 
roots in the seminal work of Erving Goffman (1974). Elements of Walter Fisher’s 
(1984) narrative paradigm, “narrative probability” and “narrative fidelity,” also 
informed the investigation of the Rose interviews. The ideas of Burke, Goffman, and 
Fisher were selected as critical tools because of their potential to illuminate 
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significant features of the official communication and interview artifacts and answer 
the questions being asked about them.  
To address the critical problem associated with the televised broadcasts 
several theoretical lenses contributed to the analysis. First, analysis of the artifacts 
were approached from the strategic framing concept of Zhongdang Pan and Gerald 
M. Kosicki (2001). This tool helped to illuminate the essential features of the 
rhetorical strategies employed in the television broadcasts under investigation. Also, 
Burke’s (Burke, 1973, pp. 45-51) notion of the role of the scapegoat in persuasive 
communication and Richard Weaver’s (1985, pp. 212-232) concepts of the “god-
term” and “devil-term” contributed to the analysis.  
Kenneth Burke’s pentad. Burke identified five elements in the pentad which 
were developed as a way to discover “what people are doing and why they are doing 
it” (Burke, 1969, p. xv). “Act” “names what took place in thought or deed” (p. xv). 
“Scene” refers to “the background of the act, the situation in which it occurred” (p. 
xv). “Agent” is the “person or kind of person…[who] performed the act” (p. xv). 
“Agency” is the “means or instruments…used” to perform the act (p. xv). The fifth 
and final element is the “purpose” or the “why” of the act (p. xv). Burke and Foss 
remind us that the “pentad” was developed to be used within a rhetorical transaction 
such as a speech or dialogue—so that the pentadic features are discovered within the 
actual content of the discourse (Burke, 1969, 1973; Foss, 1989). 
The terms of the pentad are not relegated to only intuitive or obvious 
properties. For example, 
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under “Agent” one could place any personal properties that are assigned a 
motivational value, such as “ideas,” “the will,” “fear,” “malice,” “intuition,” 
“the creative imagination”…Machines are obvious instruments (that is, 
Agencies); yet in their vast accumulation they constitute the industrial scene, 
with its own peculiar set of motivational properties. War may be treated as 
Agency, insofar as it is a means to an end. Besides general synonyms for 
scene that are obviously of a background character, such as “society,” or 
“environment,” we often encounter quite specific localizations, words for 
particular places, or eras. “It is 12:20 P.M.” is a “scenic” statement…Terms 
for historical epochs, cultural movements, social institutions (such as 
“Elizabethan period,” “romanticism,” “capitalism”) are scenic. (Burke, 1969, 
p. xx & 12) 
 
A careful and systematic reading of the rhetorical artifact helps the critic discover 
important features and their manifestations.  
The pentad has been used by rhetorical scholars for more than 25 years (e. g., 
Birdsell, 1987; Kelley, 1987; Ling, 1970) and is rooted in Burke’s concept of 
dramatism, the study of human motivation. Foss articulates the assumptions under-
girding dramatism: 
 One assumption at the heart of dramatism is that language use constitutes 
action, not motion. Motion corresponds to the biological or animal aspect of 
the human being…. This level does not involve the use of symbols and thus is 
non-symbolic…. A second assumption of dramatism is that humans develop 
and present messages in much the same way a play is presented. We use 
rhetoric to constitute and present a particular view of our situation, just as the 
presentation of a play creates a certain world or situation inhabited by 
characters who engage in actions in a setting (1989, pp. 455-456).  
 
In addition to the five elements of the pentad, Burke identifies elements that 
complement the pentad and assist the critic in uncovering “what people are doing and 
why they are doing it” (Burke, 1969, p. xv). Specifically, the concept of counter-agent 
is a term that indicates that “an agent might have his act modified…by…enemies” (p. 
xix). As Burke explained it, 
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if one were given to the brand of speculative enterprise exemplified by certain 
Christian heretics (for instance, those who worshipped Judas as a saint, on the 
grounds that his betrayal of Christ, in leading to the Crucifixion, so brought 
about the opportunity for mankind’s redemption) one might locate the 
necessary motivational origin of the act in the counter-agent. (p. xxi) 
 
Also, with regard to the concept of attitude, Burke has stated that he regretted “not 
turn[ing] the pentad into a hexad, with ‘attitude’ as the sixth term” (p. 23). Burke 
articulated the significance of the term in relation to action. Burke argued that attitude 
can be “classed under the head of agent” in the pentadic grammar, because it is the 
product of an agent’s consciousness and is therefore a type of action.  
 Any one of the pentadic elements can be considered the primary motivation 
because of its influence within the rhetorical artifact. But the critic should study the 
rhetorical artifact by utilizing each motivational element as the featured term, by 
pairing the motivations associated with the term to examine ratios. According to 
Burke (1969, p. 15), the five terms of the pentad allow for ten ratios (scene-act, 
scene-agent, scene-agency, etc.). “The ratios are principles of determination” (p. 15) 
as they characterize terministic relationships in terms of how one pentadic element 
relates to another. To illustrate, in Barry Brummett’s (1979) analysis of two gay 
rights controversies pro-gay rights activists posit that people are born gay and that 
based on this they engage in homosexual acts; thus, agent determines act. Conversely, 
anti-gay rights people argue that individuals chose to engage in homosexual behavior; 
which classifies them as homosexual. In the later situation, act determines agent.  
Erving Goffman’s frame analysis. Gregory Bateson is credited with coining 
the word “frame” to refer to, as Goffman (1974) explained it, definitions of a situation 
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that are built up in accordance with principles of organization which govern social 
events and our subjective involvement in them (p. 10). In order to capture its nuances, 
several scholars have defined framing. Entman (1993) said that  
to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular 
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation. (p. 52) 
 
Iyengar (1991) suggested that “the concept of framing refers to subtle alterations in 
the statement or presentation of…problems” (p. 11). Morley (1976) pointed to the 
importance of investigating the  
basic conceptual and ideological “framework” through which events are 
presented and as a result of which they come to be given one 
dominant/primary meaning rather than another. (p. 246) 
 
The above definitions focus on selection but other definitions emphasize the 
generation of meaning. For example, Goffman (1974) noted that frames allow users 
to “locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete 
occurrences defined in its limits” (p. 21). Hall (1982) presented the idea that framing 
“provides the criteria by which all subsequent contributions are labeled as relevant or 
irrelevant—beside the point” (p. 59). Edelman (1993) identified the power of frames 
“especially in how observations are classified…and categorized” (p. 232). The above 
definitions highlight the power of frames to select certain information for 
presentation, produce meaning, and screen out alternative interpretations of 
information.  
Goffman’s (1974) term “frame analysis” refers to the examination of the 
terms used to organize experience (p. 11). A critique of framing research is that it can 
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easily slip into the effects paradigm, a model which holds that there are no 
alternatives to the dominant meanings in texts. The basic premise of the critique is 
valid in that the “reality” consumed by the public structures, if not dictates, what 
issues they think about and how they think about those issues. Therefore, for purposes 
of analyzing the Flemming Rose interviews, greater emphasis was placed on how the 
Muhammad Cartoon Controversy was framed as a result of societal interests. Framing 
was investigated as cultural rather than cognitive phenomena. This approach 
responded to the recommendation that research move beyond a narrow concern with 
bias—deviation from an objective standard—to a more fruitful view of the 
ideological character of the artifact (Reese, 2001, p. 9). 
A wide array of theoretical approaches and methods have been employed in 
framing research (Hertog & McLeod, 2001, p. 139). Frames, in the current analysis, 
are cultural structures with central ideas and more peripheral concepts. The set of 
relations among the central ideas and peripheral concepts vary in kind and strength (p. 
141). Some of the concepts central to frames are, for example, narratives, metaphors, 
and myths that resonate within the culture (p. 141). These cultural phenomena carry 
extensive meaning in at least three ways. First, they possess tremendous symbolic 
power (p. 141). Second, the inherent power of culturally privileged narratives, 
metaphors and myths is that they carry “excess meaning” (p. 141). That is, by simply 
mentioning one or more of these powerful concepts the array of related ideas, social 
history, policy choices, heroes, and villains may be activated (p. 141). A third source 
of power for frames is that individuals, organizations, and institutions act in ways that 
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presume members of the society share the frame (p. 141). Frames, as a part of the 
deep structure of a culture, provide the unexpressed but shared knowledge of 
communicators that allows each to engage in discussion that presumes a set of shared 
assumptions (p. 141). 
Walter Fisher’s narrative paradigm. Fisher’s “narrative paradigm” is based 
on his concepts of “narrative probability” and “narrative fidelity.” This dramatisic 
perspective on the study of human communication assumes that individuals rely on 
narratives to account for and explain their actions (Fisher, 1984). Fisher posited that 
when I use the term “narration,” I do not mean a fictive composition whose 
propositions may be true or false and have no necessary relationship to the 
message of that composition. By “narration,” I refer to a theory of symbolic 
actions—words and/or deeds—that have sequence and meaning for those who 
live, create, or interpret them. The narrative perspective, therefore, has 
relevance to real as well as fictive words, to stories of the living and to stories 
of the imagination. (p. 2) 
 
Fisher said that the narrative paradigm provides the audience with “logic for assessing 
stories, for determining whether or not one should adhere to the stories one is 
encouraged to endorse or to accept as the basis for decisions and actions” (Fisher, 
1985, Dec., p. 348, emphasis in original). “Narrative probability” and “narrative 
fidelity,” are criteria for assessing the degree of “rationality” of a story (Fisher, 1984, 
p. 8). Narrative probability refers to the extent to which the story is coherent—
complete and free of contradictions. “Narrative fidelity” is associated with “whether 
the stories…ring true with the stories…know[n] to be true” (Fisher, 1984, p. 8), 
thereby examining the truthfulness of the story.  
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Pan & Kosicki’s strategic framing. Framing has been defined as “schemata of 
interpretation” that enables individuals to “locate, perceive, identify, and label” 
occurrences or life experiences (Goffman, 1974, p. 21). The work of Vincent Price 
and David Tewksbury represents a formal statement of the cognitive view of media 
framing effects and how it takes place (1997). They posited that framing effects result 
from the salient attributes of a media message changing the applicability of particular 
thoughts, resulting in their activation and use in evaluations. However, the effects 
paradigm limits framing analysis to a unidirectional process. It prevents us from 
analyzing the strategic contests among deliberators and between audience members 
(Pan & Kosicki, 2001, p. 39).  
Gamson (1992, 1996) demonstrated that people construct their understanding 
of issues by tapping into the symbolic resources available to them in their everyday 
lives, as conveyed through their experiential knowledge, popular wisdom, and media 
discourse (cited in Pan & Kosicki, 2001, p. 39). Individuals combine symbolic 
resources differently across varying situations, strategically maneuvering to “tame the 
information tide” and communicate with others (p. 39). Thus, framing an issue is to 
participate in public deliberation strategically, both for one’s own sense-making and 
for contesting the frames of others (p. 39).  
Cobb and Elder in addition to Hilgartner and Bosk argued that strategic 
framing is an ideological contest over not only the scope of an issue, but also over 
matters such as who is responsible and who is affected, which ideological principles 
or enduring values are relevant, and where the issue should be addressed (cited in Pan 
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& Kosicki, 2001, p. 40). Kinder and Herzog noted that it involves elite manipulations 
and performances (cited in Pan & Kosicki, 2001, p. 40), although not to the exclusion 
of citizen participation (p. 40). Each actor needs to take strategic steps to “get 
messages across” and win arguments by making their message meet the epistemic 
standards of “good arguments” and achieve “cultural resonance,” according to 
Gamson and Modigliani (cited in Pan & Kosicki, 2001, p. 40).  
Recordings of the televised broadcasts produced by “Charlie Rose” and “60 
Minutes” permits examination of how images were strategically used to get messages 
across in an effort to win arguments. Strategic framing “involves personalities, 
characters, scripts, conflicts, dramas, emotions, symbols, and expressive activities 
consisting of both “real” and “pseudo-events”” (Pan & Kosicki, 2001, p. 40). The 
method was chosen as a critical tool because of its usefulness for discovering if and 
how the program’s moderator and program participants strategically maneuvered to 
frame the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy. 
Additional Burkean tool. The notion of the scapegoat, according to Burke 
(1973), carries with it the sense of “familistic consubstantiality” 
 
by which parents take personal gratification in noting the delight of their 
child, when the child has been given some plaything or is engrossed in some 
event. The child is at once outside them and of them, so that their pleasure by 
identification could not properly be called either wholly self-regarding or 
wholly extra-regarding. Their act is as much a giving as an appropriation. It is 
a giving from them, whatever may be its satisfaction to them. (pp. 44-45, 
emphasis in original)  
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Just as, in Burke’s analogy, the parent experiences the reflected enjoyment of the 
child, the purgative effect of casting one’s malignance on another is likewise 
undeniable. 
the giving of one’s burden to the sacrificial vessel of the scapegoat is a giving, 
a socialization, albeit the socialization of a loss, a transference of something, 
deeply within, devoutly a part of one’s own self…It delegates the personal 
burden to an external bearer…by objectively attributing one’s own vices or 
temptations to the delegated vessel. (p. 45) 
 
Burke explicates the nature of the ritual scapegoat as being different from the 
“pseudoscientific” scapegoat in that 
the ritual scapegoat is felt to both have and not to have the character formally 
delegated to it—but a pseudoscientific scapegoat endowed by “projection” 
without an explicit avowal of the process, is felt purely and simply to have the 
assigned character...the scapegoat is taken to possess intrinsically the qualities 
we assign to it. (pp. 45-46) 
 
The scapegoat functions as a “suppurating device (that brings the evil “to a 
head”)…The sacrificial bulls and wild game die in behalf of the slayer (dying that he 
may “live more intensely”)” (pp. 46-47). A close textual reading of transcripts from 
the televised broadcasts indicated that Burke’s notion of the scapegoat would shed 
light on the effects associated with how the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy was 
framed during coverage of the debates.  
Weaver’s “god” and “devil” terms. In his survey of ultimate terms in 
contemporary rhetoric, Richard Weaver (1985) explored terms to which the very 
highest respect is paid, “god-terms,” and those which are repudiated, “devil-terms” 
(pp. 212-232). “God-terms,” he argued, are expressions to which all other expressions 
are subordinate (p. 212). To illustrate, Weaver identified several 20th Century terms 
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that enjoyed supreme rhetorical positions. For example, the term “progress” 
possessed the power and force to validate almost anything (p. 212). A politician could 
be urged on voters as a “progressive leader;” a community could be proud to call 
itself “progressive;” technologies and methodologies could claim to be “progressive;” 
a peculiar kind of emphasis on modern education could call itself “progressive,” and 
so on without limit (pp. 212-213). The terms “fact,” “science,” “efficient,” and 
“modern” carried similar power and force. Without delving deep into psychological 
complexities, Weaver grounded his arguments in the psychological notion that “it is 
the nature of the conscious life of man to revolve around some concept of value” (p. 
213). Most likely this quality arises from the need to orient oneself in the ideological 
cosmos in order to coordinate one’s activities (p. 213). It is reasonable then to believe 
that depriving humankind of the tendency to orient itself would amount to psychic 
cruelty.  
 The best indicator of a “god-term” is the term’s capacity to demand sacrifice. 
“For when a term is so sacrosanct that material goods” and loved ones must be 
mysteriously rendered up for it, then it can justifiably be said to be ultimate in some 
sense (Weaver, 1985, p. 214). The counterpart of the “god-term,” the “devil-term,” 
tend to be “publicly-agreed-upon terms” whose “peculiar force of repudiation” are 
difficult to explain (p. 223). Again, drawing on psychology, Weaver posits that there 
“seems to be some obscure psychic law which compels every nation to have in its 
imagination an enemy” (p. 222). He speculates that perhaps an enemy is needed in 
order to define oneself, arguing that “if a nation did not have an enemy, an enemy 
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would have to be invented” (p. 222). This suggests that the need to give vent to 
expressions of scorn and hatred is as strong as or in some way rivals the tendency of 
humankind to revolve around some concept of value. Weaver’s notion of the “god-
term” and “devil-term” were chosen as a critical tool in order to determine if the 
terms were employed and how they were used in the televised broadcasts being 
analyzed.  
Questions for the Objects of Study 
The questions posed of the rhetorical artifacts were arrived at through a close 
textual reading and re-reading of each artifact. Each artifact was considered on its 
own and in terms of its relationship with the group of artifacts and what they reveal as 
a whole. The questions below arose from consideration of the artifacts and the 
knowledge inherent in them. Recognition of the need for dialogue as an alternative to 
the initial indifference on the one hand, and violence and economic exclusion on the 
other is an indication that an understanding of the type of rhetoric needed to lessen 
the effect of and reduce the number of controversies is needed. To that end, this study 
addresses the following questions: 
1. What underlying motives are revealed by a dramatistic analysis of the rhetoric 
of interlocutors at the genesis and nexus of the Muhammad Cartoon 
Controversy? 
2. What frame dominates coverage of the controversy in the Flemming Rose 
interviews? 
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3. Did interview participants dramatize events in the same way that the conflict 
was dramatized in the official communications?  
4. What did Muslim voices contribute to the freedom of expression vs. religious 
sensibilities dialogue in televised coverage? 
5. How was the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy used to re-position Islam to 
the West by non-Muslims and by Muslims in televised coverage? 
6. What lessons can be learned from analysis of the Muhammad Cartoon 
Controversy that can be applied to the amelioration of future international 
cultural conflicts? 
Analyzing the Objects of Study 
The analysis in this study approached each artifact separately and was divided 
into three sections: official communications, interviews, and television broadcasts. 
Quotations found in each of the three parts of the analysis which are not followed by 
a citation make reference to the artifact under consideration. It was argued above that 
the worldviews of the parties to the cartoon controversy can best be uncovered from 
the Burkean perspective of dramatism (Burke, 1962). Hence the official 
communications were explored within the methodological framework of Kenneth 
Burke’s (1969) pentad and provide an answer to the first research question. 
Importantly, Burke’s pentad helps the critic discover “what people are doing and why 
they are doing it” (p. xv) by investigating “elements selected from within the actual 
content of the discourse” (Burke, 1962; Foss, 1989). Thus, a pentadic approach was 
appropriate as the official communications of Danish public servants are the products 
  58 
of the worldviews of the society in which the cartoons were first published and 
articulate the official position on the publications. The official communications of 
leaders in the Danish Muslim community represent the worldviews of the targets of 
those publications.  
 Questions two and three were answered by an exploration of the rhetoric in 
the Flemming Rose interviews. Framing analysis was applied to these artifacts in 
addition to Fisher’s narrative paradigm. This approach was useful in discovering how 
Rose, a key figure in the controversy, utilized narrative to create meaning (Fisher, 
1984). Questions four and five were answered by analysis of the televised broadcasts. 
The program participants included key Danish figures, moderate Muslim 
intellectuals, and others who closely followed developments in the Muhammad 
Cartoon Controversy. The concepts of Pan & Kosicki (2001), Burke (1969), and 
Weaver (1985) were applied to these artifacts to provide understanding on whether 
and how the cartoon conflict was amplified through the broadcasted coverage. An 
answer to question six was derived from reflection on the synthesis of the analyses of 
the objects of study and the implications associated with the analyses. Question six is 
addressed in Chapter Six.    
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If situations are defined as real, they can 
be real in their consequences. 
-- W. I. Thomas, The Child in America: 
Behavior Problems and Programs, 1928, 
adapted by Z. Hall 
CHAPTER THREE 
Analysis of the Official Communications 
 Analysis of the official communications that transpired near the beginning of 
the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy provides insight into how the controversy was 
dramatized by key parties in Denmark. The way that people rhetorically dramatize 
their situation reveals their motivations. For more than 25 years Kenneth Burke’s 
dramatistic tool, the pentad, has been employed by scholars as a way to examine the 
language choices of rhetors in order to discover “what people are doing and why they 
are doing it” (Burke, 1969, p. xv). As an element of the pentad, “act” “names what 
took place in thought or deed” (p. xv). “Scene” refers to “the background of the act, 
the situation in which it occurred” (p. xv). “Agent” is the “person or kind of 
person…[who] performed the act” (p. xv). “Agency” is the “means or 
instruments…used” to perform the act (p. xv). The fifth and final element is the 
“purpose” or the “why” of the act (p. xv). “The basic forms of thought…are 
exemplified in the attribution of motives” (p. xv). To that end, the question asked of 
this set of rhetorical artifacts is what underlying motives are revealed by a dramatistic 
analysis of the rhetoric of interlocutors at the genesis and nexus of the Muhammad 
Cartoon Controversy?  
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 Burke’s concept of ratios, which informs this analysis, involves a synecdochic 
relation between two elements of the pentad. Such a pairing reveals a deterministic or 
hortatory relation of the first term on the second. For example, as Burke articulates 
The word “ground,” much used in both formal philosophy and everyday 
speech when discussing motives, is likewise scenic, though readily 
encroaching upon the areas more directly covered by “agent” and “purpose.” 
We can discern the scenic reference if the question, “On what grounds did he 
do this?” is translated: “What kind of scene did he say it was, that called for 
such an act?”…However, the scene-act ratio can be applied in two ways. It 
can be applied deterministically in statements that a certain policy had to be 
adopted in a certain situation, or it may be applied in hortatory statements to 
the effect that a certain policy should be adopted in conformity with the 
situation. (Burke, 1969, p. 12 & 13, emphasis in original) 
 
A single term of the pentad may characterize the rhetoric of a particular rhetorical 
artifact. But as Burke noted, “we find examples of the two ratios everywhere; for they 
are at the very centre of motivational assumptions” (p. 11). In what follows, the four 
artifacts that comprise the official communications related to the Muhammad Cartoon 
Controversy are examined. An introduction to each artifact is provided, followed by a 
presentation of the pentadic elements and a complete analysis of the artifact. 
Quotations that are not associated with a citation reference the artifact being 
analyzed. The final part of this chapter, the conclusion, provides a summary and 
addresses the implications of the official communications artifacts.  
Official Communications 
Letter from Muslim Ambassadors 
 Eleven representatives to Denmark from Turkey, the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Indonesia, Bosnia and 
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Herzegovina, and Morocco sent correspondence to the Prime Minister of Denmark 
seeking audience concerning publication of the Muhammad cartoons in Jyllands-
Posten, Denmark’s leading newspaper (Muslim Ambassadors, 2005). This October 
12, 2005 letter also referenced incidents prior to publication of the cartoons that 
dramatically affected Muslim reaction to the publication. A close textual reading 
reveals that this correspondence has two parts. The first three paragraphs make up 
part one. Paragraph four represents part two. What follows are the pentadic elements 
of parts one and two, followed by an analysis of the rhetorical choices made by the 
Muslim Ambassadors to Denmark to dramatize events in the country. 
 Pentadic elements-part one. Scene: The Ambassadors’ narrative within the 
letter pointed to collective effort on the part of the Danish media and public officials 
that produced a scene ripe for conflict. They pointed Prime Minister Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen’s attention to the 
ongoing smearing campaign in Danish public circles and media against Islam 
and Muslims. Radio Holger’s remarks for which it was indicted, DF MP and 
Mayoral candidate Louise Fervert’s derogatory remarks, Cultural Minister 
Brian Mikkelssen’s statement on war against Muslims and Daily Jyllands-
Posten’s cultural page inviting people to draw sketches of Holy Prophet 
Mohammad…are some recent examples.  
 
The Muslim Ambassadors contributed to the conflict laden scene with the implication 
that unchecked discrimination could have negative consequences by “cause[ing] 
reactions in Muslim countries and among Muslim communities in Europe.”   
Agent: The agents in this part of the correspondence are the Danish media and public 
officials.  
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Act: A compilation of acts on the part of the Danish media and public officials 
coalesce into a present-day smear campaign against Muslims in Denmark. The 
Ambassadors make clear that the public circle of actors attempting to demean Islam is 
broader than the entities and individuals named in the letter. They state that those 
named have participated in “some recent examples” of discrimination, pointing to a 
history of discriminatory acts. 
Agency: Under the auspices of democracy, freedom of expression, and human rights 
the Danish media and public servants disparage Islam and its adherents.  
Purpose
 Pentadic elements-part two. 
: To malign Islam is the purpose of the activities on the part of the Danish 
media and public servants. The negative perception of Muslims that this campaign 
created would ensure discord between Muslims and Danes and justify maltreatment 
of and unequal justice for Muslim immigrants.  
Scene: The assurance that there will be equal 
justice under the law led by the Prime Minister “tak[ing] all steps necessary” to 
address the problem.  
Agent: The Ambassadors seek a response from the Danish government by urging 
“Your Excellency’s government to take all those responsible to task.” 
Act: Legal action against those discriminating against Islam and Muslims.  
Agency: The Danish legal code against discrimination toward minority groups living 
in Danish society and religions operating in the country. The code is the “law of the 
land” through which the Ambassadors seek redress.  
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Purpose
 Analysis. Although the letter from the Muslim Ambassadors is divided into 
two parts, the ratio that runs throughout the entire letter is scene-agent, an indication 
of the power of the situation to influence the acts of the agents. In part one, the 
tranquil scene in Denmark is contaminated by the discriminatory acts of the media 
and public officials. The Ambassadors named some media outlets and public officials 
as examples. However, with the exception of the cartoon publication in Jyllands-
Posten, the correspondence does not go into detail about the actions on the part of the 
individuals and entities identified. So, to grasp the level of scenic power operating in 
this part of the letter some background information is required. In addition, the 
following details are also helpful in understanding the state of relations between 
Muslims and Danes before publication of the infamous cartoons. For example, on 
August 3, 2005, it was reported that Kaj Vilhemsen, owner of Radio Holger in 
Denmark, was charged with racism for “encouraging listeners to drive all Muslims 
out of Europe and if necessary kill Muslims…in order to combat terrorism” 
("Denmark: Committee Meets", 2005; "Owner of Danish Local Radio Station", 
2005). Although Vilhemsen admitted to having made the comments, he argued that 
his statements did not contravene the racism provisions of the Danish criminal code 
("Owner of Danish Local Radio Station", 2005).  
: To promote inter-connectedness between Muslims and Danes to improve 
“integration and Denmark’s overall relations with [the] Muslim world.” 
The Denmark Radio Broadcasting Central Committee revoked Radio Holger’s 
license for three months for the July 12, 2005 statements that violated the media-
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political principles set by the Copenhagen Municipality local radio board ("Danish 
Radio Station Loses License", 2005). Christian Scherlig, chairman of the radio and 
television board, indicated that future contravention of the rules could lead to 
permanent revocation of Radio Holger’s license (2005). Vilhelmsen indicated that he 
was prepared to complain to Denmark’s Minister of Culture (2005). He added that 
agitation for the “repatriation of foreigners will continue in other media” arguing that 
“if one medium is shut down then we will simply set up another which will help to 
spread the message about a Danish Denmark”(2005). Vilhelmsen, who was convicted 
of racism in 2001 for writing an article in which he stated that “the rape of non-
Muslim women is an intrinsic part of Muslim culture” received a 14-day suspended 
sentence for his more recent incendiary comments ("Danish Radio Station Owner", 
2006). A unanimous panel of judges found the essence of Vilhelmsen’s comments 
“that all Muslims represent a threat to Western civilization” to be propaganda that 
accuses them of terrorist activities which serves as justification for the sentence 
(2006, emphasis added).   
DF MP (Dansk Folkeparti, Member of Parliament) and Mayoral candidate 
Louise Frevert contributed to the contaminated scene through the placement of 
articles on her Web site stating that “misguided Muslim youth felt they had a right ‘to 
rape Danish girls and knock down Danish citizens’” (Olsen, 2005). In another article 
it was said that “Denmark should send young Muslim criminals to prisons in Russia 
to save money” (2005). According to legal experts and human rights activists, Frevert 
violated the law by making derogatory statements about Muslims as a group (2005). 
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Several left-wing lawmakers filed complaints against Frevert for violating the race 
statutes ("Danish Lawmaker", 2005).  
Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen was told by a member of the 
Red-Green Alliance to “unequivocally distance himself” from Frevert (Olsen, 2005). 
However, to have done so would have proved difficult for Rasmussen since his 
minority center-right government rules with the support of the Danish People’s Party, 
the party in which Frevert held three key posts. In 2003, Denmark’s Supreme Court 
ruled that the Danish People’s Party leader, Pia Kjaersgaard, had racist views because 
she publicly opposed immigration (2005). That it is no secret that the Danish People’s 
Party actively garners support for legislation and policies against immigration 
suggests that Kjaersgaard was found to have racist views not because she publicly 
opposed immigration but for the manner in which she demonstrated her opposition.  
The comments of Danish Cultural Minister, Brian Mikkelsen, contributed to 
scenic contamination when he said that the compilation of Denmark’s cultural 
heritage of art, music, literature and film “would be used against the influence of 
Muslim culture” in Denmark ("Minister of Culture Comments", 2005). A Cultural 
Committee was formed and charged with creating the Danish canon. Several 
members on the committee argued that Danish culture should not be used as a tool 
against minority groups in Denmark (2005). At the Conservative Party’s national 
congress, Mikkelsen informed those congregated that “in the middle of our country a 
parallel society is developing in which minorities practice their Middle Age norms 
and undemocratic mindset. We cannot and will not accept this” and that “this is the 
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new front in our cultural war” ("Minister of Culture Comments", 2005; Burcharth, 
2006). To avoid becoming too much of a liability and experience the backlash and 
expulsion from his party that was the fate of Frevert, Mikkelsen proclaimed that 
I would also like to reject any attempt to link the cultural canon together with 
the right-of-center cultural struggle, which deals with fundamentalism verses 
democracy. ("Cultural Minister Apologizes", 2005) 
 
Mikkelsen’s denial that the cultural canon is a weapon of war against cultural 
pluralism linked Rasmussen’s right-of-center ruling government to the battle for 
cultural supremacy. In view of Mikkelsen’s position on Muslim immigration, it 
becomes clear why Vilhelmsen of Radio Holger felt he could complain to the 
Minister of Culture following the Radio and Television Board decision to revoke his 
broadcast license for making racist comments on the airways.   
In their letter to the Prime Minister, the Ambassadors identified individuals 
and entities whose actions served as “examples” of discrimination against Muslims in 
Denmark. It is reasonable that naming the actors rather than recounting their 
associated activities would serve as a sufficient reminder for Rasmussen. This is true 
because those named by the Ambassadors were public servants and the Danish media. 
In addition, Prime Minister would have had first-hand knowledge of how these 
conflicts were addressed by members of Parliament, Ministries, his right-of-center 
government, political parties, and judges and ministers who oversee compliance of 
the Danish media. These incidents and the publication of the Muhammad cartoons 
were presented to the Danish Prime Minister by the Muslim Ambassadors as 
examples of contaminants in Danish society. 
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We strongly feel that aspersions on Islam as a religion and publishing 
demeaning caricatures of the Holy Prophet Mohammad…goes against the 
spirit of Danish values of tolerance and civil society. This is on the whole a 
very discriminatory tendency and does not bode well with the high human 
rights standards of Denmark. 
 
The acts and tendencies described by the Muslim Ambassadors contaminated the 
idyllic scene of openness, dialogue, and tolerance that characterized Denmark. Within 
the contaminated scene, moderate Danish Muslims are caught in the middle between 
Muslim extremists and Danish separatists. 
In your speech at the opening of Danish Parliament, Your Excellency rightly 
underlined that terrorists should not be allowed to abuse Islam for their 
crimes. In the same token, Danish press and public representatives should not 
be allowed to abuse Islam in the name of democracy, freedom of expression 
and human rights, the values that we all share.  
 
And the allusion to reprisal, “may we underline that it can also cause reactions in 
Muslim countries and among Muslim communities in Europe,” on the part of the 
Muslim Ambassadors further contaminates the scene with the implication that 
unchecked discrimination could have negative consequences for Denmark and 
Europe.  
 It should be noted that in this part of the correspondence there are counter-
agents to the Danish media and public officials though they are not identified in this 
dramatization. Burke notes that counter-agents are “enemies” of the agent, whose acts 
the counter-agent seeks to modify (Burke, 1969, p. xix). The actions of the counter-
agents are revealed only through discovery of the acts committed by the agents 
named in the letter. For instance, individual members of far-left wing political parties 
filed suite against media functionaries and public servants for violating Denmark’s 
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racial discrimination statutes. Additionally, Cultural Committee members who 
objected to Cultural Minister Brian Mikkelsen using the cultural canon as a weapon 
in the war against the spread of Islamic culture in Denmark were also among those 
who made efforts to preserve or restore harmony.  
Part two of the letter represents a vision of the future, one hopeful for the 
revival of the “spirit of Danish values of tolerance and civil society” if only Prime 
Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen would have acted to restore the idyllic scene. The 
irony of this vision lies in the Ambassadors’ notion of who should or would improve 
the situation of Muslims in Denmark and the means by which it should or would be 
accomplished. The Ambassador looked to the very government and pubic officials in 
favor of stringent immigration policies and suppression of Islamic culture to 
champion their rights and thereby restore the tranquil scene in Denmark. 
Reply to the Muslim Ambassadors 
 The Danish Prime Minister’s reply (Rasmussen, 2005) to the Muslim 
diplomats has two parts. The first part of the letter, paragraphs one and two, were 
written in the third person and described a scene that is fair and just. In part two, the 
remaining three paragraphs were written in the first person and reference an 
international arena in which the Danish government pursued dialogue and mutual 
understanding with Muslim countries. First, key elements of the pentad present how 
the Prime Minister dramatized the Muslim situation in Demark in his reply to the 
Muslim Ambassadors’ request for a meeting. This is followed by an analysis of his 
dramatization. 
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 Pentadic elements-part one. Scene: The “wide scope” of freedom of 
expression in Danish society which is “the very foundation of the Danish 
democracy.” Denmark is a society “based on respect for the freedom of expression.” 
Agent: The “offended party” can seek legal redress for “blasphemous or 
discriminatory expressions” that disturb the tranquil scene characterized by fairness 
and justice.  
Act: Taking the matter “to court.”  
Agency: The Danish court is the means of formal redress for blasphemous and 
discriminatory offenses.  
Purpose
 Pentadic elements-part two. 
: To get legal relief from the blasphemous and discriminatory expression 
made by the Danish press and public officials.  
Scene: An international environment where there 
is “mutual respect” and “mutual understanding” for Danish and Muslim value 
systems.  
Agent: The Prime Minister who had “personally taken the initiative to enter into a 
dialogue with representatives from the Muslim communities in Denmark.” We also 
see the Prime Minister’s government actively stimulating “dialogue between 
Denmark, the EU and countries in North Africa and the Middle East.”    
Act: The initiation of dialogue with “Muslim communities in Denmark,” and the 
initiation of “dialogue between Denmark, the EU, and nations in the Middle East and 
North Africa.” 
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Agency: Prime Minister Rasmussen points to “the Partnership for Progress and 
Reform” “launched by the Danish government in 2003” as the means for increasing 
“mutual understanding of the values” on which Danish and Muslim cultures are 
based.  
Purpose
 Analysis. The first part of Rasmussen’s reply exemplifies the ratio of scene-
agent because the scene dictates the acts of the agent. Specifically, in paragraphs one 
and two, the scene cannot be controlled by Rasmussen or the Danish government. As 
the very “foundation of the Danish democracy,” freedom of expression in the press 
cannot be “influenced.” But the offensive expressions of the press are but part of the 
equation. The Muslim Ambassadors also identified officials who they deemed guilty 
of blasphemous and discriminatory speech. However, Rasmussen did not address the 
acts of the Danish public officials in his reply. This part of the letter, written in the 
third person, established distance between the author and the recipients. Herein, 
Rasmussen informed the Ambassadors that “acts or expressions of a blasphemous or 
discriminatory nature” may be taken to the court, thereby further distancing himself 
from the Ambassadors and pointing to them as the agents of change.   
: To “increase mutual understanding” between societies with disparate values.  
Ostensibly the purpose of taking the acts to the Danish court was to get legal 
relief from the blasphemous and discriminatory expression of the Danish press and 
public officials. However, the recommendation to take the matter to court directed the 
attention of the Muslim Ambassadors away from Anders Fogh Rasmussen as the 
locus of assistance for Danish Muslims. The idea that pointing to the court as a means 
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of relief was a deflection is supported by knowledge of the socio-political climate in 
Denmark. The web of Danish political parties, media functionaries, public servants, 
and public policies opposing Muslim immigration virtually ensures less than equal 
protection under the law. 
In part two of his reply, Rasmussen self-identified as the agent of change in an 
international scene where “mutual respect” and “mutual understanding” of disparate 
values is sought. Here, the ratio of agent-scene best characterizes the rhetorical 
choices made. This ratio reveals that the agent dictates what occurs in the scene. 
Unlike the first part of the letter where the Prime Minister has no control over the 
type of speech practiced by the media in Danish society, the second half of the letter 
shows Anders Fogh Rasmussen in charge of the dialogue that affects relations 
between Danes and Muslims. It becomes clear that Rasmussen is not referring to an 
invitation to plurality within Danish society or to the notion that mutual 
understanding will lead to protection of value systems incongruent with the Danish 
system.  
The Prime Minister’s statement that “there is indeed room for increasing 
mutual understanding between the different cultures and religions” references 
relations between Denmark and Muslim countries rather than Danes and Danish 
Muslims. This conclusion is supported by the fact that a single sentence is the only 
reference to dialogue between Danes and Danish Muslims in the entire letter. 
Specifically, Rasmussen tells the Ambassadors that he has “personally taken the 
initiative to enter into a dialogue with representatives from the Muslim communities 
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in Denmark.” Rasmussen does not indicate who these “representatives” are or which 
“communities” they represent, nor does he articulate the nature of their dialogue. 
Most interesting of all, the Prime Minister provides no explanation as to why he gave 
audience to “representatives from Muslim communities” and would not meet with 
Muslim Ambassadors to Denmark. Rasmussen’s choices were not aligned with his 
claim of support for “mutual respect” and “mutual understanding.”  
Rasmussen told the Ambassadors that the “Partnership for Progress and 
Reform” is the vehicle launched by the Danish government in 2003 to 
“stimulate…dialogue between Denmark, the EU and countries in North Africa and 
the Middle East.” The explicit aim of the program is to “engage a broad spectrum of 
Danish institutions and organizations in partnerships with their sister organizations in 
the Arab world and Iran.” The Danish government’s intentions are further clarified by 
the statement that the Partnership “will in this way nurture institutional and personal 
friendships among our societies and increase mutual understanding of the values on 
which we base our societies.” The Prime Minister articulated how Danish foreign 
policy focused on promoting improved international relations. However, improved 
integration of Muslim immigrants into Danish society is not mentioned in 
Rasmussen’s reply to the Ambassadors.  
An exploration of the Partnership for Progress and Reform provides increased 
understanding of why Rasmussen pointed to this program as the means for creating 
the desired “mutual respect” and “mutual understanding” that is expressed in the 
correspondence. It also helps us to understand why any statement promoting 
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improved integration of Muslims into Danish society would have been inconsistent 
with the citing the Partnership for Progress and Reform, which in 2003 was a part of 
Denmark’s new foreign policy vision. The foreign policy initiative entitled “A 
Changing World” focuses on Denmark’s “priorities and actions against terrorism” 
(Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004, June). As part of the foreign policy 
program, the Partnership for Progress and Reform focuses on four elements, one of 
which is building a bilateral partnership program for progress and reform with 
countries in the Middle East.  
In a report on Danish development assistance in the Middle East, it is stated 
that the “Partnership for Progress and reform…will support modernization and 
development in the wider Middle East region. Denmark will strengthen the dialogue 
with the countries of the region and increase assistance for a number of specific 
initiatives” (Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004, August, p. 3). Denmark 
indicates that reform of Middle East countries is needed because “widespread 
autocratic form[s] of government blocks political and social development and thereby 
the development of the human potential” (2004, August, p. 9). As a result “economic 
stagnation and unemployment lead to a great pressure of migration” (2004, August, p. 
9). It becomes clear that Denmark’s Partnership for Progress and Reform works to 
establish “renewed dialogue with [Muslim] countries on modernization of their 
societies” to reduce the number of immigrants to Denmark.  
Rasmussen’s reply to the Muslim Ambassadors’ request for a meeting 
references dialogue he has initiated with Middle Eastern countries. An examination of 
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the Partnership for Progress and Reform indicates that dialogue with these countries 
focuses on ways to reduce or stop the “drain…of well-educated members of their 
societies” (Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004, August, p. 9). Rasmussen 
does not address dialogue on ways that Danes and immigrants can live peacefully in 
Denmark in light of freedom of expression issues that have offended Muslim 
immigrants. Of course, any effort to help a society improve conditions that allows 
them to hold onto productive members of society for the betterment of that society is 
laudable. However, given the socio-political environment in Denmark, questions arise 
concerning the altruistic nature of the government’s Partnership for Progress and 
Reform.  
Denmark worked to broaden their Partnership for Progress and Reform efforts 
by promoting a similar European Union (EU) strategy (Royal Danish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2004, August, p. 3). The EU strategy focuses on similar reforms and 
articulates the challenges as emanating from “a single over-arching concern; the 
burgeoning challenge presented by a predominantly young population creating an 
ever-increasing demand for education and fulfilling employment. Reforms in the 
Mediterranean and the Middle East shall open to these young people the prospect of 
attaining a stake in their society” (Council of the European Union, 2004, June, p. 3, 
emphasis added). Knowledge of EU Strategic Partnership policies, which mirror a 
number of Denmark’s Partnership for Progress and Reform policies, supports the 
conclusion that the dialogue initiated by Rasmussen is a dialogue on containing or 
reducing immigration rather than integration of Muslims into European societies.  
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Finally, what is particularly interesting about Rasmussen’s reply to the 
Muslim Ambassadors’ request for a meeting is that the Prime Minister never said that 
he would not meet with the Ambassadors. Rasmussen’s refusal to meet was implied. 
To reply by implication is an interesting non-response especially considering the 
Prime Minister’s insistence that relations and dialogue between Danes and Muslims 
be conducted with “mutual respect” and “mutual understanding.” The Prime 
Minister’s slight is decisive and clear.  
Rose’s Justification for Publishing the Cartoons 
 Flemming Rose, the cultural editor of the Danish daily Jyllands-Posten, 
published an article in the Washington Post amid backlash from critics who referred 
to the publication of the Muhammad cartoons as childish, irresponsible, hate speech, 
and “provocation just for the sake of provocation” (Rose, 2006). Below is a pentadic 
presentation of Rose’s dramatization of the publication phenomenon. 
 Pentadic elements. Scene: A climate of “self-censorship, pitting freedom of 
speech against the fear of confronting issues about Islam.” 
Agent: Flemming Rose. 
Act: Publication of twelve cartoon depicting the Prophet Muhammad and Islam. 
Agency: Flemming Rose’s position as the cultural editor Jyllands-Posten. 
Purpose
 Analysis. Agent-purpose is the ratio that runs throughout this article by Rose, 
which reveals that the agent is imbued with a purpose that must be fulfilled. His 
: To “push back self-imposed limits on expression that seemed to be closing 
tighter.”  
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purpose for publishing the cartoons is critical but subordinate to his position as 
defender of freedom of expression. With statements like “I commissioned the 
cartoons,” “I still feel this is a topic that we Europeans must confront,” and “in my 
book [this] is a form of self-censorship” Rose appointed himself guardian of the free 
speech line over which censorship must not cross. He commissioned the Muhammad 
Cartoons in defense of not only Danish freedom of expression but the right of all of 
Europe to express itself without regard to Muslim religious sensibilities. Rose 
indicated that Jyllands-Posten is not “fundamentalist in [their] support of freedom of 
expression as the paper would not publish “pornographic images or graphic details of 
dead bodies” and “swear words rarely make it into” the pages of the paper. But the 
religious taboo of not depicting the Prophet Muhammad is a restriction that Rose 
could not countenance. He told the reader that “over two weeks we have witnessed a 
half-dozen cases of self-censorship, pitting freedom of speech against the fear of 
confronting issues about Islam.” Rose’s admission that “I am sensitive about calls for 
censorship on the grounds of insult” was offered as justification for defending against 
the “popular trick of totalitarian movements” to feign offense.   
 Rose supplied evidence that he was troubled by the incidents of self-
censorship by defending his commissioning of the cartoons as a response to Europe’s 
“widening fears and feelings of intimidation in dealing with issues related to Islam.” 
He argued that the newspaper’s “goal was simply to push back self-imposed limits on 
expression that seemed to be closing in tighter.” Rose said he “believe[d] that this is a 
topic that we Europeans must confront, challenging moderate Muslims to speak out.” 
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His dramatization of the situation placed him at the forefront of the fight for freedom 
of expression in Europe.  
 To combat self-censorship Rose claimed that he “adopted the well-known 
journalistic principle: Show, don’t tell” by commissioning the cartoonists to “draw 
Muhammad as you see him.” Rose appears disingenuous in his statement that “we 
certainly did not ask them to make fun of the [P]rophet.” It is difficult to read his 
denial in any other way when to hire cartoonists to satirize a religious figure invites 
sarcasm, ridicule, and folly in depicting the subject. Further, Rose related that “we 
have a tradition of satire when dealing with the royal family and other public figures, 
and that was reflected in the cartoons.” Jyllands-Posten’s long-standing tradition of 
satire would have no effect if it merely reflected the self-perception of the subject 
under scrutiny. Satire is effective only if it reduces, stretches, or in some way distorts 
the subject matter. Rose’s claim that there was no intention to “make fun of the 
[P]rophet” defeats the widely-accepted purpose of satire.  
 The major purpose of publishing the satirical cartoons, according to Rose, was 
“to test the limits of self-censorship by calling on cartoonists to challenge a Muslim 
taboo.” By Rose’s standards, to test the limits of self-imposed censorship any taboo 
would help him carry out his investigation as long as the proscribed subject related to 
Islam. But, that the subject matter involved a melding of the sacred and the profane at 
the intersection of artistic expression and religious values seems to be more than a 
fortuitous selection of an apt method for testing the “chilling effect” on freedom of 
expression.  
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 A secondary purpose for publishing the satirical cartoons was to treat Danish 
Muslims “as equals.” Rose argued that “the cartoonists treated Islam the same way 
they treat Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism and other religions.” And that by treating 
Muslims “as equals” the cartoonists made the point that “we are integrating you into 
the Danish tradition of satire because you are part of our society, not strangers.” But 
one could question the sincerity of this claim given that the Muslim immigrant 
community in Denmark was new and because socio-political conditions for Muslims 
in Demark were not favorable. Specifically, near the end of the 20th
 Another purpose that surfaces in the way that Rose dramatized the climate of 
“self-imposed censorship” is the desire to demonstrate “our right to publish material, 
even offensive material.” Rose advanced this notion as the best way to protect the 
fundamental right to freedom of expression. He exclaimed that “we cannot apologize 
for our right to publish.” Newspapers can be “paralyzed by worries about every 
 Century, there 
was an influx of a substantial Muslim population in Denmark (Bureau of Democracy, 
2005a). To satirize a new acquaintance, friend, or social group at the start of a 
relationship is to risk destroying the opportunity to extend good will in an effort to 
establish a healthy long-lasting relationship. Further, that the socio-political 
environment in Denmark was not amicable for Muslims (Bureau of Democracy, 
2005b; Sullivan, 2005) supports the idea that the relationship that Danes had with 
Muslims could not endure the weight of ridicule and denouncement that characterizes 
satire. Rose’s claim that the cartoons were “including, rather than excluding, 
Muslims” is open to debate.  
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possible insult,” warned Rose, if editors are too evenhanded in applying similar rules 
against publishing offensive materials. Here, again, Rose was self-appointed to lead 
the charge for editorial freedom in Denmark and all of Europe.  
 Rose’s purpose to keep the public sphere free from imposing Muslim religious 
restrictions becomes apparent in his exemplification of how he demonstrates respect 
for religions. For example, by taking his shoes off when he visits a mosque he 
demonstrates respect. Such respect is not due in the public sphere, according to Rose. 
For “a believer to demand that I, as a nonbeliever, observe his taboos in the public 
domain, he is not asking for my respect, but for my submission.” Clearly, Rose sees 
himself as the guardian of the public sphere, protector of editorial freedom, and 
standard bearer of the right to free expression for Denmark and Europe. By Rose’s 
standards, the public domain is managed by tenants upheld by adherents to secular 
democracy. Rose’s use of his position as cultural editor of Jyllands-Posten to publish 
cartoons that offend the religious sensibilities of the second largest religious group in 
Denmark (Bureau of Democracy, 2005a) leads one to question how democratic is 
Rose’s vision of democracy. 
New Year Address by Rasmussen 
 On January 1, 2006 Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen delivered his 
New Year Address to the people of Denmark (Rasmussen, 2006, January). During 
this annual speech, it is customary to present information on the state of Denmark’s 
economy and other matters of national interest as well as concerns abroad. 
Rasmussen held to this tradition in parts one and two of his speech. In part one, 
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Rasmussen informed Danes that they have a lot to be thankful for. Denmark has “one 
of the strongest economies in Europe” and the “majority of Danes have experienced 
the benefits of prosperity.” Danish prosperity was spread to other parts of the world 
through “international assistance” programs that are heralded as the best in the world. 
Rasmussen indicated that these reports indicate two things: “that we have well-
ordered finances and we have the surplus to think of others than merely ourselves.”  
In the second part of the speech Rasmussen advised Denmark to use the time 
of growth and prosperity to “make the necessary decisions that are crucial to the 
future” of the country and in this way “sustain the prosperity of the good times.” 
Rasmussen pointed out that in the future there will be “a larger number of elderly 
people” and “fewer people in the labor market.” This coupled with the knowledge 
that “at the same time we will live longer” is a portent that “an increasing number of 
people will be drawing on public benefits, while there will be fewer and fewer paying 
taxes.” “This scenario is not sustainable,” cautions Rasmussen. However, he assured 
Danes that because of “our current healthy economy” there is no need to “introduce 
hasty interventions forced on us by a crisis.” Instead, the country can “implement the 
necessary changes gradually over an extended number of years,” giving individuals 
ample time to adjust to new measures. This should be accomplished while “creat[ing] 
new knowledge and new ideas” to stay competitive in a changing world. In these first 
two sections of his New Year speech Rasmussen dramatized an environment where 
Danes are in control of the present and the future. With planning, self-directed 
adjustment to new mandates, technological and employment innovation, and 
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education of all Danish youth, Danes could maintain the idyllic scene that is 
Denmark.  
The third and final part of Rasmussen’s speech focused on the Muhammad 
Cartoon Controversy which erupted in September 2005. A presentation of the 
pentadic elements that characterize the situation is followed by an analysis of how 
Rasmussen dramatized the conflict in his 2006 New Year address to the people of 
Denmark. 
Pentadic elements. Scene: Foreign ideas threatening Danish values. 
Agent: The Danish tradition of satire, questioning authority, questioning the 
established order, and subjecting everything to critical debate. 
Act: Protection of Danish society where there is a strong sense of community based 
on fundamental values. 
Agency: Danes standing united. 
Purpose: To safeguard Denmark’s ability to be prosperous, innovative, and 
internationally competitive.  
Attitude
 Analysis. The pentadic ratio of this third part of Rasmussen’s speech is agent-
purpose; for it falls upon the agent to ensure that Denmark remains prosperous. As 
agent, Danish tradition would act to protect Danish society and its fundamental 
values. Burke examined the possibility of ideas functioning as agents in a given 
situation (Burke, 1969, pp. 177-181). He articulated how the idealism philosophy of 
George Berkeley supports the notion that an agent can have the form of an idea, such 
: The shrill tone of the critical debates about freedom of expression. 
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as tradition. “Ideas, spirits, and relations are all in their respective kinds the object of 
human knowledge” (p. 180). “We make our way among ‘ideas.’ And we learn how to 
deal with other ‘ideas,’ that we can bring about desired situations” (p. 178). 
Rasmussen posited that “Denmark[’s]…healthy tradition of putting critical questions 
to all authorities,” and “subjecting everything to critical debate,” through humor and 
satire “has led to progress in our society.” Rasmussen’s characterization of this 
Danish tradition as a “process” underpins the suggestion that ideas have force, the 
ability to act to bring about desired conditions. He phenomenalized tradition in his 
statement that “it is this urge to question the established order” that has brought about 
the cultural and economic progress of Denmark. The means by which tradition can 
bring about the desired conditions is through the will of the Danish people to “stand 
united” in their resolve to safeguard fundamental values such as freedom of speech. 
By “stand[ing] united” tradition will be the force that “protect[s] a society that allows 
[for]…freedom to differ...and a strong sense of community based on fundamental 
values.” 
Rasmussen details why the prophylactic quality of tradition is critical to 
Danish society: “For it is in this process that new horizons open, new discoveries are 
made, new ideas see the light of day. While old systems and outdated ideas and views 
fade and disappear.” Together, the agent and purpose functioned as correctives for 
how the debate about freedom of expression was being conducted. Burke often 
commented that he regretted “not turn[ing] the pentad into a hexad, with ‘attitude’ as 
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the sixth term” (Burke, 1969, p. 23). Burke articulated the significance of the term in 
relation to action.  
Where would attitude fall within our pattern? Often it is the preparation for an 
act, which would make it a kind of symbolic act, or incipient act. But in its 
character as a state of mind that may or may not lead to an act, it is quite 
clearly to be classed under the head of agent. (p. 20, emphasis in original) 
 
Burke argued that attitude can be “classed under the head of agent” in the pentadic 
grammar, because it is the product of an agent’s consciousness and is therefore a type 
of action.  
In the case of the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy the manner of the debate 
was called into questions by Rasmussen. He announced that “the tone of the debate 
has become too shrill and unpleasant.” Specifically, Rasmussen pointed to “action or 
indications that attempt to demonize groups of people on the basis of their religion or 
ethnic background.” It is quite possible that in their effort to protect society, Danish 
tradition keepers lost sight of the comportment with which debates are to be carried 
out. Rasmussen reminded listeners that they are to “speak freely and present [their] 
views to each other in a straightforward manner...in mutual respect and 
understanding. And in a civilized tone of voice.” On the other hand, the Prime 
Minister commended the Danish people because the “tone of the debate is in general 
both civilized and fair.” Particularly, compared to other parts of the world “the 
situation in Denmark is much more quiet and peaceful than in many other countries.” 
This third part of Rasmussen’s speech is harmonious with the overall theme of the 
speech which shows Denmark in control of the national environment of tranquility, 
openness, dialogue, and prosperity. 
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Conclusion 
Summary 
 The analysis of how key individuals dramatized events in Denmark provides a 
troubling view of conditions for Muslims in Denmark. Though the findings are 
disturbing, a dramatistic analysis of the rhetorical choices made uncovers the 
underlying motives of the rhetors at the genesis and nexus of the artistic expression 
conflict that became know as the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy. Examination of 
the letter from the Muslim Ambassadors reveals a scene-agent ratio that provides a 
view of a scene contaminated by the open and severe discrimination against Muslims 
by powerful Danish figures. The potent nature of the scene did not initially solicit a 
reaction on the part of Danish Muslims to act in self-defense. On the contrary, the 
agent in this ratio is the Danish media and public officials acting consistently with the 
nature of the depraved scene. No where in the letter from the Muslim Ambassadors 
did they see themselves as the agents of change on their own behalf. Instead they 
looked to the Danish government and institutions to clean up the scene by providing 
political and legal assistance. 
The evidence detailing the activities of the Danish media and public servants 
negate any notion that Danish Muslims wrote to the Prime Minister in response to an 
erroneous perception of discrimination against Muslims and Islam. Instead, the 
evidence points to actual efforts to cast aspersions on Muslims as a people and to 
demean Islam as a religion. Particularly troubling is the concerted effort on the part of 
powerful Danes, from the head of the government to media functionaries, to victimize 
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Danish Muslims on radio broadcasts, via newspapers, and through legislation. Most 
disturbing is that the analysis demonstrates that Danish Muslims are essentially being 
victimized on two fronts. On the one hand, moderate Danish Muslims must contest 
fundamentalist elements within Islam who abuse Islam in their religious crusade. On 
the other hand, they must contend with Danish separatists who debase Islam to justify 
waging a cultural war against Muslims. The above analysis of ratios supports this 
conclusion.  
 The first part of Rasmussen’s reply to the Muslim Ambassadors exemplifies 
the ratio of scene-agent. In other words, the Danish government could not control the 
scene. According to Rasmussen, it was up to Danish Muslims to act as agents on their 
own behalf and seek redress for wrongs through the Danish legal system. In part two 
of his reply Rasmussen self-identified as the agent of change. Essentially, he implied 
that the scene is not contaminated by deflecting the attention of the Ambassadors 
away from the Danish scene to an international scene where “mutual respect” and 
“mutual understanding” of disparate values is sought. Here, the ratio of agent-scene 
best characterizes the rhetorical choices made. 
The rhetoric of Flemming Rose and the third part of the Prime Minister’s New 
Year address share the ratio of agent-purpose. Rose’s purpose for publishing the 
cartoons is critical but subordinate to his self-appointed position as defender of 
freedom of expression for Denmark and all of Europe. In Rasmussen’s New Year 
address it falls upon the agent to ensure that Denmark remains prosperous and in 
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control of its own destiny. As agent, Danish tradition would act to protect Danish 
society and its fundamental values. 
Implications 
 The analysis of the official communications artifacts suggests several 
important implications for understanding the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy. The 
artifacts reveal that the debate was ostensibly about freedom of expression but the 
actual contest was for Danish cultural superiority in Denmark and by extension 
European cultural superiority in the EU. Danes argued for cultural supremacy from a 
freedom of expression frame because they felt their identity was being threatened. 
Danish Muslims argued for the protection of their human rights under Danish law 
because they felt their religious value system was under threat. Threats stirred parties 
on both sides of the conflict to mobilize and respond in defense as is born out in the 
rhetoric of the official communication artifacts.  
In particular, references made within the artifacts to individuals, entities, 
events, and national programs helps us to understand how this conflict could erupt in 
a small Scandinavian country that is well-known for its tradition of open dialogue, 
tolerance, and tranquility. Based on a synthesis of the above analyses and references 
to evidence emanating from the official communications it is clear that Danes felt 
their identity was being threatened. The threat pressed in on two fronts: the tenuous 
relationship with the European Union (EU) from without, and the spread of Islamic 
culture from within.  
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 Early in the development of the EU, Danes were skeptical of joining the union 
because they feared the loss of sovereignty (Helm, 1997). Initially, Denmark said 
“‘no’ to the 1992 Maastricht treaty in a referendum which produced a vote of 50.7 
percent against” joining the EU (1997). “The narrow ‘no’ vote sent shockwaves 
across Europe” ("Skeptical Danes", 1998). It was “only after Danish leaders had 
returned to the EU negotiating table, and won four ‘opt-outs’ did the population 
switch their vote, grudgingly, to ‘yes’” (Helm, 1997). The opt-outs from the monetary 
union, immigration and justice policy, European citizenship rules, and defense co-
operation are still in place today (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1992). In 1997 there 
was concern that Denmark would also vote no on the Amsterdam treaty, which 
favored eastward expansion of the EU. The thinking was that Danes would be 
concerned about the risk of more immigration (Helm, 1997). But there was a 
proverbial line in the sand. A “no” vote would have reduced Danish influence in 
forthcoming discussions over the EU’s future, would have delayed EU enlargement, 
and would have “put a question mark over Denmark’s future EU membership” 
("Denmark and the European Union", 1998).  
A brief look at the situation inside Denmark helps us to better understand the 
nation’s EU skepticism. Demark, with a population of roughly five million, was the 
richest EU country per capita only after Luxembourg. In 1998, the economy was 
growing steadily at around 3% a year, unemployment fell below 7%, and inflation 
was around 2% ("Denmark and the European Union", 1998). Both the budget and the 
balance of payments were in surplus (1998). Historically, Denmark was a great 
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power, controlling much of Scandinavia (1998). But since the 18th Century it had lost 
every war it fought, and had shrunk to match (1998). Presently, fierce nationalism 
lingers. For example, Danes are immensely proud of having Europe’s oldest royal 
family and they are deeply reluctant to surrender sovereignty. On the nationalist right, 
Pia Kjaersgaard of the Danish People’s Party had a raw message in 1998. “The EU 
wants to close Denmark down as a nation…while inveighing against illegal 
immigration and crime—two sides, in her view, of the same coin” ("Those Awkward 
Danes", 2000, September). The Danish People’s Party is “profoundly anti-
immigrant,” stating that “we will not accept a transformation to a multi-ethnic 
society…Denmark belongs to the Danes” (cited in Blau & Christensen, 2006).   
Broadly, the “no” camp can be said to have been in three camps: the 
nationalists who feared a further loss of sovereignty; a “pricklier brand of democrat,” 
who believed that the EU would ruin the participatory democracy of Denmark; and 
those who thought that Denmark’s exceptionally generous welfare state would come 
under attack from an EU that would gain ever-greater control over social security and 
taxation ("Those Awkward Danes", 2000, September). In current national debates on 
cultural policy, globalization implies a revival of nationalism as a defense against a 
possible loss of identity (Duelund, 2008, August, p. 3). Strengthening national 
cohesion is considered a vitally important response to migration and multicultural 
challenges (2008, August). Pressure from an expansion focused EU threatened 
Danish efforts to remain a cohesive society.  
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 A final example of Denmark’s tortuous relationship with the EU relates to its 
monetary opt-out. Though it did not adopt the Euro, the Danish economy is almost 
entirely tied to the EU economy. And though the krone had been one of Europe’s 
steadiest currencies, the central bank had to on occasion raise short-term interest rates 
to defend it ("Denmark and the European Union", 1998). Another way that Denmark 
benefited from its relationship with the EU was that Danish “farmers collect[ed] fat 
subsidies from Brussels” (1998). Denmark’s willingness to reap the benefits of EU 
membership while opting-out of important membership responsibilities led to their 
being labeled “freeloaders” by some ("Resentment Simmers", 1988). The threat to 
Danish identity caused Denmark to fight EU pressures to conform to expansionism in 
response to globalization.  
  Threats to Danish identity from within Denmark were addressed through a 
coalition of powerful public officials and media entities to “push back” the spread of 
Islamic culture in Denmark. Danes worked to slow down or halt immigration from 
Muslim countries and make life unpleasant for Danish Muslims in hopes that they 
would choose to repatriate. This perspective provides a more meaningful 
understanding of why the nature and extent of the discriminatory acts on the part of 
very powerful individuals and entities in Denmark returned only minor penalties for 
contravening blasphemy and race statutes. We can also more fully understand why 
the Prime Minister took a passive stance toward the Muslim Ambassadors who 
wanted to meet with him. His reference to the Partnership for Progress and Reform as 
a solution to the problems faced by Danish Muslims is also more clearly understood 
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under this lens. Also, we are in a better intellectual position to appreciate why 
Flemming Rose appointed himself czar of freedom of expression for all of Europe. 
The Danish government’s protection of Rose’s decision to publish the offensive 
cartoons was an avenue for demonstrating Denmark’s solidarity with the broader 
Union at the expense of Muslim immigrants living within its boarders.  
 Flemming Rose has been highly criticized by many for publication of the 
infamous cartoons. Analysis of the official communications provides understanding 
as to why Rose felt that he had “to push back self-imposed limits on expression that 
seemed to be closing tighter” (Rose, 2006). That Rose could not endure more than “a 
two-week period of a half-dozen cases of self-censorship” is an indication that 
something more than irritation over that brief period of a few cases of self-censorship 
was at work (2006). And finally, in regard to the Prime Minister’s New Year speech, 
we can more fully understand the importance of the role of Danish tradition to 
safeguard the long-held values of Danish society to ensure “a Danish Denmark” 
("Danish Radio Station Loses License", 2005).   
 It was noted in chapter one that image making by opponents of cultural 
change can function to “push-back” change from the status quo. Dubin (1992) 
indicated that several distinct conditions heighten the probability of art controversies: 
the nature of the subject, the extent to which the work violates understood and 
accepted beliefs, and fundamental social and demographic shifts along with generally 
unsettled social conditions. As noted earlier, the eruption of an art controversies 
requires the “combination of two critical elements: there must be a sense that values 
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have been threatened, and power must be mobilized in response to do something 
about it” (1992, p. 6). The publication of the Muhammad cartoons met all of the 
sufficient and necessary conditions required for the event to erupt into an art 
controversy, on a global scale.  
  Flemming Rose’s choice of using the method “show, don’t tell” proved to be 
the perfect canvas for blending the sacred and the profane (Rose, 2006). His method 
for testing the “chilling-effect” of self-imposed censorship was effective on four 
levels. First, his methodology left little room for the cartoonists to draw Muhammad 
in any way other than the images that circulated about Muslims and Islam in Western 
media. Negative coverage of Muslims and Islam was so prevalent that Muslim 
representatives met with the Prime Minister to request more positive images and 
narratives about Islam in the media (2006). Second, publication of the infamous 
cartoons functioned as a bandage on the open sore-like relationship that Denmark has 
with the EU. It is apparent that Denmark successfully framed the censorship problem 
as a European problem. Member states responded by republishing the cartoons in a 
show of solidarity. Third, the artistic expressions were sure to strike a sour chord in 
the Danish Muslim community and Muslim world because the profane elements used 
to depict Muhammad would naturally be highly offensive. Fourth, because the 
rhetorical messages of the cartoons were perceptual rather than textual the 
methodology of “show, don’t tell” (2006) allowed for a high level of deniability 
regarding any intention to offend Muslims.  
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But Danes failed to appreciate the degree to which Muslims were mobilized in 
order to respond to the threat to their value system. Analysis of the official 
communication artifacts helps us to appreciate that the Muhammad Cartoon 
Controversy is an example of how conflict can be dramatized in the broader society 
when artists disregard prohibitions against visualizing the sacred, and melding the 
sacred and the profane. In chapter four the Flemming Rose interviews are analyzed.  
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The historian, essentially, wants more 
documents than he can really use; the 
dramatist only wants more liberties than 
he can really take. 
                                                                    -- Henry James, The Aspern Papers, 1888. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Analysis of Interviews of Flemming Rose 
Introduction 
Many scholars in a number of disciplines have recognized that the attribution 
of motive is present in any interpretation of, or statement of experience, including 
broadcast news (p. 228; Entman, 1993; Goffman, 1974; Pan & Kosicki, 1993; Reese, 
2001; van Dijk, 1993). One way to analyze discursive forms and the attendant 
attitudes (incipient actions) they foster toward a situation is by examining what Burke 
has called “terministic screens” (1968, pp. 44-45), and media critics—drawing on a 
sociological perspective—have called “frame[s]” (Ott & Aoki, 2002). Frame analysis, 
then, refers to examining the organization of experience (Goffman, 1974, p. 11). In 
his examination of social reality, William James gave the matter of reality a 
subversive phenomenological twist. He asked, “under what circumstances do we 
think things are real?” (cited in Goffman, 1974, p. 2). In his answer, James stressed 
selective attention, intimate involvement, and non-contradiction of what is already 
known (p. 2). His answer implied that our sense of realness is contrasted with our 
feeling that some things lack this quality (p. 2).  
Through the interplay between rhetorical choices, media practices, culture, 
and audiences, frames function to create “reality.” A frame can be thought of as a tool 
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or “schemata” of interpretation that works through texts to structure potential 
meaning (Reese, 2001, p. 16). “Symbolic devices making up…texts constitute the 
phenomena of the underlying principle” (2001, p. 14). Frames are the “central 
organizing ideas” that generate “reality” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989, p. 3). Thus, to 
discover the interpretive principles of frames that rhetorically structure “reality” is the 
work of the rhetorical critic. 
Clues to the organizing principle used in structuring the frame can be found in 
the text, within individuals, and within social and cultural practices (Reese, 2001, p. 
14). Because a frame is not the same as its symbolic manifestation, the critic must 
look beyond the manifest content to the generating principle produced in the latent 
message of the narrative (2001). That is, investigators must infer the organizing 
principle from the latent content, which is at work in other narratives as well. Since 
frames are part of a much larger structure or societal ideology, to ignore principles 
that give rise to frames is to be misled by the face value of the text (2001). Frame 
analysis goes beyond the identification of what information is included and excluded 
to a full investigation of the power of a communicating text. It is acknowledged that 
media content, particularly news text, generates knowledge for audiences and that this 
manifestation of “reality” is explicable through motivation (Burke, 1969, p. xv).  
Framing was chosen as a critical tool in order to focus on how the Muhammad 
Cartoon Controversy was interpreted in the interviews of Flemming Rose. The 
interpretative approach of frame analysis allows for investigation of ambiguity, 
historical contingency, the implicit, and emphasis on how meaning is signified 
  
 
105 
(Reese, 2001, p. 8).  Frames do not stop with the organization of one narrative, but 
invite us to marshal a cultural understanding and keep on doing so beyond the 
immediate text as a broader way of accounting for “reality” (2001, p. 9). The 
questions asked of the rhetorical artifacts analyzed in this chapter are: (1) what frames 
dominate coverage of the controversy, and (2) did interview participants dramatize 
events in the same way that the conflict was dramatized in the official 
communications? A background on each artifact is followed by an analysis. 
Quotations that are not associated with a citation reference the artifact being 
analyzed. The conclusion provides a summary and addresses implications associated 
with the analyses.  
 “The Situation Room” 
 Background. Wolf Blitzer interviewed Flemming Rose, cultural editor of 
Jyllands-Posten, on February 7, 2006 on the program “The Situation Room” (Blitzer, 
2006). On the same day, Coretta Scott King was laid to rest beside her husband in 
Atlanta, Georgia. As with numerous networks, the burial ceremony was covered on 
the Cable News Network (CNN). Memorable portions of the event were featured 
throughout the airing of the cartoon controversy segment on the “The Situation 
Room.” A thorough analysis of the Rose interview can be accomplished without 
violating the sacredness of the funerary proceedings. Out of respect for the deceased, 
her family, and her contribution to the United States of America and the world we 
will journey accordingly.  
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“The Situation Room” is anchored by Wolf Blitzer who began his career in 
1972 with the Reuters News Agency in Tel Aviv. Shortly thereafter, he became a 
Washington, D.C., correspondent for The Jerusalem Post. After more than 15 years of 
reporting from the nation's capital, Blitzer joined CNN in 1990 as the network's 
military-affairs correspondent at the Pentagon. Over the decades, Blitzer has reported 
on a wide range of major breaking stories around the world that have shaped the 
international political landscape. Blitzer has interviewed, among others, American 
presidents and many foreign heads of state. He holds a Master of Arts degree in 
international relations from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced 
International Studies in Washington, D.C. “The Situation Room,” is a fast-paced 
three-hour weekday political news program which assembles top correspondents, 
analysts, contributors and guests to cover the day’s events. 
The length of “The Situation Room” program permits coverage of numerous 
news stories. Therefore, a brief overview of this episode of the program will be 
helpful. During the Blitzer-Rose segment of the “The Situation Room” other stories 
were presented, as noted above. The other instance included coverage on “possible 
terrorist activity” involving the “bulk purchase of prepaid cell phones.” Following the 
Blitzer-Rose segment, five news stories were covered, which ranged from the Iraq 
war to young starlets who posed nude in photos by Annie Leibovitz. During the 
Blitzer-Rose segment, a total of nine CNN journalists, including the host, contributed 
to developing the cartoon controversy narrative. There were 49 exchanges during this 
segment which occurred between journalists, sources, and the interview guest, 
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Flemming Rose. The Blitzer-Rose interview began with the 26th
 Analysis. All stories have form. The narrative form constructed in this episode 
of the “The Situation Room” possessed ample power to lead the audience to view the 
Muhammad Cartoon Controversy through a totalitarian ideology frame. This frame 
subsumes the idea that fundamentalist entities—such as Islamic governments, 
organized groups such as al-Qaeda, to local radicals—were responsible for violent 
protests around the globe. And “given the formal characteristics of narrative, how a 
story begins is crucial to how a story develops” (Ott & Aoki, 2002, p. 486). The 
cartoon conflict narrative began in the run-up to the story. Blitzer juxtaposed Tehran 
and Demark by providing the date and times in the two locations. The two places 
have diametrically different public images, Tehran, Iran, a hotbed of anti-American 
activity and sentiment for decades, and Denmark, a bastion of the tranquility and the 
“good life.”  
 exchange and ended 
within ten exchanges. The analysis of “The Situation Room” was conducted using a 
transcript of the program. Video of the show was not available. In the analyses that 
follow and the analyses in chapter five, the term “run-up” refers to the portion of the 
program or article that precedes the body of the narrative. “Run-up” is a journalistic 
term that has been utilized here because it conveys that more than a preview is being 
provided. The “run-up” to the story also functions as a framing device to limit the 
potential interpretation of the narrative that follows.  
That the date and time in the two places is a framing device is clear since the 
interview of Rose was not live, but videotaped. The two hour time difference between 
  
 
108 
“Tehran” and “Denmark,” “3:30 a.m.” and “1:30 a.m.,” respectively, was not 
significant and would have been less striking if they had been announced in 
chronological order. Blitzer established the bifurcated “scene” by contrasting the two 
locations. He went on to inform the audience that Tehran is “just one of the cities 
from Asia to Africa rocked by violence” over the cartoon conflict. The provision of 
no further information other than the time in Denmark, by contrast, implied that it is 
not a place characterized by violence and is still operating in harmony with the image 
of it held in the public imagination. Burke (1969) explained that “the scene contains 
the act” and that “using ‘agents’ in the sense of actors,…one could say that ‘the scene 
contains the agents’” (p. 3). According to “a principle of drama…the nature of acts 
and agents should be consistent with the nature of the scene” (p. 3). The good vs. evil 
frame developed by juxtaposing Denmark and Iran was dominant throughout the 
narrative and functioned as a scenic element through which the “thing[s] contained” 
could be viewed.  
 There is “fresh and violent fury today at those controversial caricatures of 
Prophet Muhammad,” Blizter told his audience. That “thousands took part in 
demonstrations, some of which got out of control” is an accurate assessment of there 
having been violent protests. But there were in fact many peaceful demonstrations. 
However, associating the Muhammad Cartoon Conflict with Tehran and Beirut, 
capital cities characterized by rabid violence and held to be engaged in terrorist 
activity, narrowed interpretation of the conflict to mob action influenced by 
totalitarian ideology. The rhetorical choices of the host created a dominant frame of 
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mob action, thereby naming the nature of the acts committed by cartoon protestors 
and placing their activities in the malignant part of the scene.  
 Two short elliptical phrases established the sub-frame of irrationality to the 
dominant mob action frame. Through Blitzer’s careful word choice, the sub-frame 
minimized the affect the cartoons should have had on the international Muslim 
community. The latent meaning behind particular words was forceful. For example, 
referencing the depictions as “those controversial caricatures of the Prophet 
Muhammad” (emphasis added) functioned to exclaim disregard for the seriousness of 
the injury to Muslim religious sensibilities. Likewise, Blitzer’s describing the 
violence that erupted in some locations as “all over a controversial series of cartoons” 
(emphasis added) rhetorically framed the reaction to them as irrational. The use of 
these words as framing devices was exhibited by other media outlets as well, for 
example the New York Times ("Those Danish Cartoons", 2006), and Rose’s (2006) 
own article that was published in the Washington Post. Unjustified indignation and 
irrationality are characteristic of the mindset one would expect from throngs engaged 
in mob action. Blitzer’s rhetorical choices devised a sub-frame that further solidified 
the protestors place in the lethal scene.  
 In the run-up to the story, Blitzer also used the premise of the show to develop 
a dominant frame of authority. Specifically, the phrase situation room is a metaphor 
for how international conflicts and potential issues are managed by the U.S. Through 
24-hour high-tech monitoring of security concerns, and international political and 
military activities the U.S. stays abreast of potential issues. “The Situation Room” is 
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modeled on the White House operation that is housed in the basement of the West 
Wing and bears the same name. Like the White House operation, “The Situation 
Room” has “new pictures and information…arriving all the time.” And “CNN 
reporters across the United States and around the world [are] bringing today’s top 
stories.” A total of nine CNN journalists contributed to “The Situation Room” 
cartoon conflict narrative. The frame of authority functioned to imply that there is a 
similarity between the monitoring and assessment of the cartoon conflict and the 
official government monitoring and assessment of international activities. The run-up 
to the story functioned as the beginning of the narrative, setting the stage for narrative 
development throughout the program.    
 Narratives are temporally structured—creating appetites as they unfold (Ott & 
Aoki, 2002, p. 486). As C. Allen Carter (1996) posited, 
When the narrative strategy is working as intended, the culmination of each 
episode sets the stage for the next…The story relieves its audience of the 
burden of having to “choose between” different phases of its unfolding and, 
simply by taking them through one phase, prepares them for the next. Each 
successive step of the plot leads into the next, whether or not it leads its 
audience astray. (p. 40) 
 
In “The Situation Room” narrative frames were linked to each other to move the story 
forward. A compilation of dominant and sub-frames delivered through the 
participation of eighteen distinct voices culminated in a meta-frame of totalitarian 
ideology. The overarching totalitarian ideology theme driving the narrative emerged 
from the dominant frames identified above as well as other dominant frames—
American self-censorship, government inspired revolt, poverty begets violence, 
Muslim extremists/Al Qaeda, economic crisis—used to construct the narrative.  
  
 
111 
 The American self-censorship frame was as salient as the mob action frame. It 
functioned to bring the U.S. into the debate. This time it was not Flemming Rose 
anointing himself the standard bearer of freedom of expression for the West, but 
American journalists asking why aren’t we publishing the cartoons like the rest of the 
western world. CNN’s Jack Cafferty posited that as the protests over the cartoons 
continue to spread, “so does the reluctance here in the United States to show them.” 
His rhetorical choice inextricably tied the media’s decision not to publish to the 
violent protests thereby bringing the problem of self-censorship to American shores. 
Cafferty invited viewers to e-mail their thoughts, which he would later read on the air.  
 Four of the five e-mails were in favor of publishing the cartoons in the U.S. 
“Muslims need to learn how to react to things in a civilized manner,” wrote one 
viewer. Another viewer stated that “if your viewers were able to see what all the fuss 
is supposedly about, they would have a far greater understanding of how a large 
population, the Muslims, is being manipulated.” A third viewer stated that he had 
“reached the end of [his] rope.” He argued that “there have been countless beheadings 
videotaped and circulated on the Internet without virtually any condemnation from 
the Muslim community.” His response juxtaposed the loss of life with lack of respect 
for religious sensibilities and highlighted Muslim negligence in responding to 
violations against the sanctity of life. E-mail responders bolstered the 
irrational/unjustified Muslim response frame. And the correspondence indicates that 
viewers were, in large part, favorable to publication of the cartoons. It was through 
the American self-censorship frame that the debate was broadened from its original 
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Denmark-EU borders to include the entire West. It was through the self-censorship 
frame that the American media was placed on the side of “good” and identified as not 
part of the malignant scene.  
 The government inspired revolt frame was also dominant. CNN’s Brent 
Sadler told of a “protest march in Peshawar” denouncing the cartoons “where several 
government officials also took part, including the provincial chief minister.” Sadler 
immediately followed this news with word from Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen 
that “the [cartoon conflict] situation [is] a growing global crisis.” Juxtaposition of 
governmental participation in Peshawar and the assessment of the conflict by the 
Prime Minister highlighted the official support given to the protests in Pakistan. 
Sadler also reported that “Iran’s best selling newspaper announce[d] retaliation” by 
means of “a contest for the best cartoon about the Holocaust.” His next statement, that 
“the U.S. State Department was quick to condemn it,” framed the activity at the state 
level rather than as an Iranian independent media decision for which its government 
could do nothing. CNN’s Ali Velshi also pointed a finger at Iran for its participation 
in the economic protest by noting that “other than Iran, whose president has called for 
a boycott, other Middle Eastern governments haven’t gotten involved.” The 
government inspired revolt frame focused attention away from Denmark as 
responsible for the global protests and perpetuated the notion that adherents to Islam 
were manipulated by Muslim governments to protests against the cartoons and all 
things western.  
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 In the poverty begets violence frame, which also was dominant in the 
narrative, CNN’s Tom Foreman noted that the violent protests were “happening in 
some of the poorest parts of our planet.” He pointed out that even in oil-rich countries 
“millions of Muslims are barely connected to the global economy. They live on little 
money with few political rights and that, [media] analyst[s] say, fuels their reaction 
to insults from the outside” (emphasis added). This frame points a lens on the 
deplorable conditions that some poor people endure. In this frame, according to 
observers, the poor are reacting to political and social conditions and not the insult 
felt as a result of the cartoon publication per se. Though exact sources were not 
indicated, Foreman’s citing “analysts” as the source of evidence that poverty begets 
violence suggested that his claim was credible.  
Notably, only two Muslim voices are heard throughout this episode of “The 
Situation Room” and both of them appear, briefly, in the exchange with Foreman. 
Imam Ajmal Masroor of the Islamic Society of Britain gave credence to Foreman’s 
statement by saying that poor Muslims “are not allowed to freely express their views” 
so there are “various political as well as social issues that all come to a head with this 
cartoon saga.” Ahmed Younis of the Muslim Public Affairs Council tried to put the 
situation into perspective by stating that “the people we see on TV are less than one 
percent of the Muslim masses.” But his assessment was quickly squashed by 
Foreman’s rebuttal that “still that percentage, however small is making a big noise 
now, just as Osama bin Laden had openly hoped it would.” The poverty begets 
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violence frame puts the onus of the violent protests on Muslin countries and squarely 
places them in the malignant scene.  
 Framing devices are used to help narrators move the story along in successive 
steps. For example, the mention of Osama bin Laden in frames such as the poverty 
begets poverty frame moved the story along to the Muslim extremist/Al Qaeda frame. 
Tom Foreman told the audience that Al Qaeda had been “fanning resentment among 
poor Muslims into religious, cultural and militant zeal.” Osama and “his 
lieutenants…have recruited among the poor and encouraged religious schools in poor 
areas to teach a [in]tolerant brand of Islam.” The Muslim extremist/Al Qaeda frame 
was forwarded by others such as CNN’s Brent Sadler who stated that “it’s the Islamic 
extremists whipping up the worst of the violence to damage and challenge the West 
for the Arab masses.” This frame was supported by the sub-frame clash of 
civilizations. For example, Foreman stated that “Osama bin Laden has said for years 
that he wants a clash of civilizations between the entire Muslim world and the entire 
western world.” The Muslim extremist/Al Qaeda frame functioned rhetorically to 
provide an additional locus of responsibility for the violent protests and bolstered the 
notion that Muslim adherents were pawns in a much larger terrorism program. 
Audience members who found it difficult to believe that the governments of the 
numerous Muslim countries were responsible for the violence were provided with an 
alternate interpretation through the Muslim extremists/Al Qaeda frame. 
 Economic crisis was a dominant frame in “The Situation Room” coverage of 
the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy. CNN’s Ali Velshi echoed Foreman’s earlier 
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statement that the boycott of Danish products was spreading through a lot of 
countries. Velshi pointed out that “a grassroots boycott of all things Danish is now 
under way in more than a dozen Gulf states.” Stating that it was unfortunate for 
Danish companies that “it was a Danish newspaper that first published the offending 
cartoons” rhetorically relieved the commercial sector of Danish society of any 
responsibility for the impact to their bottom lines. It was noted that Iran’s 
“president…called for a boycott,” again, pointing to Muslim government 
responsibility for the cartoon conflict fallout. Velshi created American identification 
with the struggling European Union companies by stating that “most recently, general 
anti-American sentiment has resulted in sales drops for companies like Coke.” That 
the American boycotts did not have “much staying power” is an indication that the 
mention of the phenomenon functioned as a framing device to situate the U.S. 
alongside EU countries in the clash of civilizations against the Middle East.  
 In addition to the dominant frames through which the cartoon conflict was 
interpreted “other stories making news” were pivotal in shaping the way the cartoon 
controversy could be viewed. For example, yet another CNN journalist, Betty 
Nguyen, delivered coverage on homeland security “linking bulk purchases of prepaid 
cell phones to possible terrorist activities.” This story was injected into “The 
Situation Room” episode immediately following the brief Blitzer-Rose interview. 
Finally, immediately after the 49th and final exchange of the Rose segment, CNN’s 
Betty Nguyen covered a story on Iraq detailing that at least seven people were killed; 
four were Marines who “died in roadside bombings.” These stories, though not part 
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of the Rose interview segment, helped to rhetorically frame the cartoon controversy 
through a totalitarian ideology frame. Their placement during the show indicates that 
they were used as framing devices. There were other, benign, stories that were 
covered during the episode. Placing either of those stories where the homeland 
security and Iraq stories appeared would not have changed the timing of the episode 
or the ability to tell these stories. But the benign stories would not have supported 
framing the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy as a totalitarian ideology. The conflict 
was dramatized differently in the next interview of Flemming Rose.  
Interview by Alia Malek 
 Background. Alia Malek (2007) interviewed Flemming Rose, cultural editor 
of Jyllands-Posten, by telephone in January 2007 for an article that was published in 
the Columbia Journalism Review in March of that year. The one-on-one interview 
provided an opportunity for Rose to reflect on his decision to commission and publish 
the internationally-infamous cartoons. Alia Malek is a writer and assistant editor of 
the Columbia Journalism Review. She is a former trial attorney for the U.S. 
Department of Justice, Human Rights Division. The Columbia Journalism Review’s 
Mission is to encourage and stimulate excellence in journalism in the service of a free 
society. Founded in 1961, the organization examines day-to-day press performance as 
well as the forces that affect that performance.  
 Analysis. In the introduction to the published interview, Malek noted that in 
the fifteen months since the publication of the Muhammad cartoons “the controversy 
over where to draw the line between free speech and criticism of Islam persists.” 
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Malek’s statement that Rose “claimed he solicited the cartoons to resist the self-
censorship crippling the West” demonstrates that by the time this interview of Rose 
was published the debate had clearly moved beyond the EU to be identified as a 
threat to self-censorship in the West. A close textual reading of the interview 
indicates that Malek’s introduction served as preparation for development of a 
narrative with an overarching immigration frame. As the narrative progressed, the 
interview questions together with Rose’s responses successively framed Rose’s 
reflections on the cartoon controversy as an immigration issue by: first establishing 
the responsibility of journalists to the readership; determining whether Rose’s 
justification for publishing the cartoons, stamping out self-censorship, was met; and 
probing Jyllands-Posten’s relationship with the Danish Muslim community as well as 
potential bias against the Muslim minority. Journalistic responsibility, dichotomous 
minority group, immigration, and self-censorship are the dominant frames that help to 
tell the story of how Rose reflected on the cartoon publication phenomenon. 
In the interview with Malek, Rose moved away from his usual carefully-
scripted responses to interview questions. This may have been a function of the 
passage of time. Or, it may reflect a more relaxed approach due to broader 
recognition of the issue of self-censorship outside of the EU, much like the American 
media identified with Denmark’s position on self-censorship in “The Situation 
Room” interview of Rose. Whatever the reason, Rose’s responses seem to be “of the 
moment” rather than rehearsed. For example, when asked whether the cartoon 
conflict had changed his view of journalism Rose responded that he had become “far 
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more understanding [of] those complaining about the media,” that coverage can be 
“inaccurate and biased.” Having a sense of this problem is one thing but “it’s another 
to be the object of this kind of journalism yourself,” stated Rose. Rose’s response to 
his personal experience with the media was to be “more conscious about what kind of 
authority you give to…so-called experts…in this case, especially experts on Islam or 
religion.” According to Rose, readers should be apprised of an expert’s institutional 
affiliation or tradition which may inform his or her opinion. This is certainly a good 
practice because it makes for a better informed citizenry and a more productive 
society. But what is troubling about his response is that Rose focused on how to 
manage the participation of others in an effort to provide accurate and unbiased 
information rather than on how he can extract the “straw” of bias from his own 
journalistic function and practice. The so-called religious experts framing device 
linked the journalistic responsibility frame to the dichotomous minority group frame 
and moved the narrative forward.   
By linking the two frames, Rose juxtaposed “radical imams” with the 
moderate majority of Muslims and created a dichotomous minority group frame as 
part of his reflections. He indicated that Jyllands-Posten would no longer seek 
information about the Danish Muslim community from “radical imams” but would 
turn to the moderate majority to provide a different voice. Rose’s sweeping label of 
“radical imams” raises questions about his journalistic accuracy and bias. One 
question being, are all imams radical? If they are not, did Rose’s generalization 
mislead readers on a very important level and does the generalization expose bias on 
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the part of Rose? Rose credited the cartoon conflict for exposing a “more 
multifaceted face of the Muslim population” and indicated that democratic Muslims 
had “become a very important voice in public debate.” Malek’s skillful questioning 
uncovered that although the existence of the moderate majority came to the attention 
of Danish society, Muslims had no greater participation in news gathering or voice on 
social issues than prior to the cartoon publication.  
Rose claimed to not know if there were any Muslims on staff at his paper and 
indicated that “no story comes to my mind” that would make it beneficial to have 
Muslim reporters available to gather news. When asked whether there had “been an 
ongoing dialogue between the Danish Muslim communities” and Jyllands-Posten 
Rose stated that he did not “believe in journalism as a community builder” and that 
the paper “should not act as some kind of mediator.” Whether it is apparent to 
Flemming Rose or not, the publication of the Muhammad cartoons fostered division 
in Denmark. It incited outrage and led to protests, the violence of which did not 
resolve the issue. The natural question raised is that if the paper could be used, 
intentionally or inadvertently, to produce the results that did could it also be a vehicle 
for good? Could it be a vehicle for community building? If not, could it be a medium 
that does not foment division? And if mediation is not the “duty” of Jyllands-Posten 
how can mediating against self-censorship on behalf of the media across Denmark 
and all of the European Union justify the publication of the Muhammad cartoons?   
There is some overlap between the dichotomous minority group frame and the 
immigration frame, which helped to move the story along and keep the focus of the 
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overarching frame on immigration. For example, in a 2006 Jyllands-Posten opinion 
poll moderate Muslims were asked if “free speech [should always] have priority 
compared to considerations for people’s religious feelings, traditions, and rules.” The 
fifty-one percent against the priority of free speech was an indication, according to 
Rose, “that there are issues on which we differ, and we have to deal with them.” But 
Rose was curiously non-responsive in his reply to Malek’s question on whether the 
issue revolved around “racial incitement” rather than “free speech.” Rose stated that 
“you are free to choose your religion whereas you can’t choose the color of your 
skin.” And in an attempt to maintain that there is a clear line between racial and 
religious background, Rose argued that “the cartoon of Muhammad with a bomb in 
his turban has been taken out of context.” Rose challenged the intellectual capacity of 
those who read the cartoon as stereotyping all Muslims. In Rose’s evaluation, the 
cartoon could only be read as some Muslims have hijacked Islam to commit terrorist 
acts. And to read the cartoon otherwise, he contended, is “a kind of illiteracy.” Rose’s 
argument exhibits a double standard. His invitation to the cartoonists to draw 
Muhammad as they saw him was not extended to readers, to read him as they see 
him.  
Flemming Rose argued that the publication of the cartoons benefited Muslims 
because before the phenomenon “fewer Danes with immigrant backgrounds [made] 
public appearances.” But “why only talk about Muslims,” Rose asked. “There are 
many minorities out there that would not get as fair a hearing as the Muslims,” he 
added. Rose’s comments provided a much deeper understanding of the immigration 
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issue in Denmark. The issue extended beyond Muslims as the “biggest minority” and 
“the most vocal” group to include immigrants of all backgrounds. But because 
Muslims are the biggest and most vocal minority, they served as a perfect example of 
how aliens are dealt with, particularly if they try to avail themselves of too many of 
society’s resources.  
There was likewise some overlap between the immigration frame and self-
censorship frame. As the narrative wound to a close, Malek asked Rose if it’s fair to 
satirize immigrants if they don’t have equal access to the media. Rose expressed that 
“it is an act of love and inclusion…to know [that] you can laugh and make fun of one 
another.” But lack of access to the media silences the voice of immigrants, rendering 
them unable to make fun of Danes in return. The lack of access could be viewed as an 
institutionally imposed censorship on Danish immigrants. But in the heated debates 
over freedom of speech, no one argued for the right to free speech for Danish 
minorities. In other words, if freedom of expression is a right that can not be 
compromised under any circumstance shouldn’t it be championed for all citizens? In 
terms of American self-censorship regarding publication of the Muhammad cartoons, 
Rose argued that the cartoons were newsworthy by January 30, 2006 and should have 
been published. The immigration and self-censorship frames as well as the 
journalistic responsibility and dichotomous minority group frames equipped readers 
with the capacity to interpret the cartoon controversy as an immigration issue for 
Denmark. 
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Conclusion  
Burke (1973) argued that forms function as equipment for living, by which he 
means that discursive forms such as comedy, tragedy, satire, epic, and news stories 
furnish individuals and collectives with the symbolic resources and strategies for 
addressing and resolving the given historical and social problems they face. When 
there is a crisis such as the freedom of speech vs. religious sensibilities conflict, then, 
discourse—and especially the public discourse of the news media—aids people in 
“coming to terms” with the event. Frame analysis permitted investigation into 
interviews of Flemming Rose to explore how the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy 
was defined, and how that definition potentially shaped public opinion. 
“The Situation Room” interview segment provided a plethora of information, 
the amount of which would be too cumbersome for an audience to sift through to 
arrive at its own assessment of the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy. Framing helped 
to focus attention on how the information should be interpreted. The dominant frames 
of good vs. evil, journalistic authority, American self-censorship, government 
inspired revolt, poverty begets violence, Muslim extremists/Al Qaeda, and economic 
crisis created a cafeteria of frames from which to choose. The variety of frames 
presented during the segment allowed audience members to choose a frame, or 
interpretation, which suited their existing belief and value systems. However, there 
were too many to permit a real time examination of what was being viewed to 
evaluate this presentation of “reality” for coherence and contradictions. Yet, the 
narrative “rang true” because it shared salient frames with other news stories and 
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issues of the day—the Iraq war, terrorism, radical Islam—upon which the audience 
could draw to evaluate the veracity of the story.   
Throughout “The Situation Room” episode there were 49 exchanges between 
the moderator, journalists, guest, and sources. The Rose interview began with 
exchange 26 and ended within ten exchanges. The brevity of this interview indicates 
that thought the episode was billed as Blitzer interviewing Flemming Rose, the story 
was actually about framing the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy as a totalitarian 
ideology for American audiences.  
Responsibility and respect are sub-frames that functioned to distance 
Denmark from Muslims. As the “Other,” Muslims were rhetorically relegated to a 
malignant scene characterized by irrational and violent activity. Associating the 
Muhammad Cartoon Controversy with Peshawar, Beirut, Tehran, and Syria limited 
the potential interpretation of Muslim protests to one of extremism. That the Middle 
Eastern locations were used as framing devices is clear from the fact that there were 
numerous peaceful protests against the cartoons that were not covered, for example 
“in Copenhagen on February 5th, almost 3,000 Muslims and non-Muslims peacefully 
protested…and called for understanding” (Saloom, 2006). There were peaceful 
protests in both Britain and Kashmir (Asthana, 2006; Langford, 2006). Thousands of 
Muslims protested peacefully in Tanzania (Guardian Reporters, 2006). And the large 
staff of CNN journalists would not have had to travel to far-away places to report on 
such events. For example, at the University of California at Irvine the cartoons were 
put on display at a campus forum on Islamic extremism (del Barco, 2006). The event 
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provoked strong protest from Muslim students who denounced the cartoons as racist 
but there was no violence. Other non-violent demonstrations occurred on the east 
coast of the United States.  
Turning to the Malek-Rose interview, the caption accompanying the picture of 
Flemming Rose in the Columbia Journalism Review article by Alia Malek reads, 
“Unbowed, Rose claims he brought reality to the immigration debate.” Rose’s 
reflections during this interview appeared to be actual reflections and not a carefully-
crafted script. Rose employed his well-worn script on many occasions. For example, 
in Rose’s (2006) article Why I Published Those Cartoons we see an extended version 
of interview responses that Rose provided on several occasions such as during his 
taped interview on “The Situation Room” (Blitzer, 2006). A close textual reading of 
the article and the program transcript reveals that Rose’s discussion of the conflict 
was nearly verbatim in both places. The Malek-Rose interview exhibited the 
dominant frames of journalistic responsibility, dichotomous minority group, 
immigration, and self-censorship which buttressed a meta-frame of immigration 
around the cartoon conflict.  
The dominant frames in the Malek interview of Rose created a dramatization 
of the cartoon conflict that is similar to how the phenomenon was dramatized by 
interlocutors at the genesis and nexus of the conflict. But to appreciate how the 
interlocutors dramatized the cartoon conflict required a great deal of understanding 
regarding socio-political conditions in Denmark before and at the time the cartoons 
were published. Conditions that were not apparent from the face value of the official 
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communication texts analyzed in the present study. Conversely, Rose’s reflections 
during the interview dramatized the conflict less like a freedom of speech issue and 
more like the immigration issue that it was. Though Rose’s reflections brought 
readers closer to the actual foundation of the cartoon conflict, his non-responsive 
answers to some of Malek’s questions should have raised red flags in terms of “the 
ring of truth” in his narrative. His non-responsive answers interrupted the coherence 
of his story and highlighted that these spots may be places where contradictions in his 
dramatization reside. Dramatization of the cartoon conflict in “The Situation Room” 
episode was a drastic shift away from the way it was dramatized by interlocutors at 
the start of the conflict. “The Situation Room” dramatization exhibited a war-like 
interpretation of the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy that befitted the conflict-
monitoring premise of the show and the military-affairs correspondent background of 
the host. The interpretative approach of frame analysis permitted investigation of 
ambiguities, historical contingencies, as well as the implicit and explicit emphasis on 
how meaning was signified in the interviews of Flemming Rose. In chapter five I 
analyze the televised broadcasts covering the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy.  
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It is worth considering whether the real 
civil disobedience must not begin with 
our language. 
--Richard M. Weaver, Language is 
Sermonic: Richard M. Weaver on the Nature 
of Rhetoric, 1970. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Analysis of Televised Broadcasts 
Introduction 
Strategic framing, vis-à-vis framing used to analyze the interviews in the 
previous chapter, carries with it the idea of competing frames in public deliberation 
and was chosen as a useful tool for analyzing the televised broadcasts concerning the 
Muhammad Cartoon Controversy. This tool is appropriate for these artifacts because 
to participate in public deliberation inevitably involves the discursive practices of 
framing an issue (Pan & Kosicki, 2001, p. 37). In their discussion about the link 
between framing and frame contestation, Pan and Kosicki (2001) posited that 
A frame is an idea through which political debate unfolds, and political 
alignment and collective actions take place…In public deliberations, the rise 
and fall in the prevalence of a frame, and consequently, a particular policy 
option, clearly involve debates among people who sponsor or align with 
different frames...Which frame to sponsor, how to sponsor it, and how to 
expand its appeal are strategic issues to participants…In “public deliberation” 
a frame also functions as a key idea to animate and sustain individuals 
participation in collective actions. (p. 39) 
 
Strategic frame analysis helps the rhetorical critic discover the interpretive principles 
that structure “reality” as well to investigate how competing frames are contested. 
Transcripts and video recordings of the broadcasts permit analysis of how 
language, non-verbal communication, and images function to produce meaning. 
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Images have been recognized as a means through which frames become salient 
(Bantimaroudis & Ban, 2001) though the ability of images to independently influence 
news frames has been hotly debated (Anden-Papadopoulos, 2008; Bal, 2003; Elkins, 
2003; Jay, 2002; Mitchell, 2002). However, this analysis investigates how images 
exert power to shape news without forwarding an argument on the degree to which 
images influence meaning vis-à-vis rhetorical choices. Specifically, this investigation 
seeks to discover how images advance the ‘preferred meanings’ of frame sponsors. 
That said, I would be remiss not to note that the rhetorical power of the Muhammad 
cartoons, absent any linguistic message, was sought after by Flemming Rose as a 
preferred method for articulating a specific message. Rose argued that the message as 
read by critics was not the intended message. Nevertheless, the message of the 
cartoons sparked a global crisis that led to the loss of life, property, goodwill, and 
corporate profits. What can be said with certainty is that images have rhetorical power 
that should be wielded with care. Investigating the use of images displayed during the 
televised broadcasts will shed light on how participants strategically framed the 
cartoon controversy. Additional critical tools used to explore the televised broadcasts 
include Kenneth Burke’s (1973) notion of the scapegoat, and Walter Fisher’s (1985) 
concepts of “god” and “devil” terms.  
The questions asked of the rhetorical artifacts analyzed in this chapter are: (1) 
what did Muslim voices contribute to the freedom of expression vs. religious 
sensibilities dialogue in televised coverage, and (2) how was the Muhammad Cartoon 
Controversy used to re-position Islam to the West by non-Muslims and by Muslims in 
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televised coverage? A background on each artifact is followed by an analysis. 
Quotations that are not associated with a citation reference the artifact being 
analyzed. The conclusion provides a summary and addresses implications associated 
with the analyses.  
“Charlie Rose” 
 Background. Public Broadcasting Station’s (PBS) Charlie Rose moderated a 
panel discussion with guests Abderrahim Foukara, Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, and 
Nihad Awad. Dr. Abderrahim Foukara received a Ph.D. in African studies at the 
University of Glasgow. Foukara joined Al-Jazeera in 2002 before moving to New 
York as the Washington Bureau Chief of Al Jazeera International.  He has worked for 
the BBC World Service, The World, and Public Radio International in various 
capacities including producer, reporter, anchor, and journalism instructor.  
Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff is the Senior Director for Policy Programs at the 
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) (2008). Before arriving at the 
GMF, Kleine-Brockhoff was the Washington bureau chief of Die Zeit, Germany’s 
intellectual weekly. He is a frequent commentator on transatlantic and U.S.-German 
affairs and serves as a panelist at think tanks like the Brookings Institution and the 
New American Foundation. Kleine-Brockhoff is often invited to comment on TV 
networks including PBS and CNBC and contributes to newspapers like the 
Washington Post.  
Nihad Awad is the Executive Director and a founding member of the Council 
on American and Islamic Relations (CAIR), based in Washington, D. C. According to 
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the Harvard Pluralism Project (1997-2008), CAIR seeks to empower North American 
Muslim communities through political and social activism. Mr. Awad conducts media 
seminars across the country to train Muslim communities in communication 
techniques (1997-2008). CAIR experts are frequently interviewed on national and 
international media such as CNN, BBC World Service, the New York Times, and 
Washington Post.  
Charlie Rose is an acclaimed interviewer and broadcast journalist. Rose 
engages America’s best thinkers and other newsmakers in one-on-one interviews and 
roundtable discussions. His one-hour show airs weekdays on over 200 PBS affiliates 
throughout the United States. This episode of “Charlie Rose” (2006) aired February 
9th on the CNN network covering international news. 
 Analysis. After previewing the show for his viewers, Rose presented clips of 
“some of the most recent reactions” to the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy. The 
footage covered former President George W. Bush, King Abdullah of Jordan; then 
Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice; Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan 
Nasrallah; and then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, each 
providing their views on the conflict. Showing these clips in the run-up to the 
narrative developed the government inspired revolt frame which was dominant 
throughout the program. Specifically, Bush called on governments around the world 
“to stop the violence.” His call to action intimated that governments were closely 
involved in what was, by most accounts, a grassroots movement. Rice’s statement 
that Iran and Syria have gone out of their way to inflame sentiment and use this 
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[conflict] to their own purposes concretized the former President’s call to action as 
properly directed at the state level. In accordance with the United State’s policy 
against negotiating with terrorists, Presidents and high-ranking U.S. officials do not 
meet or converse directly with individuals or governments known to be or are 
suspected of terrorist activities. Therefore the clip showing Hassan Nasrallah’s 
reaction seemed out of place among the clips of Bush and Rice’s reactions. 
Nasrallah’s reactions were in Arabic and translated textually on screen. The 
Hezbollah leader communicated that “defending the Prophet should continue 
worldwide.”  
The absence of captions beneath each speaker meant that audience members 
had to rely on their ability to recognize Bush, Rice, Abdullah, Nasrallah, and Annan 
in the clips. The speakers were not introduced prior to airing the clips or identified 
after they played. Therefore, American viewers unacquainted with foreign politics 
and affairs would not recognize the speaker as Nasrallah. In this way, the absence of 
identifying information functioned as a framing device for the government inspired 
revolt frame. The Lebanese born Nasrallah is not a government official. But his 
statement that “we are a nation that can’t forgive, be silent or ease up when they 
insult our Prophet and our sacred values” along with the difficulty of determining his 
identity corroborated Rice’s statement that Iran and Syria were using the conflict to 
their advantage and authenticated that Bush’s call to action was correctly directed at 
the state level. Annan contested the government inspired revolt frame by indicating 
that as to “whether some governments are manipulating this or not…it is difficult for 
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me to say…[there is] not evidence to that effect.” The irresponsibility frame was also 
established during the airing of the clips. Annan stated that he “honestly [did not] 
understand why any newspaper would publish the cartoons…it is insensitive, it is 
offensive, it is provocative.” Annan’s statement implied that Jyllands-Posten and the 
other European newspapers had a duty to use freedom of expression in a prudent 
manner. The irresponsibility frame was contrasted with the responsibility frame, 
which was dominant throughout the narrative. Both frames were attended by a variety 
of sub-frames that will be presented presently.  
As a way of transitioning into the body of the narrative, Rose introduced his 
guests. Abderrahim Foukara was on set with Rose at the brown “roundtable,” which 
was the only piece of furniture on the set. Their dark suits against the black backdrop 
of the set presented a serious tone that was surreal in nature. Thomas Kleine-
Brockhoff and Nihad Awad joined Rose via satellite from Washington, D.C. The still 
photo of the White House behind Kleine-Brockhoff was taken from an unusual angle 
which provided a view of the roof of the White House that is rarely seen. The blurred 
and tinted image suggested government support of Kleine-Brockhoff in a similar 
fashion that the blurry still photo of the capital building dome behind Awad alluded to 
officialdom. Captions displaying the names of the guests and their professions were 
frequently shown to help viewers identify them. Aside from the clips shown at the 
start of the program and the still photos behind two of the guests, no additional 
footage or images were shown during the program. 
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Early in the narrative, the government inspired revolt frame picked up again. 
Rose put the question squarely, “is [the controversy] being used by certain 
governments or certain people to inflame a reaction? Awad cited Annan as being 
more experienced in politics and deferred to his statement that there is no evidence to 
indicate government involvement. However, Awad conceded that “there are different 
people, different parties, different governments [that] may exploit this issue for their 
own political interest.” Nevertheless, he stated that there is a responsibility to provide 
evidence supporting statements such as the one made by “our secretary of state saying 
that Iran and Syria have been fanning the flame.” Awad argued that ultimately the 
“blame game” distracted from the core issue of “depicting the Prophet Muhammad 
and equating Islam with violence and terrorism.”  
In his comment on Die Zeit’s decision to re-publish the cartoons, Kleine-
Brockhoff contributed to the government inspired revolt frame stating that “once 
champions of religious freedom and tolerance like the governments of Syria and Iran 
become involved, retreating their ambassadors, then all of a sudden it becomes a 
debate in which we feel we have to inform our readers.” Kleine-Brockhoff’s 
contestation of the blame game sub-frame put the onus of the paper’s decision to re-
publish onto the shoulders of those who reacted to the original publication, thereby 
confirming the circular nature of sub-frame. He went on to state that the cartoon 
conflict “can be a field day for authoritarian governments in the Middle East...so for 
them it has been so far a beautiful situation.” With this statement, Kleine-Brockhoff 
attempted to shatter the blame game sub-frame by underscoring the level of 
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enjoyment that instigators derived from their participation in the controversy. He also 
attempted to show that the instigators were driven by the specific purpose of being 
able to demonstrate “that this is what democracy produces, it produces blasphemy.” 
Kleine-Brockhoff was not able to overcome the salience of the blame game sub-frame 
but he did highlight an important point. That is, “god-terms” are not universal. 
Specifically, it is well established that in Western thought the term democracy 
functions as a “god-term” (Weaver, 1985, p. 228). But, in Kleine-Brockhoff’s 
argument, the term democracy is an ultimate term associated with what is repugnant 
for particular circles within Islam because of its association with blasphemy. The 
caution is that if blasphemy maintains its association with democracy, democracy 
could become a “devil-term” for a broader segment of Muslim society. What this 
means is that dialogue on issues of value is critical, and will become more essential, 
for a healthy global society. Kleine-Brockhoff’s challenge to the blame game sub-
frame raises two interesting questions. First, do ultimate terms evolve over time? If 
so, what triggers the evolutionary process? Second, does the global nature of society 
in the 21st
The responsibility frame was contrasted with the irresponsibility frame, both 
of which were attended by several important sub-frames that include: freedom of 
speech, protecting the image of Islam, respecting the broader community, and respect 
for sacrosanct values. To point attention to the responsibility associated with freedom 
 Century require new/improved “god” and “devil-terms”? The first 
question, though interesting, is beyond the scope of this study. The second question 
will be addressed in the next chapter.  
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of speech, Foukara expressed that he “think[s] freedom of expression is good” but 
that in “the present circumstances that the world is going through” we should all 
“think deep and hard” about what we say. He argued that “the world has become far 
too small” for the media to not consider the effects of what is published or 
broadcasted. Rose did not challenge this responsibility frame but he questioned 
whether Arab media exhibits this practice. Foukara stated that “I hope that every 
person in charge of making editorial decisions on a daily basis…[has] been giving 
some serious thought to what they…publish or broadcast.” Awad added that being 
routinely stereotyped as “belly dancers, billionaires or bombers” in Western media 
has been “upsetting” to Arabs and Muslims worldwide. Framing free speech as a 
responsibility makes one mindful of the power associated with expressing thoughts 
and feelings. By way of example, driving carries with it a high level of responsibility 
because of the potential to affect the lives of other people. For this reason, one is not 
free to move about in any manner, there are guidelines, rules of the road. Similarly, 
one is not permitted to engage in this activity while in an altered state of mind 
because of the potential damage that can be caused to others and oneself. The notion 
of responsibility toward others, therefore, is not a foreign concept. It is, instead, a 
practice that we can transfer to another arena such as freedom of expression.     
Framing protection of the image of Islam as a responsibility functioned as a 
call to action for Muslims worldwide to “protest peacefully” and express their views 
in a way that does not allow others to, in effect, control the image of Muslims and 
Islam. Awad posited that to do otherwise is to allow others to “shape…our image” 
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like “those who designed the cartoons,” as violent. Foukara added that “it is a 
perfectly healthy thing that thousands and perhaps millions of Muslims have been 
taking to the streets to protest something they don’t like.” But this effort is lost if 
“you turn your peaceful protest…into setting buildings ablaze” or putting people “in 
harm’s way.” Awad stated that it is “important for Muslims to control the acts of the 
few” so as to “make sure that the few do not represent the image of Islam.” Awad and 
Foukara supported each other in development of the protection of the image of Islam 
sub-frame as a responsibility for all Muslims.   
Kleine-Brockhoff forwarded the respecting the broader community sub-frame 
by pointing out that “threatening those who exercise expression” is not an effective 
strategy. When “cartoonists have to live in hiding, Salman Rushdie style” or 
“artists,…journalists, [and] people who are critics of some practices in extremist 
Islam” have to live in hiding “because of what they have public[shed]” then Muslims 
start to lose the debate over freedom of speech vs. religious sensibilities. Kleine-
Brockhoff argued that Muslims have a responsibility to present their views in a 
manner that does not jeopardize the safety and freedom of the broader community. 
This sub-frame bolstered the protecting the image of Islam sub-frame in that it 
enhanced the opportunity of Muslims to protect their image. Foukara presented the 
respect for sacrosanct values frame by demonstrating that the Muslim world and the 
West have sacrosanct values with disparate foundations. For the Muslim world “there 
is religious sacrosanct, which is the person of the Prophet.” “In the West, there is a 
secular sacrosanct called freedom of expression.” Freedom of expression is very 
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important for Muslims and people in the West, argued Foukara. “But we should also 
be talking about respect for [the] sacrosanct [values] of other peoples and other 
cultures.” Framing respect for sacrosanct values of others as a responsibility for all 
could ensure that the debate over freedom of expression and religious sensibilities is a 
healthy one. Interpreting the issue in this way could also help move the debate toward 
a resolution. Strategic framing in the “60 Minutes” episode also provides insight into 
how the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy was dramatized for American audiences.  
“60 Minutes”  
Background. Host Bob Simon traveled to Copenhagen, Denmark to cover the 
Muhammad Cartoon Controversy for the segment “State of Denmark” that aired 
February 19th on “60 Minutes” (Tanz-Flaum, 2006). Bob Simon is an honored 
journalist in international reporting and has contributed regularly to “60 Minutes” 
since 1996. He has covered virtually every major foreign story in the last three 
decades. The news magazine “60 Minutes” has been on the air since 1968 and is 
known for offering hard-hitting investigative reports, interviews, and feature 
segments. The show airs weekly on the U.S. network CBS.   
 Analysis. It can be argued that strategic framing of this segment of the“60 
Minutes” episode began with the selection of guests and sources presented. Five of 
the seven individuals were Danish. Except for a professional writer, all of them were 
editors or politicians. Two people were Muslim. One was the first Muslim immigrant 
elected to Denmark’s parliament and the other an Imam. Knowledge of this selection 
indicates that, even before the narrative begins, the scales are weighted against 
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Muslim participants winning strategic contests of framing issues in favor of their 
interpretation of events. And unfortunately, Imams have routinely been characterized 
as radical or extremist in a broad range of media coverage, including the Alia Malek 
interview of Flemming Rose analyzed in the present study. The radical or extremist 
perception, no matter how inaccurate, greatly diminished the credibility of the Imam 
to the degree that he was rendered rhetorically incapable of forwarding any frames 
favorable to Islam or contesting any unfavorable frames. It is unfair but accurate that 
“Imam” functioned as a term of repudiation, a “devil-term,” which restricted Ahmed 
Abu Laban’s ability to forward and contest arguments during the program. This 
situation left Dr. Kamal Qureshi, the first Muslim Member of Parliament, virtually 
alone to create and contest frames.  
 Bob Simon began the State of Denmark narrative in the run-up to the story. 
Here, he developed the tranquility vs. mayhem frame to establish the nature of the 
scene. Simon employed a host of rhetorical devices to limn Denmark as a “lovely 
little land,” a place like no other. Even the “cluttered work space” in the “little living 
room” of Kare Bluitgen,” the children’s book writer who could not find an illustrator 
to draw Muhammad, was not out of place in the “squeaky clean” land. Bluitgen stated 
that he was “quite sad” to see what happened as a result of his trying “to promote 
better understanding between cultures and religions…in Denmark.” This statement 
along with his frail non-threatening appearance and benign occupation made him a 
sympathetic figure who could be allowed to be part of the “fairy tale” scene despite 
the disordered and cramped conditions of his apartment. Throughout the rest of the 
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segment, Danish guests, sources, and “extras” appeared in wide-open spaces, 
foregrounded in scenes of the expansive sky, or in luxuriant accommodations. They 
donned modern, expensive, or high-fashion clothing. The women were pretty and 
young, and almost all of them blonde. Many of the citizens were thin and engaged in 
some form of recreational activity. The citizens fit the “fairy tale” scene.  
By contrast, in the body of the narrative, footage of rioters and a Danish flag 
being burned is shown as Simon’s voiceover explains that riots “from Jerusalem to 
Jakarta” can be traced back to Bluitgen’s apartment. This helps the audience to 
appreciate the degree of dissimilarity in the bifurcated scene. Simon’s defining the 
area of Copenhagen that Muslims inhabit as the “Muslim quarter” rather than 
community, rhetorically painting the location as “Other,” different, alien. Images of 
the location showed cluttered markets, crowed walkways, and dilapidated buildings 
were aired throughout the segment. In the “Muslim quarter” footage all of the women 
wore the hijab, the shibboleth of immigrant Muslim women. A young Muslim woman 
in a hijab was filmed with a cigarette dangling from her lips as she was busy doing 
something with her hands. Americans would say she was smoking like a sailor. The 
image was particularly striking since Muslim women rarely smoke, especially in 
public places.  
Although “Muslims make up only two percent of the population,” Simon 
informed the audience that Denmark has “the toughest immigration laws in Europe” 
and that Danish support of the “ultra-right wing” Danish “People’s Party” has grown 
by “almost 20 percent.” Thereby, indicating that the “pretty and prosperous” people 
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of Denmark intend to protect their “coziest of kingdoms” from the cultural change 
that accompanies immigration. If strategic framing can be conceived of as terms used 
to win arguments then it can be argued that the tranquility vs. mayhem frame 
functioned as a “god-term” vs. “devil-term” frame to score a mental image of the 
dichotomous societal makeup of Denmark onto the mind of the audience. There was 
no effort on the part of any individual on the show to contest the existence or nature 
of the tranquility vs. mayhem frame that characterized the scene in Denmark.  
Bluitgen’s inability to find an illustrator to draw Muhammad for his book and 
Flemming Rose’s concern over what was proper in “the public space” helped to make 
self-censorship a dominant frame in the State of Denmark narrative. And Jyllands-
Posten, Rose’s paper, “insisted from the start that its purpose was to show that there 
are no higher values in a democratic society than free speech and free expression, and 
if Muslims want to live” in Denmark “they’d better buy that.” Toger Seidenfaden, 
editor of a rival paper, supported Jyllands-Posten’s “right to be stupid” as “part of 
freedom of speech.” Though Seidenfaden did not think that Jyllands-Posten had any 
intention to create an international crisis, the paper’s mission was to do just what they 
explicitly stated on the front page of the paper; “to teach religious Muslims in 
Denmark that in our society they must accept to be scorned, mocked, and ridiculed.”  
Jyllands-Posten, Rose, and Seidenfaden use two ultimate terms to justify 
publication of the Muhammad cartoons, freedom and democracy. “The greatest 
sacrifices that contemporary man is called upon to make are demanded in the name of 
‘freedom,’” stated Richard Weaver (1985), “though the referent which the average 
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man attaches to this word is most obscure” (p. 228). But the amorphous nature of the 
term freedom did not temper Danish insistence on the principle of free speech 
regarding publication of the Muhammad cartoons. Like freedom, democracy is an 
ultimate term and it possesses similar potency. And as “god-terms,” freedom and 
democracy can account for a broad range of responsible and irresponsible behaviors 
and acts. However, when the cartoon controversy “started careening out of 
control…the editors…reacted by refusing to speak to anyone at all.” The paper’s 
response was similar to the self-censorship exhibited in Rose’s use of a script for 
interviews (see Blitzer, 2006) and in his article (F. Rose, 2006) justifying publication 
of the cartoons. These acts demonstrate that Jyllands-Posten and Rose recognized that 
there are indeed occasions when the right to free speech should be tempered with 
prudence.  
The self-censorship frame was contested by the former Danish minister and 
newspaper editor, Uffe Elleman, who argued that “a little self-censorship is not 
always a bad thing.” Particularly, he contended, with regard to minority groups, “you 
don’t stamp on other people’s religious feelings,” Elleman stated, and to “do it with 
the single purpose of demonstrating that you have the right to do so, then you are 
undermining the freedom of speech as I see it.” Support from an unexpected defender 
went a long way toward contesting the self-censorship frame forwarded by Jyllands-
Posten, Rose, and Seidenfaden.  
Another dominant frame that emerged during the “60 Minutes” segment was 
the radical Imam frame. The first time Ahmed Abu Laban appears on screen is when 
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he is speaking in Arabic to Muslim men gathered at a Mosque in Copenhagen. His 
right fist extending back and forth, and his voice raised and intense, indicates that the 
Imam is certainly passionate, perhaps angry, unless, of course, the viewer is aware of 
culturally-oriented communication practices that are prevalent in the Middle East. For 
example, in Morocco, it is common to see individuals conversing with such intensity 
that it can be assumed, by foreigners who do not share this practice, that they are 
quarreling. After routinely witnessing the people embrace a few moments later, one 
realizes that the “quarrel” was just a conversation.  
This practice is not unique to Middle Easterners. Some groups in Latin 
American countries and America routinely converse with a high level of intensity. 
But given the negative association that has been built around the term “Imam” the 
voice and image of the man would be read as “radical Imam.” In Simon’s voiceover 
during the footage of Laban speaking at the Mosque, he told viewers that “if the paper 
[Jyllands-Posten] was trying to stir it up, it succeeded.” This statement virtually 
ensured that viewers would interpret what they saw as a “radical Imam” angered by 
the insults to the Prophet Muhammad and Islam. The “radical Imam” frame went 
uncontested during the “60 Minutes” segment. Instead of contesting this frame, Dr. 
Kamal Qureshi, during his brief appearance on in the segment, essentially bolstered 
the radical Imam frame, though inadvertently, or, perhaps more correctly, because he 
was unaware of how his voice would be juxtaposed with the appearance of Imam 
Laban. Qureshi’s statement that “we [Danish Muslims] have to take the ball away 
from the extreme groups in Denmark and put it in the middle where the rest of us are” 
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positioned moderate Muslims dialectically in relation to the perception of Imam 
Ahmed Abu Laban, thereby bolstering the radical Imam frame. Dr. Qureshi was 
interviewed in a small, noisy shawarmah joint in the “Muslim quarter” rather than in 
his office in the parliament where there were likely well-appointed accommodations. 
The decision to film in the eatery helped to frame Muslims, regardless of their status 
in Danish society, as “Other.” The dominant frames employed throughout the 
program produced a meta-frame of immigration.  
Conclusion 
 Gamson (1996) described framing as a discursive process of strategic actors 
utilizing symbolic resources to participate in collective sense-making about public 
policy issues (cited in Pan & Kosicki, 2001, p. 36). Pan and Kosicki argued that 
framing is an essential part of public deliberation but that “it not a harmonious 
process but an ideological contest and political struggle” (p. 36). It is a process 
through which interpretations of reality are developed, contested, crushed, and 
bolstered. Although the normative idea of “deliberative democracy” is that political 
elites function as “surrogate deliberators,” deliberation—as a result of the 
proliferation of interactive electronic media—“is becoming a genuine empirical 
phenomenon” (p. 35). This means that lessons that we learn from examining strategic 
framing can be applied to deliberation in the public sphere as a way to improve 
reasoning on public policy.  
 The strategic framing “contest” of the “Charlie Rose” program resulted in a 
meta-frame of responsibility through which the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy 
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narrative could be interpreted. The responsibility to use good judgment in the exercise 
of free speech was held out as a means of avoiding conflict in the future. The 
responsibility to protect the image of Islam was place squarely on the shoulders of 
Muslims whose duty it is to act in accordance with Islamic teachings when 
challenged by free speech used irresponsibly. The responsibility to respect the 
broader community supported the protecting the image of Islam sub-frame. The 
responsibility to respect the broader community sub-frame showed that those who 
threaten the safety and life of those who disagree with aspects of Islam participate in 
damaging the image of the religion. The responsibility to respect sacrosanct values 
highlighted that everyone can benefit from addressing conflicts in this manner. The 
implication is that when issues over values arise, parties are better situated to manage 
the fallout and they are in a better position to keep value-based conflicts from 
erupting.  
The inclusion of Muslim guests in the conversation on freedom of speech vs. 
religious sensibilities greatly added to how the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy was 
dramatized and provided a more balanced approach to dealing with issues 
surrounding the controversy. For example, coverage of the controversy that included 
no or very subdued Muslim voices dramatized the conflict in a one-sided manner 
which either explicitly or implicitly accused Muslims of being backward, intolerant, 
and inherently violent. Awad and Foukara provided insight into the concerns of 
moderate Muslims, exposed issues that exacerbated the cartoon conflict, and 
suggested solutions for dealing with the conflict. An opportunity to present a 
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balanced assessment of the cartoon conflict was needed and the “Charlie Rose” 
episode provided such an opportunity. Awad and Foukara used this opportunity to re-
position Islam as a peaceful religion of peaceful people who are capable of presenting 
their views intelligibly. The non-Muslims on the program re-positioned Islam as 
deserving of a fair venue. Specifically, Rose invited three guests—two Muslims and 
one non-Muslim. The resulting two-by-two conversation, on its face, presented an 
image of fairness. More often than not, when Muslim voices are included, they 
represent the minority view and are usually so out numbered that they stand a very 
small chance of winning a strategic framing contest. However, on this episode of 
“Charlie Rose” the discussants were matched in number and deliberative skill. 
 The “60 Minutes” narrative about the cartoon controversy exhibited a meta-
frame of immigration that was supported by the dominant frames of tranquility vs. 
mayhem, self-censorship, and radical Imam. In this segment of the show, Dr. Qureshi 
provided some insight into the feelings of Danish Muslims. He indicated that “there 
are a lot of Muslims that are afraid that they could be turned into scapegoats and 
people would say that the reason that the world hate[s] us is because you people are 
telling bad stories of Denmark.” Qureshi’s contribution to the dialogue presented the 
vulnerable, sympathetic side of the Muslim story that could help the audience 
appreciate the position of moderate Muslims vis-à-vis the pressure they face from 
Danish separatists and extremist elements within Islam. His expressions of love for 
his country, Denmark, and his involvement in politics indicated that he does not see 
himself or other Muslims as outsiders. Qureshi re-positioned Muslims as citizens of a 
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new country who are facing problems but are “optimistic” that they will manage to 
get control of the image of moderate Muslims in Denmark. Participation in public 
deliberation inevitably involves the discursive practice of framing an issue. For this 
reason, investigating the “Charlie Rose” and “60 Minutes” episodes as “strategic 
contests” shed light on the rhetorical moves participants made in order to forward 
their interpretation of events. Chapter six presents a synthesis of the analyses 
conducted in chapters three through five and the conclusion for this study.  
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Controversy is the cartoonist’s staff of 
life; he starves in times of “brotherly 
love.” 
-- Isabel Johnson, Cartoons, 1937. 
CHAPTER SIX 
Envisioning the Entelechialized Narrative: Tragic or Comic Frame?  
Discussion 
This study is an exploration into how the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy 
unfolded at three critical thresholds in the conflict’s development. First, this study 
focuses a lens on critical communications that transpired in Denmark among key 
figures engaged in the conflict. Second, the interviews of Flemming Rose provide 
insight into how the conflict was dramatized by Jyllands-Posten and Flemming Rose 
for international dissemination. Third, the televised broadcasts provide examples of 
how the controversy was dramatized for American audiences. Together, these 
rhetorical artifacts allowed for analysis of the product of the worldviews as expressed 
through the cartoons, multiplied by the values and traditions of the interlocutors, and 
multiplied by the amplification of the conflict through television broadcasts. Analysis 
of the artifacts reveals that there was a progressive transformation of the issues as 
news of the conflict spread around the globe. A statement on the transformational 
force inherent in narrative development is useful.  
The notion of the realization or actualization of a phenomenon stems from the 
concept of entelechy, a term coined by Aristotle more than two thousand years ago. 
Aristotle applied the concept to natural processes and later, Kenneth Burke extended 
it to the symbolic, or rhetorical, realm. Burke (1972) stated that by entelechy “I refer 
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to such use of symbolic resources that potentialities can be said to attain their perfect 
fulfillment” (p. 39). In other words, a symbol “strive[s]...to be…the kind of thing that 
it was” (Burke, 1969a, p. 249). And this “striving” is accomplished “perfectly” (p. 
249) in the same way that a carrot seed produces a carrot. As Stan Lindsay (1999) 
noted, Burke found it necessary “to replace the implicit determinism of Aristotelian 
biological entelechy with the implicit freedom of human action” in symbolic 
entelechy (p. 269). Burke made this switch to underscore the free will inherent in the 
act of symbol selection and how symbol selection is determinative in the development 
and actualization, or entelechialization, of a narrative.  
In this chapter I synthesize the analyses of the artifacts and demonstrate that 
the narrative development of the conflict must be apprehended from three 
perspectives: (1) the “double nature” of the controversy both as the concrete thing 
that it is and as a participant in the narrative perfection of the total act; (2) the conflict 
as commandeered by a broader narrative to justify the War on Terror and the conflict 
as a narrative means for Denmark to enhance its identification with the EU, and by 
extension the West; and (3) the cycle of redemption as a ritual process in relation to 
the War on Terror and as a symbolic process of Danish redemption. 
Entelechialization of the cartoon controversy narrative across the three stages of 
development resulted in a different, more toxic dramatization of events which 
virtually ensures a self-fulfilling prophecy of tragedy.  
What can be drawn from art controversies generally, and the Muhammad 
Cartoon Controversy in particular, is that artists affect the broader world and social 
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conditions influence artistic expression. As we have seen in the examples of artistic 
works such as “Christa,” “Muhammad Messenger of God,” and the Nussenzwig v. 
Philip-Lorca diCorcia case, art and piety is an intersection where freedom of 
expression and religious sensibilities collide. Threats to religious dogma, a changing 
political climate, fear of displacement, and other social struggles are reflected in 
artistic expressions that can give rise to controversy. In the case of the infamous 
Muhammad cartoons, melding the sacred and the profane in proscribed depiction of 
the Prophet functioned to “push-back” the spread of Islamic culture in Denmark by 
opponents of immigration.  
The publication of cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad sparked a 
debate over whether respect for religious sensibilities trumps the free expression of 
ideas, or vice versa. Moderate Muslims condemned the violent protests that erupted in 
response to the publications. Supporters of the cartoons cited them as a legitimate 
exercise of the right of free speech, arguing that the satire of religion is a long-held 
Western tradition that should be protected. Ardent critics described the cartoons as 
blasphemous and Islamophobic. Reflecting on the nation’s history, Prime Minister 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen identified the cartoon controversy as Denmark’s worst 
international crisis since World War II (Saunders, 2008, p. 14).  
The function of rhetorical strategies employed by interlocutors on either side 
of the debate points to the need for insight into the nature of public discourse 
involving cardinal values that are rooted in disparate cultures. In the era of personal 
technology (phones, computers, and wireless devices) internationalization is 
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immediate and makes rhetoric anywhere in the world accessible to individuals around 
the globe, increasing the potential for misunderstanding. Thus, analysis of the 
Muhammad Cartoon Controversy and the escalation of the conflict resulting from the 
failure to address cultural values can provide guidance for dealing with future 
controversies.  
In this chapter, I explore the full dramatization of the cartoon controversy 
through the three stages of its development in order to demonstrate how the cycle of 
redemption operated for Denmark within the context of the cartoon conflict. As the 
full dramatization of the conflict is unraveled, I expose how the Muhammad Cartoon 
Controversy was assimilated into the clash of civilizations story and appropriated by 
the terrorism narrative to bolster the rhetoric which characterizes and condemns Islam 
to justify the War on Terror. The discussion section concludes with a presentation of 
the lessons learned from the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy. In the conclusion I 
offer some thoughts for consideration, recommend ways that the costly lessons of the 
conflict can be applied, and provide a summary of the study. 
Disequilibrium: Actual and Symbolic 
A look back at the rhetoric of the cartoon conflict as well as rhetoric related to 
Muslims and Islam over the last two decades helps us to distill the lessons of the 
cartoon conflict. Findings of the present study indicate that there was disequilibrium 
in Danish-European relations and disequilibrium in Danish society. The deterioration 
of socio-political conditions at both levels resulted in a rejection of hierarchy which 
activated the cycle of redemption. Burke describes this cycle as a symbolic process of 
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guilt, purification and redemption that results from rejecting the pyramid of hierarchy 
that is a byproduct of human interaction (Burke, 1984b, pp. 274-294). It is impossible 
to meet all of the demands of the hierarchy and guilt is experienced when one falls. 
Victimage is one way to resolve the guilt experienced. This method of purification 
must be appropriate to the sin for the drama to succeed as an act of redemption. The 
symbolic sacrifice, the scapegoat, is rhetorically prepared for the “kill” and once the 
rite of purification is preformed the guilty can once again function within the 
hierarchy until the burden of another fall becomes too great and the cycle repeats 
itself.  
To achieve the deepest understanding of the Muhammad Cartoon 
Controversy, one must gauge it bicamerally, that is, one must see the conflict’s 
“double nature” both as the concrete thing that it is, with its own unique combination 
of conditions and events, and as a participant in the perfection (the entelechial 
perfection) of the ultimate dramatization that allowed each progressive development 
in the dramatization to share in the symbolic meaning of the total act. Specifically, 
Danish rejection of European Union (EU) hierarchy, which promotes expansion and 
“progress,” resulted in the need for Denmark to strengthen its identity with the EU. 
Rejection of the EU strategy and hierarchy was also, by extension, a rejection of 
Western hierarchy, resulting in the need for identification with other Western 
countries, such as the United States. In A Rhetoric of Motives, Burke (1969b) 
contemplated the social pyramid of communication; a system that is “shrouded in 
[the] mystifications of its various levels [and] vibrates with tensions” (Carter, 1996) 
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that exceed mere persuasion. Climbing the social ladder is pervasive as is the fear of 
falling. 
Carter (1996) summarized the manifestations of societal hierarchy. 
Hierarchical motives lurk in the insignia of property, in race relations, in 
scientific bureaucracies, and in any system of caste…the attempt to reinforce 
one’s hierarchical position sometimes seems the characteristic event of social 
life. Everywhere we turn claims of superiority are filed, enigmatic confessions 
of inferiority made, and rank adjusted by all sorts of roundabout inflations and 
deflations. Conformity, hypocrisy, and philanthropy—all are forms of 
hierarchy. (p. 12)  
 
Denmark’s refusal to conform to important elements of the EU strategy for 
“progress” resulted in a demotion in status for the Scandinavian country. As Richard 
Weaver (1985) informed us, “progress” is an ultimate term, a “god-term,” adopted by 
the West. Rejection of “progress” signaled a rejection of Western hierarchy, and 
Denmark needed to be purified of its transgression. Strengthening its identification 
with the EU functioned as a corrective for, among other things, Denmark’s opting out 
of the monetary union, the immigration and justice policy, the European citizenship 
rules, and the defense co-operation provisions that are part of The Treaty of the 
European Union. The opt-outs are particularly problematic for Danish-EU relations 
since Denmark benefits from provisions of the treaty from which it has opted-out. 
However, the opt-outs are critical to protecting the prosperity and cultural heritage of 
a “Danish Denmark” ("Danish Radio Station Loses License", 2005). The EU strategy 
for “progress” includes plans for Eastward expansion that portends a rise in 
immigration which heightens the threat to Danish identity. The opt-outs are a means 
of protecting Denmark from the threat which lingers outside the country 
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 Carter (1996) posited that “even one’s relationship with one’s own self has an 
ingredient of hierarchical rhetoric, with ‘conscience’ defined as the effort to address 
one’s conduct to the spirit of an ideal community in whose esteem one wishes to be 
raised” (p. 12). Denmark sought to protect the “growth and prosperity” (Rasmussen, 
2006, January) of its “coz[y] kingdom” (Simon, 2006) by blocking EU 
encroachments on its political and economic systems. To eliminate threats to Danish 
identity from inside the country, Denmark established the toughest immigration laws 
in Europe, commissioned the development of a cultural cannon, and turned a blind 
eye to racial and religious discriminatory acts against Muslims by government 
officials and media functionaries.  
The official communications of key parties at the genesis and nexus of the 
Muhammad Cartoon Controversy was the first stage of development in the conflict 
narrative. They exposed the tension in Danish-EU relations (and by extension the 
West) prior to and at the time of the publication of the infamous cartoons. Publication 
of the Muhammad cartoons condemned the common “foe” (Huntington, 1996, p. 215) 
of Denmark and the EU which allowed Denmark to strengthen its identification with 
the EU in order to purify the guilt associated with rejection of the established 
hierarchy. The official communication artifacts also revealed disequilibrium within 
Danish society and uncovered the stringent methods used to restore the social 
hierarchy challenged by the spread of Islamic culture. Ostensibly the cartoon 
controversy was over freedom of speech vs. religious sensibilities. But the actual 
contest was over Danish cultural superiority and by extension EU and Western 
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superiority. Thus, Danish Muslims felt their religious value system was under threat. 
On both sides of the issue, threats to the sacrosanct values of the parties moved them 
to rally to protect their interests. The narrative evolved as news of the conflict spread 
beyond Denmark. 
To apprehend the evolution of the cartoon conflict I adapted Victor Turner’s 
(1977) concept of social identity transformation to the rhetorical realm. Liminal 
moments are characterized by spaces where evolutionary change occurs. For purposes 
of the present study, liminal moments expose shifts in ideological motivations behind 
the rhetoric. Liminal moments help us to understand the process of narrative 
transformation as a ritual for embodying symbolic values, defining the nature of the 
“real,” or struggling over control of the sign—a tool that assists in analyzing changes 
at the three stages of narrative development in the cartoon controversy. Locating 
liminal moments between the three stages of the cartoon conflict narrative helped to 
reveal the rhetorical connection among the artifacts, as well as the rhetorical 
connection to events in Denmark, the EU, and the world.  
Continuing with the synthesis of the analyses, the dramatizations within the 
official communication texts do not explicitly provide a comprehensive narrative 
concerning the nature of the socio-political environment that permitted the 
controversy to erupt in Denmark. However, together they provide important clues that 
lead to a more robust interpretation of events which allows the critic to analyze the 
genesis of the phenomenon. The clues also provide understanding on how the official 
communication artifacts are connected to the next stage of narrative development. 
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Change in the way the cartoon controversy was dramatized in the interviews of 
Flemming Rose vis-à-vis the official communications signals the first liminal moment 
in the dramatization of the cartoon conflict. The second stage of development is 
marked by a shift in the audience to whom the rhetoric was directed. Specially, the 
official communications were directed to the Danish audience, the dramatizations in 
the interviews were directed toward audiences outside of Denmark.  
Crucial connections exist between the official communications and the 
second, as well as third stage of development. Specifically, key segments of 
Flemming Rose’s (2006) article justifying why he commissioned the cartoons are 
found in both the second and third stages of the dramatization. For instance, in the“60 
Minutes” (Tanz-Flaum, 2006b) interview, Rose stated that “it is problematic that if 
some Muslims require of me that I in the public space, in the public domain have to 
submit myself to their taboos in that case I don’t think they are asking for my respect 
I think they are asking for my submission” (2006b). This statement appears, nearly 
verbatim, in Rose’s (2006) article that is part of the first stage of development. And, 
at the second stage, Rose referenced the public domain issue in the Blitzer-Rose 
interview on “The Situation Room” (Blitzer, 2006). The evidence indicates that the 
“official position” of Rose and Jyllands-Posten played a key role at each stage of the 
narrative development in the cartoon conflict. That Rose (2006) draws upon the 
content of his article in the many interviews that he granted is an indication that the 
article is rightly situated among the official communications and points to the high 
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probability that the document was likely produced as the official position of Jyllands-
Posten.  
At the second stage of narrative development, there was also a shift in the tone 
of the debate. Less immediate concern was placed on self-censorship by the Danish 
and EU media in relation to depicting Muhammad. Rose, by repeating the issue about 
Muslims demanding his submission, widened the realm that was in danger to include 
the entire public sphere and increased the level of threat to include all Muslim 
religious proscriptions. At this stage of narrative development there was also a shift 
from the implicit to a more explicit dramatization of the issues. For example, the way 
the conflict was framed in the Malek-Rose interview indicates that immigration was a 
fundamental issue in the cartoon controversy and that, while freedom of speech was 
important, the primary debate revolved around immigration, particularly Muslim 
immigration. “The Situation Room” episode which advertised the relatively brief 
Blitzer-Rose interview segment was in reality an episode which framed the cartoon 
controversy in a specific way for its American audience. The cartoon conflict 
narrative that preceded and followed the interview segment tied the conflict to 
American self-censorship, terrorism, and Islamic fundamentalism—the cartoon 
controversy was framed as a public crisis. During the Blitzer-Roses interview, Rose 
(2006) was tied to the carefully-crafted script of his article. Here, even though he was 
more tied to the script than in the Malek interview, we can still see how the 
dramatization of the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy is evolving. The more it is 
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dramatized by different rhetors and the smaller the role that the original interlocutors 
play, the more the changes in motive become apparent.   
The second liminal moment occurs at the threshold of the third stage of 
development—the televised broadcasts. At this stage, the Muhammad Cartoon 
Controversy is a full-blown international public crisis. During the “Charlie Rose” 
show, former President George W. Bush hinted at government involvement in the 
crisis and former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice openly accused “Iran and 
Syria” of going “out of their way to inflame sentiment and to use this [conflict] for 
their own purposes” (C. Rose, 2006). By this stage of narrative development, broad 
coverage of the phenomenon explicitly or implicitly accused Muslims of being 
backward, intolerant, and inherently violent. News of death threats against the twelve 
cartoonists circulated. News coverage was saturated with reports on damage to 
property and loss of life. News coverage of peaceful protests against the publications 
was scant at best. And information on the socio-political conditions in Denmark that 
gave rise to the controversy was non-existent, which represents a marked shift 
between the first and third stage of narrative development. That “Charlie Rose” 
gathered senior analysts to deliberate issues surrounding the cartoon conflict indicates 
that the conflict had reached critical mass and required the input of specialists to 
provide insight on the direction that should be taken in terms of public policy. 
As noted above, there are critical connections between the first and third 
stages of narrative development.  At the third stage, on “60 Minutes” (Tanz-Flaum, 
2006b), Bob Simon asked Rasmussen why he refused, in a letter that is part of the 
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first stage, to meet with the Arab Ambassadors. Rasmussen replied “well, we have 
not refused dialogue. On the contrary” (2006b). Simon pressed further, “but you 
didn’t meet with the Arab ambassadors” (2006b). Rasmussen replied, “No, but I have 
to stress that the foreign minister has had meetings with ambassadors and foreign 
ministers and others” (2006b). In Rasmssen’s (2005) reply to the Ambassadors’ 
request for a meeting, he directed attention away from himself and directed the 
Ambassadors to turn to the Danish courts for redress of abuses. As noted in the 
analysis of Rasmussen’s (2005) reply, he implied “no” to the request for a meeting. 
The exchange between Simon and Rasmussen demonstrates that Rasmussen 
intentionally implied “no.” This squashes his claim of wanting “mutual respect and 
understanding” (2005) between Danish and Muslim cultures.  
During his investigation, Simon (Tanz-Flaum, 2006b) interviewed Toger 
Seidenfaden, editor of a Jyllands-Posten rival, who provided his view on why the 
Prime Minister refused to meet with the Ambassadors. Seidenfaden stated that “sadly 
enough, in the domestic political situation in Denmark, the logic was simple. As 
conflict between the biggest newspaper in the land and religious Muslims? On whose 
side I am? It’s very simple for a prime minister to answer. I’m with the big 
newspaper” (2006b). But if Rasmussen had other reasons for saying no, we will never 
know what they were because Rasmussen will not admit that he said “no.” 
Rasmussen may be holding a hard line on this issue so that the international 
community does not blame him for having turned down an opportunity to keep the 
cartoon conflict from turning into an international public crisis. In his awkward and 
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defensive response to Simon’s question about not meeting with the Ambassadors, 
Rasmussen “stress[ed] that the foreign minister has had meetings with ambassadors 
and foreign ministers and others” (Tanz-Flaum, 2006b). Just as in his reply to the 
Ambassadors, Rasmussen, once again, engaged in double-speak to give the 
impression that the dialogue that had occurred related to Danish Muslim concerns. 
This suggests that the findings arrived at in the analysis of Rasmussen’s (2005) reply 
to the Ambassadors is correct in that the dialogue Rasmussen spoke of, in fact, 
referred to dialogue between Denmark and Muslim countries rather than between 
Danes and Danish Muslims. The implication is that Rasmussen had no intention on 
addressing Danish Muslim concerns and intentionally tried to camouflage his 
disinterest. In the third stage of narrative development, the discussion among the 
guests and moderator on the “Charlie Rose” (2006) episode and Bob Simon’s “60 
Minutes” (Tanz-Flaum, 2006a) investigation reveal that dramatizations in coverage of 
the cartoon conflict developed beyond the interpretations forwarded in interviews of 
Flemming Rose (second stage) and well beyond the dramatizations in the official 
communications (first stage). The rhetorical artifacts of the present study provide 
examples of how entelechializing the cartoon conflict narrative as an us vs. them 
interpretation of the phenomenon limits the possible outcome of the conflict to one of 
tragedy.  
Findings in Previous Research 
The findings of previous studies support the findings of the present study. For 
example, Douai (2007) found that in televised broadcasts on Al Jazeera and Al Arabia 
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the media was “unusually performative” in “problematizing the phenomenon” 
through the use of new technologies that permitted development of the conflict into a 
“mediatized public crisis” through construction of stories and propaganda “in order to 
explain the course of events over a given period of time” (pp. 11-12). Powers (2008) 
found that mainstream Western media “actively and intentionally provided packages 
of symbolized images and stories to further problematic stereotypes of Muslim[s]” 
and drew from the culturally resonant “clash” thesis to dramatize events and “invoke 
fear…about the escalating ‘crisis’” (p. 27).  Drawing on the “clash” thesis to help 
explain events was also found in the second and third stages of narrative development 
in the present study.  
In a study by Eko and Berkowitz (2007), the findings show that there were 
ethical lapses in judgment on the part of Jyllands-Posten. Ethical lapses were also 
found in the present study but not on the ground of “Danish journalistic insularity and 
lack of sophistication” (pp. 19-20). The findings in the present study are based on 
Jyllands-Posten’s hiding behind democratic values and freedom of speech to achieve 
its goal of provoking Danish Muslims, and Flemming Rose’s abuse of his position as 
cultural editor of the paper. The Eko and Berkowitz finding that there was a lack of 
sophistication is too broad because the paper and Rose exhibited a high level of 
sophistication in choosing the journalistic tradition of “show, don’t tell” through 
cartooning as a means to their end. Bhattacharya (2007) found that the use of 
orientalist imagery along with British “attitude[s] toward its Muslim 
population…located within a larger rhetoric on race, class, and immigrant identity in 
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the United Kingdom” accounts for the nature of media discourse surrounding the 
Muhammad Cartoon Controversy. Findings of the present study concur with 
Bhattacharya’s findings that orientalist images contribute to the nature of discourse 
surrounding the conflict. But additional factors such as the socio-political conditions 
in Denmark, Denmark’s troubled relationship with the EU, and the underlying 
motivations of rhetors on either side of the conflict also contributed to the discourse. 
The use of stereotypes in the media discourse surrounding the conflict suggests, as the 
findings of the Shroff (2006) study highlights, a long-standing conflict between press 
freedom and press responsibility.  
What is revealed in the findings of the present study is that dramatization of 
the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy changed over time. Analyses of the official 
communications indicate that while the discriminatory acts of Danish public officials 
and media functionaries were severe and disturbing they were not interpreted as a 
public crisis. Dramatization of the conflict escalated as it progressed through three 
stages of development, finally reaching the level of an international public crisis. 
Previous studies on the cartoon conflict show that dramatization of the controversy 
varied across audiences in France, Britian, America, and the Arabic speaking world 
as news of the controversy spread around the globe. This indicates that the narrative 
began to reflect culture specific concerns and values relative to the violation of an 
Islamic sacrosanct proscription. Though the narrative morphed over time what 
resonated across audiences, at different times and at varying degrees, were 
perceptions and attitudes that flowed from a shared clash of civilizations frame of 
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events (Douai, 2007; Eko & Berkowitz, 2007; Powers, 2008). The cartoon conflict 
was assimilated by the clash of civilizations narrative which moved the dramatization 
further along the cycle of redemption. Preparation of the ritual sacrifice will allow 
Denmark to be purified of the transgression of rejecting the EU, and by extension, 
Western hierarchy. 
A Clash of Civilizations? 
 The clash of civilizations thesis was first forwarded by Bernard Lewis (1990) 
and later expanded by Samuel P. Huntington (1993, 1996). Specifically, Huntington’s 
(1993) clash of civilizations thesis is premised on the idea that “differences between 
civilizations” and “civilization-consciousness…will supplant ideological and other 
forms of conflict as the dominant global form of conflict” (p. 48). By civilization, he 
means the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural 
identity that people share (pp. 23-24). For Huntington, Islam, Confusionism, and the 
six other civilizations—Hindu, Japanese, Slavic, Orthodox, Latin America, and 
Africa—that still exist are separate from each other and perpetually poised for 
conflict. As Huntington sees it, disparate civilizations will become more aware of the 
differences that exist between them and this will be the basis of global conflict. 
Above all, he argues, “a central focus of conflict for the immediate future will be 
between the West and several Islamic-Confucian states” (p. 48). Edward Said (2001) 
contended that the clash of civilizations thesis forwards a post-Cold War formulation 
of the world that is inaccurate because it compresses “civilizations and identities 
into…shut-down, sealed-off entities that have been purged of the myriad currents and 
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countercurrents that animate human history” (p. 1). However, in spite of a world 
history that contains a record of not only religious wars and imperial conquests but 
also evidence of cultural exchange, cross-fertilization and sharing between 
civilizations the clash thesis has currency. It has been used by advisors, policy 
makers, and leaders to make sense of the post-Cold War world and to anticipate the 
actions of potential enemies. Huntington tried to legitimate casting his clash thesis 
over the post-Cold War world by stating that “with the end of the Soviet 
Union…political considerations gave way to religious ones” (Huntington, 1993, p. 
36). But this justification ignores the many complexities of the post-Cold War world, 
such as, for example, the separation of church and state in Western countries and the 
concerns of civilizations that do not espouse a particular religion.  
 In a Committee on International Relations hearing (Subcommittee on the 
Middle East and Central Asia, 2006), legislators and analysts convened to answer the 
question of whether the U.S. is “engaged in a clash of civilizations with the Middle 
East and Central Asia as the central front in this struggle” (p. 2). And more 
specifically, “how can U.S. strategies be crafted to address [more specifically, 
combat]…[the] different levels of involvement and support” of enemies in the 
struggle (p. 3). Hillel Fradkin, Director of The Hudson Institute Center for Islam, 
Democracy and the Future of the Muslim World, was one of the witnesses testifying 
before the Subcommittee. He testified that the nature of the clash is “a utopian 
movement” that “bear[s] some comparison with recent utopian movements like 
communism and fascism. Its most fundamental similarity with them is the fact that, 
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like them, it regards liberal democracy as its enemy” (p. 35). Fradkin stated that this 
view is held by radical Islam which “promote[s] this view tirelessly both at home and 
abroad”...“and if and when this view takes hold completely [across the Muslim 
world] we will find ourselves in a clash of civilizations and maybe a civilization war. 
We won’t really have any choice” (p. 36). Fradkin’s statement, like Huntington’s 
thesis, casts the Cold War paradigm onto the post-Cold War world.  
On the Monday prior to the Subcommittee hearing, former President George 
W. Bush addressed the nation on the fifth anniversary of the horrible events of 
September 11th. He remarked that “this struggle has been called a clash of 
civilizations. In truth it is a struggle for civilization. We are fighting to maintain the 
way of life enjoyed by free nations” (cited in Subcommittee on the Middle East and 
Central Asia, 2006, p. 44). Bush, in other words, told the nation that the clash of 
civilizations is a struggle for democracy and that the democratic way of life is the 
civilized way of life. Ranking International Relations Committee Member and Co-
Chair of the Subcommittee, Gary L. Ackerman of New York, in his opening 
statement commented that he found the subject of the hearing, is there a clash of 
civilizations, “in itself alarming…that [five] years into this conflict we need to have a 
hearing to help us define and describe our enemy because the Bush Administration 
has ignored one of the most basic and obvious dictums of strategy—to know one’s 
enemy, and without accurately understanding who and what they are fighting against 
they can’t hope to fashion a successful response” (Subcommittee on the Middle East 
and Central Asia, 2006, p. 3). Nevertheless, not knowing who or what America was 
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fighting against did not prevent manifestations of the clash of civilizations thesis from 
permeating U.S. foreign policy; political rhetoric; and media discourse, including the 
news and popular culture.  
The “god-term” democracy is one of a few terms which gives the average 
American of our time a concept of something bigger than himself, “which he is 
socially impelled to accept and even to sacrifice for” (Weaver, 1985, p. 214). Not 
knowing the nature of the conflict is one of the sacrifices that can be required to 
protect democracy and freedom when it is entreated by claims that the national 
security is threatened. Democracy’s capacity to demand sacrifice is a reliable 
indicator that it is so sacrosanct that other rights must be mysteriously rendered up for 
it. It is justifiable, then, that is some sense it is an ultimate term.  
In a study on the primal motive for the War on Terrorism, Ivie and Giner 
(2007), described democracy as a “distempered demon that projects it’s shadow onto 
the external enemy” (p. 580). Democracy, they contended, “is an attitude articulated 
within the polity and configured by rhetoric, especially by conventions of discourse 
that treat relations of similitude as relations of equivalence or virtual sameness” (p. 
581). In other words, a set of literalized metaphors conceptualize democracy and the 
metaphorical concept produces a powerful mythical appeal. The distempered nature 
of democracy is articulated in what Benjamin Barber (1984) observed,  
“the rhetoric of democracy in America is very much akin to “zoo keeping.” 
Human “creatures,” situated by “liberal democratic imagery” within a 
menagerie of sovereign lions, bleating sheep, and ornery wolves are 
reduced…to one great beast. In this “zoology,”…liberal democracy’s sturdiest 
cages are reserved for the People, who are admired for their proud 
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individuality but considered dangerous as a madding crowd.” (cited in Ivie & 
Giner, 2007, p. 582) 
 
While attempting to properly contain and discipline domestic democracy, American 
political leaders endorsed a theory of democratic power that recommended a thin veil 
of democratization as the means to global peace. Ivie and Giner observed that “this 
assumption legitimized an aggressive post-Cold War foreign policy and a subsequent 
doctrine of preemptive warfare for fighting the tyranny of terrorism” (Ivie & Giner, 
2007, p. 583). Exploration of the clash of civilizations thesis helps us to understand 
how it resonated for audiences in coverage of the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy. 
We are also helped to understand the ways in which “distempered democracy” is 
consubstantial with its “enemy.” From a management perspective, the sturdy “cages 
reserved for the [American] People” puts a ceiling on the “dangerous spirit of self-
rule” (p. 582) that would make administering liberal democracy impossible. 
Conversely, as the government inspired revolt argument goes (Blitzer, 2006, p. 11), 
the Muslim masses do not need to be contained because they “do not yet know how to 
debate, dissent, revise or reform” (Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central 
Asia, 2006, p. 10) in order to have a say in how they are governed. Instead, Muslim 
governments use the people “for their own purposes” (C. Rose, 2006, p. 2). The two 
approaches to managing the masses are consubstantial in that they are determinative 
in the type and level of freedoms that the “people” do or do not enjoy. Freedom is 
limited in both systems. From an ideological perspective, Huntington states, the 
“West in effect is using international institutions, military power and economic 
resources to run the world in ways that will maintain Western political and economic 
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values” (Huntington, 1993, p. 40). He also focuses our attention on the idea that “non-
West[tern countries]…increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to 
shape the world in non-Western ways” (p. 26). Huntington, therefore, presents an 
unquenchable thirst for power and control on either side of the clash, either side 
appearing evil in the eyes of the other. To do battle requires justification. Justification 
lies in the character of the “enemy.”  
Perfecting the Enemy 
 To rally the broader population around the idea of warring, symbolically or 
militarily, against a “foe” the enemy must be a complete, perfect in order to justify 
warfare. Several methods were used in the West to perfect the “enemy” in the minds 
of the American people. And by the time the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy 
phenomenon became an international public crisis it was inextricably tied to the 
notion of a clash of civilizations and was swept up by the narrative on terror in order 
to characterize and condemn the “enemy” and justify the War on Terror. Perfecting 
the “enemy” ritually prepared the scapegoat required to redeem Denmark from its 
transgressions.  
“Decivilizing vehicles.” As early as the publication of The Roots of Muslim 
Rage by Bernard Lewis (1990)—that is, before the terrible events of September 11th, 
before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and fifteen years before the cartoon conflict—
evidence of perfecting the “enemy” can be found. Scholars of American foreign 
policy rhetoric have established that “decivilizing vehicles” are necessary 
components of perfecting the enemy. Pro-war rhetoric performs the ritual of 
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victimage as it cultivates images of a savage enemy. Through analogical extension, 
such rhetoric articulates “theme[s] of diabolism that, taken literally, goads nations 
into defending themselves against barbarians bent upon subjugating innocent 
peoples” (Ivie, 1982, p. 241). The title of Lewis’ (1990) article defines an irrational 
people that have nursed a grudge long enough for it to establish roots. Lewis goes on 
to describe the irrational “enemy” as warring against modernity” and that the war is 
“neither conscious nor explicit…and is directed against the …process of change that 
has taken place in the Islamic world…and has transformed the political, economical, 
social, and even cultural structures of Muslim countries” (p. 59). Only an irrational 
“enemy” filled with “rage” would unconsciously war against a process such as 
“modernity” rather than a tangible enemy that propagates Western hegemony, e.g., 
the United States.    
Lewis fails to mention that the West’s “civilizing” missions justifying 
colonization of a large number of Muslim countries ravaged them economically and 
threatened their cultural heritage with ruin. Nor does he mention that the legacy of 
colonialism has ongoing ramifications for former “protectorates.” Of the “enemy’s” 
irrationality Lewis (1990) goes on to say that when their “deeper passions are stirred 
dignity and courtesy toward others can give way to an explosive mixture of rage and 
hatred which impels even the government of an ancient and civilized country…to 
espouse kidnapping and assassination” (p. 59). As the narrative concerning the 
“enemy” progressed over the years, the nature of “decivilizing vehicles” used to 
characterize the “enemy” became more acrid. 
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In the book that expands the clash of civilizations thesis of his article, Samuel 
Huntington (1996) stated that “Islam is seen as a source of nuclear proliferation [and] 
terrorism” (p. 215). His characterizations of the post-Cold War situation and the 
“enemy” are echoed in the halls of Congress. Like the claims so often made against 
enemies, the charges of Muslim savagery have been persistent, thematic and 
pervasive to the point of ensuring a self-fulfilling prophecy of a clash of civilizations. 
Rhetors availed themselves of “decivilizing” language primarily to characterize and 
condemn. In Denmark, for example, accusations of savagery were persistent and 
pervasive at the highest levels of government. Specifically, Danish Member of 
Parliament and Mayoral candidate Louise Frevert allowed placement of articles on 
her Web site stating that “misguided Muslim youth felt they had a right ‘to rape 
Danish girls and knock down Danish citizens’” (J. M. Olsen, 2005). The media also 
employed “decivilizing vehicles” to condemn the “enemy.” For instance, the owner 
of Radio Holger made the incendiary statement that “the rape of non-Muslim women 
is an intrinsic part of Muslim culture” ("Danish Radio Station Loses License", 2005). 
And the radio station owner promised that if outlets for publicizing claims of Muslim 
barbarism were shout down, others would take their place (2005). In the West, 
“decivilizing vehicles” permeated news coverage related to Islam, and the 
entertainment industry took poetic license in presenting diabolical images of 
Muslims. Political and popular rhetoric about Islam and Muslims instructed the 
broader population on how to think about the current global socio-political situation 
and how to treat the “enemy” (see Burke, 1973, pp. 293-304 on literature as 
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equipment for living). What is apparent in the rhetoric concerning the Muslim world 
in the nearly two decades since the publication of Lewis’ (1990) article is the steady 
movement through “decivilizing vehicles” toward a final image of “terrorist.” Each 
“decivilizing vehicle” contributes in turn to an overall narrative of malevolence that 
identifies Islam as the intransigent enemy of democracy and justifies the War on 
Terror. 
The representative anecdote. What does one do when the “enemy” is nearly 
one quarter of the earth’s population (C.I.A., 2008) and is scattered across five 
continents? What does one do when the “enemy” is diverse in terms of historical 
background, language, cultural heritage, and in terms of the expression of its shared 
religion? What does one do when the “enemy’s” fundamentalist elements are elusive 
and nearly imperceptible in the broader population? To effectively construct an 
enemy from such a broad and diverse civilization one must construct a narrative, from 
which an anecdote can be drawn. Burke (1969a) stated that  
Men seek for vocabularies that will be faithful reflections of reality. To this 
end, they must develop vocabularies that are selections of reality. And any 
selection of reality must, in certain circumstances, function as a deflection of 
reality. Insofar as the vocabulary meets the needs of reflection, we can say 
that it has the necessary scope. In its selectivity it is a reduction. (p. 59, 
emphasis in original).  
 
The cartoon of Muhammad with a bomb for a turban is, by far, the most egregious 
depiction of the Muhammad cartoons that were first published in Jyllands-Posten and 
subsequently published in other European newspapers in a show of solidarity. Of 
representative anecdotes Burke (1969a) states that  
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the informative anecdote, we could say, contains in nuce [in a nutshell] the 
terminological structure that is evolved in conformity with it. Such a 
terminology is a “conclusion” that follows from the selection of a given 
anecdote. (Burke, 1969a, p. 60, emphasis in original).  
 
For the purposes of Flemming Rose, who commissioned the artistic expressions, the 
cartoon of Muhammad with a bomb for a turban was highly effective. But all of the 
cartoons served as a representative anecdote to capture and communicate to a broad 
audience the essence of the narrative that characterizes and condemns the “enemy.”    
Cartooning. Publishing the representative anecdote as cartoons rather than 
linguistically was a highly effective means of activating the frames established in the 
persistent and pervasive rhetoric about Muslims over the last two decades. The 
rhetoric inherent in the images was pregnant with “decivilizing vehicles” that 
characterized the “enemy.” The distorted representation of issues, situations, and 
ideas in the form of cartooning has a long history in the West (Johnson, 1937, p. 21). 
It can be easy to dismiss the importance of cartoons because they are meant to be 
humorous. But the Muhammad cartoons must be seen in the broader context of 
Western stereotyping of adherents to Islam. And it must be recognized that the 
cartoons have been appropriated by a continuation of rhetorical moves that 
characterize and condemn the “enemy.” “The communicative power of cartoons lies 
in their ability to present often-complex issues, events and social trends in a 
simplified and accessible form” (Kleeman, 2006, p. 145). The Muhammad cartoons’ 
capacity to illustrate the, supposed, savagery inherent in the “enemy” made co-opting 
the entire conflict an attractive means of perpetuating the notion of a clash of 
civilizations.  
   
 
176 
Cartoons, “as a form of visual media, ...constitute a major, but sometimes 
underestimated, vehicle for mass communication” (p. 145). The reality is that 
cartoons are a powerful form of communicating ideas. Specifically, for audiences that 
have been exposed to a plethora of antecedent genre permeated by “decivilizing 
vehicles” condemning Muslims and Islam, the probability that the Muhammad 
cartoons would elicit a response of condemnation from observers and predispose 
them to a particular course of action or way of thinking is very high. Rose (2006) 
stated that the intended message of the cartoons, and the turban as a bomb cartoon in 
particular, was not to condemn all Muslims as terrorists but to communicate that 
some elements of Islam have hijacked the religion for evil purposes. If Rose is being 
honest about his intention, then there is a need to consider whether the messages in 
political cartoons travel well across cultures because the message that Muslims are 
terrorists and Islam is intolerant was picked up by many around the world. In fact, the 
cartoons were read that way by many in Western audiences as well. Care needs to be 
taken to ensure that potential readings of political cartoons are limited to the preferred 
reading.  
What is certain is that the cartoon conflict has been annexed by the metaphor 
of terror which drives the clash of civilizations narrative to justify the War on Terror. 
To apprehend the true nature of narrative development in relation to the Muhammad 
Cartoon Controversy, one must approach it bicamerally, that is, one must see that the 
conflict has been commandeered by the broader narrative of the War on Terror, with 
its focus on the clash of civilizations, and as a Danish phenomenon which functioned 
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as a means for Denmark to enhance its identification with the EU, and by extension 
the West. To purify itself from the transgression of rejecting the EU hierarchy 
Denmark had to make sacrifice, a symbolic sacrifice of the scapegoat that had by now 
been ritually prepared for the kill.  
The Kill 
Entelechialization of the cartoon conflict narrative symbolically prepared the 
scapegoat for the ritual sacrifice required to purify Denmark of the transgression of 
rejecting the hierarchy of the EU. Burke (1984b) indicates that the principle of 
redemption requires the “guilt be matched by a principle that is designed for the 
corresponding absolute cancellation of such guilt” (pp. 283-284). In other words, 
absolute redemption can only be achieved through “the sacrifice of a speciously 
‘perfect’ victim, the material embodiment of an ‘idealized’ foe” (p. 288). This ensures 
that the act of purification is equivalent to the degree of guilt.  
 A society purifies itself through moral indignation and condemning the 
“enemy.” Ott and Aoki (2002) articulate three distinct requirements:  
(1) an original state of merger, in that the iniquities are shared by both the 
iniquitous and their chosen vessel; (2) a principle of division, in that elements 
shared in common are being ritualistically alienated; (3) a new principle of 
merger, this time in the unification of those whose purified identity is defined 
in dialectical opposition to the sacrificial offering. (p. 490) 
 
As noted above, from a management perspective, democratic governance and Islamic 
governance are consubstantial in that they are determinative in the type and level of 
freedoms that are afforded to their people. And freedom under both systems is 
limited. From an ideological perspective, based on how the cartoon conflict and the 
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War on Terror are dramatized, the West and Islam suffer from an unquenchable thirst 
for power and control over the world’s masses. On the symbolic altar, the freedoms 
peculiar to Western democracy breaks the original state of merger with Islam that was 
based on the existence of limits on freedom under both systems. Liberal democracy’s 
moral indignation over the absence of Western freedoms condemns and ritually 
alienates Muslims and positions Islam dialectically vis-à-vis the freedoms enjoyed 
under Western democracy, e.g., the Western sacrosanct of freedom of expression.  
To apprehend the cycle of redemption in the context of the Muhammad 
Cartoon Controversy we must gauge it bicamerally, both as a ritual process in relation 
to the War on Terror and as a symbolic process of Danish redemption. Specifically, 
Denmark did penance for the sin of rejecting the hierarchy of the EU, and by 
extension the West, by legislating the most rigid immigration laws in Europe, 
establishing a Danish cannon to counter the spread of Islamic culture in Denmark, 
establishing Danish bilateral foreign policies targeting Muslim countries in order to 
slow or halt the migration of Muslims, and working with the EU on bilateral foreign 
policies targeting the same counties. These actions along with the sentiment that 
“Muslims [should] be driven out [of Denmark] or exterminated” ("Danish Radio 
Station Owner", 2006) sacrificed the “idealized foe” (Burke, 1984b, p. 288) by 
symbolically expunging it from Danish society. Unification with EU identity is 
achieved through Denmark’s purified identity being defined dialectically with Danish 
Muslim identity, completing the cycle of redemption. That is, until a future stumbling 
block is encountered in the hierarchy and Denmark falls again.      
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Lessons Learned 
There are many lessons that can be drawn from the Muhammad Cartoon 
Controversy. But three fundamental issues must be addressed before there can be any 
hope of addressing additional concerns. First, there is a critical need for genuine and 
open dialogue. The cartoon controversy flooded beyond Denmark’s boarders because 
there was no dialogue over the issue of primary concern to Danes, Danish identity. 
The interconnectedness of people around the world inspired Thomas Friedman (2006) 
to pen the book The World is Flat to communicate the notion that there is a high level 
of exchange across civilizations. There is convincing evidence that supports this 
proposition, but not only because of the exportation of Western culture and the flags 
of capitalism that dot the globe, but also because of the cross-culturalization that 
occurs as a result of increased travel by Western students, educators, and others to 
locations beyond the West. They experience different ways of being that enhances 
their worldview. Also, there is the exchange that occurs between peoples of the host 
country and those expatriates who are true students of humanity. This exchange 
produces rich cultural knowledge that does not evaporate when Westerners return to 
their home countries. Yes, technologically and economically the world is flat. But the 
contours of humanity remain varied, rich, and beautiful. And it is our responsibility, 
as moral beings, to engage each other in clear and open dialogue for the betterment of 
humanity.  
Second, there is a serious problem associated with the notion of the “Other.” 
The understanding is, in most cases, that the “Other” is separate, different, and 
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inferior. As noted, the contours of humanity are varied. In other words, it is a fact that 
differences exist and there should be no effort made to cloak those differences, e.g., 
through assimilation and/or hegemonic aspirations. The problem lies in the desire to 
marginalize differences to the realm of invisibility so that concerns of the “Other” are 
not taken seriously, if addressed at all. The idea that the “Other” is inferior is not only 
damaging and demeaning to the target of such misguided thinking, but it is damaging 
in terms of producing a false sense of entitlement that is sustainable only in the short-
term. The false sense of superiority causes psychic imbalance in the individual and 
social imbalance in society that is neither healthy nor productive for either. Social 
imbalances—local, national, or civilizational—throw off the balance of humanity to 
the degree that it cannot advance to fully realize it’s potential.  
Third, there is a critical and dangerous problem associated with “perfecting 
the enemy.” Using “decivilizing vehicles” (Ivie & Giner, 2007) to justify symbolic or 
military warfare pushes the narrative about the “enemy” to the end of the line. 
Entelechializing these narratives pins the “enemy” to a wall leaving no room but to 
fulfill the prophecy of the narrative and exhibit the uncivilized behavior used to 
characterize and condemn. Stripped of his true character and pinned to the wall as the 
“enemy” is, what is there to loose since the perception of his character in the mind of 
the broader public is one of savagery? The thinking could be that savage behavior 
might just allow him to detach himself from the wall to later repair his image through 
countervailing symbols. That is, if the narrator and the subject survive their 
encounter. It is time for us to reflect on the fact that if warfare is truly justified, we do 
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not need to use our symbol system to “create” or “perfect” the enemy. Mastering the 
fundamental lessons of the cartoon controversy will produce rich rewards for 
humanity that outweigh the short-lived spoils of relentless conflict and allow 
humanity to break the, as yet, never-ending cycle of redemption.  
Conclusion 
Art controversies are not new. The melding of the sacred and profane in 
artistic expression is not new and neither are the conflicts that stem from them. What 
is unique about the Muhammad Cartoon Controversy is that it was the first freedom 
of expression controversy involving religious iconography that was global in scope. It 
was the first conflict over freedom of artistic expression that evolved into an 
international public crisis. Other art controversies were localized in scope and though 
debates surrounding some of them became heated and/or violent they were not 
considered a public crisis. It has been argued by many (Keane, 2008; Malek, 2007; 
see, C. Rose, 2006) that the cartoon conflict has not been resolved. The fact that 
Jyllands-Posten continues to reprint the cartoons along with different images of the 
Prophet Muhammad (Hawley, 2007; J. Olsen, 2008) supports the argument that the 
conflict still simmers. But, thankfully, reaction to the publications has not mirrored 
the violent protests of 2006 which swept the globe. How, then, can the lessons of the 
Muhammad Cartoon Controversy be applied to ameliorate future international 
conflicts involving disparate value systems? What follows are some factors for 
consideration.  
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Disequilibrionic Correctives 
Tragic frame or comic frame? Burke (Burke, 1984a) noted that  
our way of approaching the structures of symbolism might be profitably tested 
by the examination of various literary categories, as each of the great poetic 
forms stresses its own peculiar way of building the mental equipment 
(meanings, attitudes, character) by which one handles the significant factors of 
his time. (p. 34) 
 
In literature, tragedy has a bad outcome whereas comedy has a good outcome. Both 
are attributable to some person or persons (Hare & Blumgerg, 1988). What is worth 
considering is that if our “realities” are but selections, as Burke (1969a, p. 59) noted, 
then we have a choice in the selections made to construct our realities. We can choose 
not only what is reflected but also what is deflected. By our “selections” we 
determine the frame through which events are dramatized. The tragic frame deals 
with “crime—and any incipient trend will first be felt as crime, by reason of its 
conflict with the established values” (Burke, 1984a, p. 39). Dramatization of the 
Muhammad Cartoon Controversy, as well as the narratives that co-opted the 
phenomenon, developed through a tragic frame of condemnation and ridicule—a 
frame that Burke associated with war (p. v). Conversely, Burke (1984a) associated 
the comic frame with peace (p. v). The comic frame “warns against the dangers of 
pride” since 
When you add that people are necessarily mistaken, that all people are 
exposed to situations in which they must act as fools, that every insight 
contains its own special kind of blindness,…you return again to the lesson of 
humility. (p. 41, emphasis in original) 
 
The comic frame permits the global community to deal with the shortcomings of 
“mistaken” thoughts and actions from a place of humility since at some point each 
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one will be “mistaken” and be in need of compassion. The comic frame offers hope 
for better conditions and an opportunity for the “mistaken” to make corrections 
through clear and open dialogue within the community. Unlike the tragic frame which 
condemns and scapegoats, the comic frame recognizes the limitations and 
imperfections inherent in humankind. It permits disparate civilizations to unify and 
form a community based on the shared condition of fallibility.  
Although many agree and historical record proves that there is a critical need 
to reform the way social situations and conditions are dramatized, it is expected that 
there will be some resistance to change. Edward Said (Jhally, 1998) said of Samuel 
Huntington that he is 
so strong and insistent…[on the] notion that other civilizations necessarily 
clash with the West and so relentlessly aggressive and chauvinistic is his 
prescription for what the West must do to continue winning [that] his readers 
are forced to conclude that Huntington is most interested in continuing and 
expanding the Cold War by other means rather than advancing ideas that 
might help us to understand the current world scene or ideas that would try to 
reconcile between cultures…I go so far as saying that it [the clash thesis] 
argues from a standpoint of Pentagon planners and defense industry 
executives who may have temporarily lost their occupations after the end of 
the Cold War but have now found a new vocation for themselves. (1998) 
 
It has been noted that efforts to sustain one’s career over concern for the common 
good is not peculiar to defense executives and Pentagon planners. Robert F. Kennedy, 
Jr. (2008) spoke about what he observed in his work as an environmental lawyer: 
it’s hard to convince a man of a truth if knowing that truth is going to interfere 
with his salary. I think people put their self-interest ahead of the public and 
there’s an economic law that describes that dynamic. And the law is called the 
Tragedy of the Commons and what that law says is that all of us human 
beings acting in their own self-interest will destroy the commons. In other 
words, it is in your interest to catch the last fish in the ocean even though it 
means there will be no fish for nobody else. But if you don’t catch it 
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somebody else is going to. Free market capitalism works with private property 
but it doesn’t work in the commons. It doesn’t work in the public trust area. 
(2008) 
 
What Pentagon planners, defense industry executives, and other professionals fail to 
recognize is that new approaches to how conflict is managed does not necessarily 
mean that their careers are in jeopardy. Just as, according to Said (Jhally, 1998), 
defense analysts and decision makers made a new vocation for themselves by 
developing the clash of civilizations thesis, so too, they can envision a different post-
Cold War approach to the global situation. But, if they are unwilling to explore ways 
to reconcile between cultures then they have identified themselves as part of the 
problem rather than part of the solution. The common good of the global society 
depends on each of us setting aside our own self-interest.  
History testifies to the horrors that errant symbol systems have brought upon 
humanity. As a corrective, the comic frame grants license to make terminological  
“selections” (Burke, 1969b) of reality that promote peace, harmony, and goodwill 
across civilizations.  “Selections” of “reality” that reflect violence and dominion 
deflect “realities” that promote goodwill between cultures. They deflect the rich and 
beautiful cultural heritages and histories that are unique to each civilization. They 
deflect the heights that humanity can reach only through peace and cooperation across 
civilizations. “Selections” of “realities” that uplift humanity are more potent than 
“selections” that divide and ruin. Burke (1984a) encouraged us to see that “the 
progress of humane enlightenment can go no further than in picturing people not as 
vicious, but as mistaken” (p. 41, emphasis in original). Humanity’s achievement of its 
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greatest potential is not possible through domination of one civilization over others. It 
is imperative that we recognize and accept that how we choose to use our symbol 
system is determinative in the outcome of a tragic or comic frame of events.  
Self fulfilling prophecy. Regardless of our choice, we should recognize that 
our choice of symbols used to dramatize events and describe people is determinative 
in the outcome realized. The notion of the self-fulfilling prophecy is based on the 
Thomas Theorem (Thomas & Thomas, 1928) which was reformulated by Robert 
Merton (1968) and states that “the self-fulfilling prophecy is, in the beginning, a false 
definition of the situation evoking a new behavior which makes the originally false 
conception come true” (p. 423). Whether the presumed definition of the situation 
happens to be actually false has been debated (Krishna, 1971) but that debate is not 
taken up here. What is important, for purposes of this study, is that the power of 
rhetoric defines situations and produces real outcomes. There is an indivisible 
connection between the concepts of entelechy and the self-fulfilling prophecy. In 
other words, the symbols we use affect the way consciousness conceives of a 
situation which is a vital force that directs an organism or phenomenon toward self-
fulfillment. Acknowledgement of the strength of our symbols should goad us to use 
rhetoric responsibly for the betterment of society.  
Today’s global society. Symbolic disequilibrium manifests itself as 
disequilibrium in society at the local, national, and global level. Disequilibrium will 
always produce a tragic outcome. Among the myriad societal examples of errant 
symbol systems are the horrors of slavery, the atrocities of the Holocaust, the explicit 
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disequilibrium of the American Jim Crow system, and the ongoing catastrophe that is 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Further, if we consider the fact that “for the 21st 
century, the continued exponential growth in science and technology raises both 
hopes (e.g., advances in medicine) and fears (e.g., development of even more lethal 
weapons of war)” (C.I.A., 2008), the fear that our rhetorical power can be outmatched 
only by our technological capacity should move us to develop a symbol system that 
permits meaningful dialogue. This is particularly true since conflicts over issues of 
value have the potential to develop into military conflicts. Our rhetorical capacity to 
create situations that can lead to military conflict should encourage us to fashion non-
violent ways to rhetorically address issues of value. A first step in developing 
meaningful dialogue is to accept that the world is continually changing and moving 
toward greater interconnectedness and transnationalism that is, aided by technology, 
immediate.  
Increased immigration has caused some Western countries to change their 
laws in order to alter immigration patterns. Nevertheless, a growing number of states 
are no longer mono-cultural societies. What is unique about present-day immigration 
patterns vis-à-vis previous migratory influxes is the change in circumstances that 
brings foreigners to the host country. Unlike, for example, the myriad of involuntary 
immigrants that arrived in the West as slaves or immigrants fleeing war-torn Europe 
who arrived on America shores, many of today’s immigrants make a conscious, 
unrushed selection of their destination. This affects how they perceive fitting into 
their new country. Today’s globally connected migrants bring with them a broader 
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view of the world, and greater expectations of humanity and their new country. This 
makes marginalizing the “Other” to the realm of invisibility more difficult, if not 
impossible. What this means is that problem solving rhetorical skill and non-violent 
symbol systems are imperative. Acceptance of the need for meaningful dialogue is a 
first step on the path of achieving equilibrium. A second step is to examine the 
available means for resolving issues of value through dialogue and reason.   
Two constitutionally protected rights. The law protects speech in order to 
safeguard the functions that freedom of speech enables a society to fulfill. And 
religious freedom has also been protected by the law for a long time. Blasphemy is 
one of the oldest crimes known to Man and is still a serious offense in many 
jurisdictions. Depending on the jurisdiction, blasphemy laws range from the 
protection of the dignity of God himself, to protecting the truth of a religious belief, 
to protection of the feelings and sensibilities of a religious group (Post, 2007, pp. 337-
338). Freedom of speech and freedom of religion are two constitutionally protected 
rights. The question is how the state interest in protecting religious freedom can be 
balanced with the state interest in the freedom of speech necessary to serve the 
functions of society. There is an obvious conflict between protecting the marketplace 
of ideas and excluding sacrilegious discourse from the public square. The challenge 
of balancing speech and religious rights can lead to situations where cases are not 
decided on the issue. As we saw in the Nussenzweig ("Nussenzweig v. Philip-Lorca 
diCorcia, et al.," 2007 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3636) case the decision was arrived at 
on a procedural ground.  
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At the global level, similar but more complex issues affect freedom of 
expression vs. freedom of religion cases. International and regional human rights 
covenants can yield few protections for religious freedom because the provisions of 
the international instruments may conflict with the of laws state. And even in counties 
where blasphemy laws exist, protections may not be possible through international 
instruments due to the direction of socio-political currents in a given country. The 
implication is that though serious efforts are made to resolve issues involving 
sacrosanct values addressing them legally presents significant challenges. Therefore, 
efforts to ensure clear and open dialogue as a means of resolving issues must include 
a plan to develop non-violent symbols and other rhetorical strategies.   
Civilizing the “decivilizing vehicles.” The purpose of “decivilizing vehicles” 
is to characterize and condemn an enemy in a rhetorical campaign. Efforts to “perfect 
the enemy” through rhetoric that employs “decivilizing vehicles” is a violent and 
dangerous means that can only lead to a tragic outcome. Characterizing the “Other” in 
a way that “justifies” marginalization of targeted groups is a form of violence that 
also characterizes and condemns. This practice, by definition, functions as a 
“decivilizing vehicle” that operates in rhetoric that pushes the narrative to the end of 
the line, pinning the “Other” to a wall and requiring him to defend against 
destruction. Destructive symbols must be replaced by non-violent language that 
permits dialogue and understanding.   
Ultimate terms are as ultimate terms do. In Western thought it is well 
established that “democracy” functions as a “god-term” (Weaver, 1985, p. 228). 
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However, on the “Charlie Rose” show (C. Rose, 2006), Kleine-Brockhoff’s argued 
that the term democracy is associated with what is repugnant for particular circles 
within Islam because of its association with blasphemy. The caution is that if 
blasphemy maintains its association with democracy, democracy could become a 
“devil-term” for a broader segment of Muslim society. What this means is that 
dialogue on issues of values is critical and will become more essential for a healthy 
global society as humanity becomes more interconnected. Kleine-Brockhoff’s 
statement raises an interesting question. Does the global nature of society in the 21st
Though the seeds of democracy were sown in ancient Greece and throughout 
history have reflected the evolutionary intellectual patrimony of all mankind, 
they flowered first in modern form in the West and it is upon U.S. soil that 
they have fully sprouted and taken root. Precisely for this reason, then, only 
within America is American democracy possible, for it cannot be isolated 
 
century require new/improved “god-terms”?  
First, let us reflect on an existing “god-term.” Gene Heck (2007) wrote about 
democracy as a conundrum that must be contemplated. He stated that 
For today, while there is indeed a tendency to view unbundled Anglo-
American democracy as a political paradigm aspired to, and usable, by all, 
there remain critical questions as to whether it is exportable to other 
cultures...when it comes to governance, therefore, it may well be that “one 
size does not fit all,” as democracy is not, as some presume, a “natural and 
normal condition of all mankind” (p. 111) 
 
The fundamental differences between the value systems of the West and Islam 
naturally give rise to different perceptions. The notion that “one size does not fit all” 
speaks to the probable reason why “democracy” could be associated with blasphemy 
in the mind of some Muslims. Heck (2007) gave the reason why the United States 
should not aspire to be the moral exemplar to the Islamic world by stating that 
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from America’s traditions and her values…While to Western observers, then, 
the “problem with Islam” may appear to be a noticeable paucity of 
freedoms—freedom to inquire, freedom from indoctrination and constraint, 
freedom from pervasive economic corruption and mismanagement—
therefore, the reality is that the road to the liberating democracy that they put 
forth as a panacea comes strewn with pitfalls, both ideological and 
institutional. (p. 112) 
 
American democracy is well suited for America. And Heck provides a cogent 
rationale on why divergent values held by the West and the Middle East means that 
democracy does not function as a “god-term” in Islam. Richard Weaver (1985) 
posited that  
it is the nature of the conscious life of man to revolve around some concept of 
value…he has to know where he is in the ideological cosmos in order to 
coordinate his activities. Probably the greatest cruelty which can be inflicted 
upon the psychic man is this deprivation of a sense of tendency. (p. 213) 
 
The interconnectedness and immediate transnationalism that occurs in today’s global 
society means that we need ultimate terms that can be shared across civilizations 
which help humanity coordinate its activities. Respect and responsibility are two 
terms that, if raised to the level of ultimate terms, can assist in the coordination of 
important human activities. These terms can help to change they way that we interact 
so that clear and open dialogue between civilizations can occur. If symbol systems are 
developed in the spirit of respect and responsibility it will be difficult to develop 
narratives pregnant with “decivilizing vehicles.” And as a result fewer “enemies” 
would be “created.” Respect and responsibility can change how the “Other” is 
perceived, from different, separate, and inferior to different, integrated, and valued. 
Operating from a place of respect and responsibility would mean that courts would be 
faced with fewer cases involving competing constitutional rights because open and 
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clear dialogue would occur between members of our global society in responsible and 
respectful manner. Respect and responsibility would move humanity toward a self-
fulfilling prophecy with a comic frame rather than a tragic frame. Respect and 
responsibility, as “god-terms” for today’s global society, would help humanity 
ameliorate future international conflicts involving disparate sacrosanct values. The 
Martinique poet Aimé Césaire (1968) helped us to appreciate that “no race possesses 
the monopoly of beauty, of intelligence, of force. And there is a place for all at the 
rendezvous of victory.”  
Summary of the Study 
In this project I applied several rhetorical methods and tools to investigate 
three types of rhetorical artifacts: official communications, interviews of Flemming 
Rose, and televised broadcasts. A close textual reading of each artifact was critical to 
a rigorous investigation. Specifically, Kenneth Burke’s (1969a) pentad was employed 
to make manifest the motivations of key parties involved at the genesis and nexus of 
the conflict. Frame analysis (Goffman, 1974) was utilized to investigate the 
interviews of Flemming Rose to expose how these dramatizations differed from those 
of the official communications. In addition to frame analysis, application of Walter 
Fisher’s (1984) concepts of “narrative probability” and “narrative fidelity” informed 
the investigation by providing insight into the level of coherence and believability 
associated with interpretations of the conflict.  
Several tools contributed to addressing the critical problem associated with the 
televised broadcasts. Strategic frame analysis, conceived by Zhongdang Pan and 
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Gerald M. Kosicki (2001), uncovered the rhetorical moves made by interlocutors in 
order to win arguments and advance their interpretation of events. In addition, 
Burke’s (1973) notion of the scapegoat provided insight into how victimage was used 
in the dramatization of events. And finally, Richard Weaver’s (1985) concepts of 
“god” and “devil” terms showed how the use of ultimate terms were employed to 
intensify dramatizations of the cartoon conflict. Important features of how the 
Muhammad Cartoon Controversy was dramatized by different parties at different 
narrative stages of the conflict are exposed in this study. 
The study is exploratory rather than comprehensive in that it seeks to 
investigate how the cartoon conflict narrative developed over time. This study 
investigates the nature of the narrative at each stage of development in order to reveal 
the new direction of interpretations. A comprehensive investigation of rhetorical 
artifacts surrounding the controversy would be unwieldy for this type of study. And 
based on the large number of artifacts that I have collected over the years, a 
comprehensive study of nearly any type would be unmanageable. However, a study 
narrowing particular artifacts by category (e.g., the blogosphere; and media outside of 
Europe, America, and Arab world, e.g., Muslims protested in Senegal and China) 
could convey important knowledge on how the conflict was dramatized. This is 
particularly relevant since our increasingly global society is attended by ever 
increasing cross-cultural interaction making it imperative for us to envision and 
implement improved rhetorical strategies for interacting anywhere in the world in a 
way that will yield non-violent (rhetorical and physical) results.  
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The post-Cold War situation of the world has been called different things by 
different scholars and commentators: the clash of civilizations by Huntington and 
Lewis (1993, 1996; 1990, respectively), the clash of definitions by Edward Said 
(Jhally, 1998), the clash of imperialisms by Eko and Berkowitz (Eko & Berkowitz, 
2007). But, regardless of what the situation is called, what is clear is that improved 
rhetorical strategies are needed to ameliorate future international conflicts involving 
disparate sacrosanct values. This study reveals how the West pushed the Muhammad 
Cartoon Controversy narrative to the end of the line for American audiences. But, no 
civilization is innocent of entelechializing narratives for the purpose of characterizing 
and condemning their “enemy.” The exigency of the situation is a call to action for 
each to use rhetoric responsibly and be respectful of others in today’s global society. 
As symbol-making, symbol-using animals (Burke, 1966, p. 16) we determine the 
symbols employed in our rhetoric and thereby have the power and a license to 
envision a comic frame for our narratives.  
 
And the word was a god. 
                      --John 1:1 
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APPENDIX 
Access the Rhetorical Artifacts Online 
Official communications. 
1) Letter from eleven Muslim Ambassadors to Prime Minister Anders Fogh 
Rasmussen requesting a meeting, October 12, 2005  
http://www.filtrat.dk/grafik/Letterfromambassadors.pdf [Letter] 
2) Reply from Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen concerning the meeting 
request, October 21, 2005  
http://gfx-master.tv2.dk/images/Nyhederne/Pdf/side3.pdf [Letter] 
3) Flemming Rose on Why I Published Those Cartoons, Jyllands-Posten, 
February 19, 2006 
http://www.jp.dk/english_news/artikel:aid=3566642/ [Newspaper Article] 
4) January 1, 2006 New Year’s address to the Danish people by Danish Prime 
Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen 
http://www.stm.dk/Index/dokumenter.asp?o=6&n=0&d=2468&s=2 [Speech] 
Interviews. 
5)  “The Situation Room” interview of Flemming Rose, cultural editor of 
Jyllands-Posten, February 7, 2006  
http://web.lexis-
nexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/universe/document?_m=aea7897216764dc3
b63e32a9cb7dd3f7&_docnum=3&wchp=dGLbVlb-
zSkVb&_md5=afb4c0fc9458c65fe4ebd82918bcc8c4 [Transcript] 
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6) Alia Malek interview of Flemming Rose in the Columbia Journalism Review,  
March/ April 2007  
Columbia Journalism Review, 45, 18-19. No hyperlink available. 
Television broadcasts 
7)  “Charlie Rose,” February 9, 2006  
http://web.lexis-
nexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/universe/document?_m=aea7897216764dc3
b63e32a9cb7dd3f7&_docnum=7&wchp=dGLbVlb-
zSkVb&_md5=a2765dfd81bf1e8669591eddced935b8 [Transcript] 
 
http://www.charlierose.com/view/interview/545 [Online video; the DVD used 
in the analyses of the present study is available for purchase from 
Amazon.com]  
 
8) “60 Minutes,” February 19, 2006  
http://www.lexisnexis.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/us/lnacademic/search/hom
esubmitForm.do [Transcript] 
 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/02/17/60minutes/main1329944.shtml 
[Online video; the DVD used in the analyses of the present study is available 
for purchase from Amazon.com]  
 
 
 
 
 
